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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the relationship between the provincial Crown and Aboriginal 
peoples in the particular context of the prairie provinces to determine whether or not it can 
be described as fiduciary and, if so, what obligations arise from it. 
While very fewjudicial decisions have dealt with this specific issue, an analysis ofthe 
existing jurisprudence suggests that there are two types of fiduciary relationships in which 
Aboriginal peoples are involved. The first type is a manifestation of the more traditional 
fiduciary concept. It is similar to classic fiduciary situations, such as doctorlpatient, 
directorlcorporation, partnerlpartner, in which a fiduciary having control over the property 
or person of another must act in that other person's best interests. In the Aboriginal context, 
the power of the federal Crown over surrendered Indian reserve lands and over Indian 
moneys is limited by its fiduciary obligations of this traditional type. The second type is 
unique to the situation of Aboriginal peoples. It arises out of the constitutional protection 
provided to Aboriginal and treaty rights and gives rise to obligations that limit the 
jurisdiction of federal and provincial governments over them. 
This thesis concludes that the provincial Crown in the prairie provinces possesses no 
fiduciary obligations arising directly out of its relationship with First Nations peoples, in the 
classic fiduciary sense, because history and the Constitution have established that that 
relationship is with the federal Crown. Provincial fiduciary obligations are limited to those 
arising from the constitutional protection of Aboriginal and treaty rights and thus arise only 
in respect of constitutionally valid provincial laws that infringe on such rights. In 
Saskatchewan, the only infringing provincial laws that are possible are those made under the 
authority provided by paragraph 12 of the Natural Resources Transfer Agreement, 1930, 
which authorizes Saskatchewan to make limited laws relating to hunting, fishing and 
trapping applicable to Indians. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
In 169 1, Henry Kelsey, a British explorer, became the first white man to set eyes on 
the Saskatchewan River.' Less than 25 years later, in 171 3, the Imperial English Crown had 
entered into the first of the peace and friendship treaties with Aboriginal peoples.2 Not long 
afterwards, in 1726, the Chancery Court rendered its decision in what has become the 
leading case establishing the idea that fiduciary obligations arise out of fiduciary 
re la t i~nsh i~s .~  However, while the relationship between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples 
was initially established at about the same time as was the judicial recognition of the fiduciary 
concept in English law, it was not until more than 250 years later, in 1984, that the Supreme 
Court of Canada determined that the fundamental nature or character of this relationship 
'Marjorie Wilkins Campbell, "The Saskatchewan", in Dennis Gruending, ed., The 
Middle ofhiowhere: Rediscovering Saskatchewan (Saskatoon: Fifth House Publishers, 1996) 
8 at 9. 
2The first of the peace and friendship treaties was entered into in what is now Canada 
at Saint John River, N.B., according to B. Wildsmith, "Pre-Confederation Treaties," in B. 
Morse, ed. Aboriginal Peoples and the Law (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1991) at 
122. The first such treaty in North America was at Massachusetts Bay in 1693. 
3Keech v. Sandford (1726), Sel. Cas. T. King 61, (1726) 25 E.R. 223. The case 
involved a dispute between an infant and the trustee of the estate of the infant's deceased 
father. The trustee had personally taken a lease of certain of the infant's property, when no 
other lessee was available. His intentions were honourable, but the court held that he had 
breached a fundamental fiduciary obligation of all trustees to avoid putting themselves in a 
position where their personal interests and their fiduciary duties could be in conflict. 
between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples was f id~ciary .~  
A fiduciary relationship is one in which the fiduciary, who is the party in the 
relationship in a position of power, is obliged to exercise that power on behalf and for the 
benefit of the other party, who is known as the beneficiary. It is this power in the hands of 
the fiduciary and powerlessness in the hands of the beneficiary, and the undertaking of the 
former to act on behalf of the latter, that is at the core of the fiduciary construct. Not 
surprisingly, then, the fiduciary construct is one that arises in equity, and equity holds the 
fiduciary to a very high standard of c o n d ~ c t . ~  As a result, duties, called fiduciary obligations, 
The case was Guerin v. R., [I9841 2 S.C.R. 335, [I9841 6 W.W.R. 481 [hereinafter 
Guerin cited to W.W.R.]. 
'According to Lord Herschel1 in Bray v. Ford, [I 8961 A.C. 44 at 5 1 (H.L.): 
It is an inflexible rule of a Court of Equity that a person in a fiduciary 
position ... is not, unless otherwise expressly provided, entitled to make a 
profit; he is not allowed to put himself in a position where his interest and 
duty conflict. 
This inflexibility has its origins in the judgment of the Lord Chancellor in Keech v. Sandford, 
supra note 3 (as quoted in Terra Energy Ltd. v. Kilborn Engineering Alberta Ltd., (1 997), 
198 A.R. 241, at para 93 (Q.B.) [hereinafter Terra Energy]): 
I must consider this as a trust for the infant; for I very well see, if a trustee, 
on the refusal to renew, might have a lease to himself, few trust-estates 
would be renewed to cestui que use; though I do not say there is a fraud in 
this case, yet he should rather have let it run out, than to have had the 
lease to himself. This may seem hard, that the trustee is the only person of 
all mankind who might not have the lease: but it is very proper that rule 
should be strictly pursued, and not in the least relaxed. [emphasis added] 
arise out of such relationships. The precise nature and scope of those obligations varies with 
the relationship out of which they arise.6 In the case of the fiduciary relationship between 
the Crown and Aboriginal peoples, the judicial definition of the fiduciary obligations arising 
out of it has been slowly occurring since 1984, as cases come before the Supreme Court of 
Canada in which fiduciary claims are advanced by Aboriginal peoples. 
61n Terra Energy, ibid, the plaintiff argued that the existence of a fiduciary 
relationship is not a necessary prerequisite to finding that one party in a relationship owes 
the other party a fiduciary obligation. The trial judge, Mr. Justice Cairns said, in this regard, 
at para. 103 : 
After considering a vast body of case law and academic articles I cannot 
agree with the Plaintiffs novel characterization of the law, It is trite law tlzat 
fiduciary obligations and duties can only arise as an incidence of a 
fiduciary relationship. [emphasis added] 
This principle was confirmed by the Alberta Court of Appeal, [I9991 6 W. W.R. 483, 
at para. 26, which stated: 
The law with respect to the fiduciary principle, although in a state of 
evolution, has constantly held that fiduciary obligations arise out of fiduciary 
relationships. 
(An application for leave to appeal this case to the Supreme Court of Canada was 
dismissed with costs, [I9991 S.C.C.A. No. 3 16.) 
Professor Robert Flannigan argues for a greater emphasis on the hc t i ons  performed 
by the fiduciary rather than the particular class of relationship involved. His approach 
identifies common threads that connect various categories of fiduciaries, and is a useful 
means for examining the nature of the specific obligations that arise out of the fiduciary 
relationship. It is these h c t i o n s  that give the fiduciary power over the beneficiary's 
property or person and it is because the fiduciary wields this power that fiduciary obligations 
arise. However, his argument calls for an analysis of the components of the relationship, not 
for abandoning the connection between the relationship, and the power it provides to the 
fiduciary, and replacing the requirement for the relationship with free-floating obligations. 
See "Fiduciary Regulation of Sexual Exploitation", The Canadian Bar Review, Vol. 79 No. 
3, 301-3 14 at 307-308. 
To date, most of the cases decided in the Supreme Court of Canada that deal with 
the issue of the fiduciary obligations of the Crown, do so in the context of the justification 
of federal laws that interfere with Aboriginal  right^.^ In that context, the fiduciary 
relationship produces an obligation that acts as a restraint or limit on the exclusive legislative 
jurisdiction provided to Parliament under s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867 to make 
laws in relation to "Indians"' and their lands. This limitation results because, since the 
Aboriginal and treaty rights of Aboriginal peoples are recognized and affirmed by the 
constitution, Parliament cannot be permitted the whimsical control over them that s. 9 l(24) 
might otherwise be taken to suggest9 Equity, therefore, provides the necessary brake on 
that strictly legal power and, originally in the absence of politics,I0 secures the larger goal of 
7See, for example, R. v. Sparrow, [I9901 1 S.C.R. 1075, [I9901 4 W.W.R. 410 
[hereinafter Sparrow cited to W.W.R.], R. v. Van der Peet, [I9961 2 S.C.R. 507; R. v. Cdte', 
[I9961 3 S.C.R. 139; R. v. Adams, [I9961 3 S.C.R. 101; R. v. Gladstone, [I9961 2 S.C.R. 
723; R. v. N. T.C. Smokehouse Ltd., [I9961 2 S.C.R. 672; By contrast, R. v. Badger, [I9961 
1 S.C.R. 771, [I9961 4 W.W.R. 457 [hereinafter Badger], deals with the infringement of 
a treaty right by provincial legislation enacted under the constitutional authority of the 
Natural Resources Transfer Agreement. A number of decisions mention the fiduciary 
relationship but do not provide any analysis of it. 
'1 use the term "Indian" because that is the language of s. 91 (24). Throughout this 
thesis I use "Indian" when I am referring to the s. 91(24) context. 
g"Whimsical" in the sense that the federal government takes the position that it can 
exercise jurisdiction under s. 91(24), or not, as it chooses. 
"Politics was not available to Aboriginal peoples who were powerless and kept that 
way through the assimilationist policies of Canada's first century. From its first enactment 
as a consolidation and expansion of all laws relating to Indians in 1876, until 195 1, the 
Indian Act prohibited Indians from setting foot off the reserve without the permission of the 
local Indian agent; Indian bands were prohibited fiom hiring lawyers to pursue their claims; 
Indians could not vote (until 1960), serve in combat, or get an education, without ceasing 
to be "Indian". Since the Crown took to itself control over Indians and their lands and since 
it persisted in policies that perpetuated dependence, including withholding the right to vote, 
justice or fairness for Aboriginal peoples within the Canadian community. As the Supreme 
Court of Canada said in R. v. Sparrow, "federal power must be reconciled with federal 
duty1'. ' ' 
The reconciliation to which the Court was referring is the reconciliation of exclusive 
federal power with constitutionally-protected rights. According to the Court, the existence 
of s. 91(24) implies that the Aboriginal and treaty rights protected by s. 35 of the 
Constitution Act, 1982 are not absolute. If not absolute, these rights can be infringed, but, 
because of the fiduciary duty, they may only be infringed where the infringing legislation can 
be justified. For this reason, the Crown must prove that the infringing legislation seeks to 
secure valid legislative objectives in amanner that minimally impairs the protected right and 
by the use of a process that provides an opportunity for the holders of the right to have input 
into the legislative initiative, so as to allow them their preferred means of exercising their 
rights. This notion of reconciliation of power and duty is the first hint in the jurisprudence 
that fiduciary obligations can only exist where the Crown wields legislative power in relation 
to Aboriginal peoples. 
it was not possible for a political dynamic to develop. And, throughout the treaty-making 
period on the prairies, as the herds of bison declined, the federal government regularly used 
the method of withholding rations from a starving people as a means of "bringing the people 
into line". (See Olive Patricia Dickason, Canada's First Nations: A History of Founding 
Peoples from Earliest Times (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1992) at 300.) The 
fiduciary construct in this context is, in many respects, a substitute for the practical 
limitations on strictly legal power that a political dynamic provides. 
"R.  v. Sparrow, supra note 7 at 43 5. 
Critics of this reasoning argue that rights that are constitutionally recognized and 
affirmed ought to be absolute. They point to the fact that s. 35, which provides for this 
recognition and affirmation, falls outside the Charter portion of the Constitution Act, 1982, 
which is explicitly subject, by virtue of s. 1, to reasonable limits prescribed by law that can 
be demonstrably justified. If Charter rights are thus explicitly circumscribed, then, the 
argument goes, the lack of such explicit limitation surrounding the rights described in s. 35, 
as part of the same legislative document as the Charter, suggests that those rights are indeed 
absolute. 
However, the Court has turned that argument around, saying that the continued 
existence of s. 9 l(24) after the enactment of s. 35 is effectively a specific limitation. In other 
words, the explicit language of s. 1 of the Charter was not necessary in relation to s. 35 
because sufficiently explicit language was already present in s. 9 l(24). If Parliament retains 
authority to legislate in relation to "Indians and Indian Lands", it must be, then, the argument 
goes, a power with some substantive content. 
While it must be accepted that one provision ofthe constitution cannot be interpreted 
so as to nullify another, the necessary reconciliation between s. 35 and s. 91(24) is also 
possible by finding that s. 9 l(24) reserves to Parliament the power to makes laws in relation 
to Indians and their lands, but only if those laws do not impair their constitutionally protected 
rights. The Court has apparently concluded, however, that the collective rights protected 
by s. 35 ought to receive no greater deference than the individual rights protected by the 
Charter. 
The concept of immutable rights, at least in the possession of individuals in society, 
seems something of an anathema to Anglo-Canadian jurisprudence. The Canadian Charter 
establishes individual rights only as presumptive, always subject to the greater interest ofthe 
collective public good over that of the individual. In some respects, the existence of s. 1 of 
the Charter permits Canadian judges to be more honest than their American counterparts in 
that the finding that a Charter right has been infringed does not necessarily result in the 
infringing law being struck down; it merely moves the discussion to a different question: is 
there a greater public good being served by the infringing law to which individual rights 
ought to be sacrificed? The rights protected by s. 35, however, are collective rights, and the 
balancing that must occur in this context is not just between the claims of individuals as 
against the public good, but also between the claims of one segment of Canadian society as 
against others. 
In the s. 3 5 context the establishment of a fiduciary relationship provides a convenient 
vocabulary for reconciliation of two apparently disparate, and even contradictory, portions 
of the constitution. But, the fiduciary relationship is not essential to that analysis. The mere 
fact that s. 91(24) and s. 35 exist together requires a reconciliation, whether or not it is 
fiduciary, that inevitably will result in limitations on the exercise by Parliament of legislative 
authority under s. 91 (24). The fiduciary path of reconciliation that the Court has chosen has 
limited both parliamentary authority and the scope of the constitutional protection of s. 35 
rights. And it has at least one other consequence as well: inexorably, one must conclude that 
the fiduciary relationship is itself rooted in the constitution. 
Thus the Court has held that the entrenchment ofAboriginal and treaty rights through 
their constitutional protection requires that the apparently unfettered federal power to 
legislate affecting Aboriginal peoples and their lands must be limited or controlled when the 
exercise (or arguably even non-exerciseL2) of federal power infringes unjustifiably on those 
rights. The corollary is also true: existing Aboriginal and treaty rights, although 
constitutionally recognized and affirmed, may be interfered with by laws that can be justified. 
However, the question posed originally in Guerin was the question of how the 
Crown's conduct, other than as manifested in the enactment of legislation, can be measured 
against the fiduciary standard that Guerin declared to exist. In response to this question, the 
Supreme Court of Canada has only considered three cases since its decision in Guerin. 
In the case of Ontario (Attorney General) v. Bear Island FoundationI3, the plaintiff 
Indian Band claimed that it retained a right of possession to a large tract of land in Ontario, 
'*I first wrote these words in a preliminary draft prepared in July 1997. 
Subsequently, what seemed to many (and perhaps still does) a far-fetched notion was 
accepted by the Supreme Court of Canada in its decision in the reference cases relating to 
the remuneration of Provincial Court Judges, [I9971 3 S.C.R. 3. There the court held that 
legislatures must enact a particular type of legislation relating to the determination ofjudges' 
salaries in order to preserve their judicial independence. 
13[1991] 2 S.C.R. 570, [I9911 3 C.N.L.R. 79. 
based on its Aboriginal title to the land. The Court held that an Aboriginal title in the land 
had indeed existed, but it had been extinguished when the Band adhered to the Robinson- 
Huron Treaty of 1850. However, as the Court stated: 
It is conceded that the Crown has failed to comply with some of its 
obligations under this agreement [the Robinson-Huron Treaty of 18501, and 
thereby breached its fiduciary obligations to the Indians.I4 
In R. v. Lewis1', the Aboriginal plaintiffs claimed that the Crown breached its 
fiduciary obligations by failing to include a fishery within the boundaries of a particular 
reserve. The court held that "any fiduciary obligation on the part of the Crown [that may 
have existed] to secure access to the fishery . . . was honoured by providing fishing 
 station^"'^ for the plaintiffs' use. Neither of these cases entered into any detailed analysis of 
the fiduciary relationship or the obligations flowing from it, other than to assert that they 
both existed. 
I4Ibid at para. 7.  Some commentators argue that because the provincial Crown was 
the party to this litigation that the case implicitly acknowledges provincial fiduciary 
obligations, when it said at para. 7, "It is conceded that the Crown has failed to comply with 
some of its obligations under this agreement, and thereby breached its fiduciary obligations 
to the Indians. These matters currently form the subject of negotiations between the 
parties." The "parties" to the litigation included only the provincial Crown. Of course, the 
reason for this was that the Bear Island Foundation had, on behalf of the Temagami Band 
of Indians, registered cautions or caveats against a large tract of land in Ontario on the basis 
that its Aboriginal title had not been surrendered. The province initiated the litigation to 
have the cautions removed, but engaged in negotiations, which ultimately failed. 
15[1996] 1 S.C.R. 921, [I9961 5 W.W.R. 348. 
I6Ibid at para. 52. 
In the case of Blueberry River Indian Band v. Canada (Department ofIndian Affairs 
and Northern De~e lo~ment ) '~  the court established an intention-based approach to 
determining questions of fiduciary failure in the case of surrender of reserve lands, although, 
paradoxically, it didn't attempt to place that approach in the fiduciary context.'' It also held 
that the failure by federal authorities to rectify an error in a transfer of surrendered land that 
inadvertently included mineral rights, when they had the power to do so under the Indian Act 
at the time, was a breach of the Crown's fiduciary obligations (raising the question of 
whether Parliament's failure to legislate toprovide the legal power to do so would have also 
been a breach of its fiduciary obligations). On the other hand, the Apsassin decision accepts 
unquestioningly the application of a legislated limitation period, without asking whether the 
fiduciary obligations of the Crown might prevent Parliament from enacting limitations 
legislation at all in relation to cases of its own fiduciary breaches.I9 
17[1995] 4 S.C.R. 344 [hereinafter Apsassin]. 
"The idea of looking to the intention of the Indians involved has the superficial allure 
of deference to their wishes, but may in fact be an approach that results in the acceptance of 
decisions and actions by the Crown as fiduciary that are contrary to the interests of the 
Indians as the beneficiary in the fiduciary relationship. Normally, one would understand such 
conduct to be a breach of fiduciary duty. In fact, in any other fiduciary relationship the 
fiduciary has no obligation to defer to the wishes of the beneficiary; the fiduciary obligation 
is to act in the beneficiary's best interests, whether or not that corresponds to the 
beneficiary's wishes. Of course, the fiduciary relationship with Aboriginal peoples is also 
described as sui generis, and in that sense, it appears that this is one of the unique 
characteristics of this particular fiduciary relationship. 
I9It does seem somewhat anomalous that Parliament might apparently enact 
legislation to limit its fiduciary responsibilities, although presumably the validity of 
limitations legislation must lie in its general application. There is also the question of 
whether or not a limitations period in effect extinguishes a right, and if so, does it indicate 
a "clear and plain" intention, and is it enacted by Parliament? 
So far, then, we laow only that: 
a fiduciary relationship exists; 
Parliament's power to enact laws under s. 9 l(24) is limited by fiduciary 
obligations that arise out of that relationship to act in the best interests 
of Indians when legislating (and perhaps when not legislating) in relation 
to them; 
a breach of a treaty obligation is a breach of a fiduciary obligation; 
in determining the best interests of Indians, it is necessary to look at their 
intentions; and 
the Crown must have access to all avenues available to it to rectify lapses 
in its conduct as a fiduciary. 
However, to date there have been no cases in the Court that specifically address the 
question of the role of Canadian provinces in the fiduciary context.20 It is in this context that 
the hndamental question explored by this thesis arises: that is, since fiduciary obligations are 
20There are, however, three cases where provincial laws were at issue. In one of 
these, the Quebec case of R. v. CGte', [I9961 3 S.C.R. 139, the court found that no Abriginal 
right had been infringed. The other two cases, R. v. Sundown, [I9991 2 C.N.L.R. 289, and 
R. v. Badger, [I9961 1 S.C.R. 771, involved provincial hunting laws enacted under the 
authority of the Natural Resources Transfer Agreements, 1930. It is the contention of this 
thesis that the jurisdiction of the prairie provinces under those agreements is the one narrow 
area in which they have jurisdiction, and therefore power, over Indians, so as to engage the 
justification requirement of s. 35 based on the reconciliation of power and duty that the 
fiduciary construct requires. However, in any other context, a provincial law that is "in 
relation to" Indians or their lands is ultra vires the province, and void or inoperable on that 
account. It should also be noted that laws of general application that are made applicable 
to Indians by virtue of s. 88 of the Indian Act, are federal laws, although they incorporate 
provincial laws by reference. 
not free standing but arise out of fiduciary relationships, is there a fiduciary relationship 
between provinces and Aboriginal peoples and, if so, what fiduciary obligations might it give 
rise to? 
Several academic writers have made the point that the concept ofthe divisible Crown 
-that is, the idea that the Crown may exist as sovereign in different forms, such as federal 
and provincial -- is a reasonably recent one. They go on to argue that, in treating with the 
Crown, Aboriginal peoples have not been, or ought not to be, required to sort out which 
manifestation of the Crown is the one with which they should be dealing.2' Thus, they argue, 
when the Crown in Canada chose to divide itself, this did not alter the Aboriginal 
understanding of the Crown, and, consequently: 
Individual components of the whole of the Canadian Crown's duty attached 
to either the federal or provincial Crowns in a manner reflective of the 
division and distribution of powers, responsibilities, and benefits under the 
British North America Act, 1 867.22 
The divisible Crown is a necessary construct of federalism, where legislative authority 
and thus sovereignty is parcelled out between federal and provincial governments. 
Aboriginal peoples ought not to be expected to sort out which manifestations of the Crown 
with which they should be dealing because they should be able to rely on any manifestation 
21See, for example, Brian Slattery, "First Nations and the Constitution: A Question 
of Trust", (1 992) Canadian Bar Review, Vol. 71, No. 2,261 - 293 [hereinafter "A Question 
of Trust"] and Leonard Ian Rotman, Parallel Paths: Fiduciary Doctrine and the Crown- 
Native Relationship in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996) at 244-254. 
22Rotman, ibid at 250. 
of the Crown to treat with them fairly and honourably. It is difficult to assume that either 
the federal or a provincial Crown would deal with Aboriginal peoples (or others for that 
matter) knowing or believing that it could not keep the promises it made. But, this merely 
begs the more fundamental question of the nature of the relationship between Aboriginal 
peoples, as such, with a provincial Crown. 
In a fiduciary relationship, the fiduciary has the power to affect the beneficiary 
through the fiduciary's power to make unilateral decisions; the power to make unilateral 
decisions cannot be claimed to exist because the provincial Crown is a fiduciary. However, 
since provinces have no authority to legislate in relation to Aboriginal peoples as such, they 
have no unilateral power that they can wield over them in a manner sufficient to ground the 
existence of a fiduciary relationship. This merely logical observation is borne out as well by 
historical events, at least on the prairies. The result of an analysis of the relationship in other 
provinces may be different.23 
231n Ontario, for example, the agreement between Canada and Ontario that was 
entered into in 1894, and implemented by complementary federal and provincial legislation, 
as a means of settling the disputes between the two governments that were taken to the 
courts in a series of cases beginning with St. Catherine S Milling in 1888, provides Ontario 
with a place in all subsequent treaty negotiations in that province. Ontario has apparently 
interposed itself in the treaty relationship and may well have unilaterally assumed obligations 
of a fiduciary nature in much the same way as did George I11 when he unilaterally took on 
the role of protector through the promulgation of the Royal Proclamation. Perhaps this is 
also an element of the Supreme Court's decision in Paul v. C.P., [I9881 2 S.C.R. 654, 
where both Canada and New Brunswick had legislatively confirmed and approved the 
location of a railway that crossed an Indian reserve. And, of course, it is this unilateral 
intrusion into matters affecting Aboriginal peoples that is at the heart of the British Columbia 
Supreme Court's declaration in Gitanyow First Nation v. Canada, [I9991 B.C.J. No. 1258, 
that fiduciary obligations can be owed by the provincial Crown. In that case, the provincial 
government had agreed to negotiate treaties with Aboriginal peoples and was being sued, 
The question also arises of whether or not the fiduciary relationship that originally 
developed between Aboriginal peoples and the Imperial Crown at and since the time of 
contact is contained in s. 91(24) independent of s. 35, or in the constitution at all. Some 
academic writers presuppose a constitutional "home" for the relationship, but assume that 
it follows the division of powers.24 Guerin declared the fiduciary relationship to exist 
without regard to s. 35. Furthermore, as we shall see, the fiduciary cases clearly establish 
the essential character of a fiduciary relationship as one in which power can be wielded by 
the fiduciary in a context in which the beneficiary is particularly vulnerable. It follows that 
since s. 91(24) is the constitutional locus of power in relation to Aboriginal peoples, it must 
also be the constitutional locus of the relationship, and hence the obligations that arise out 
of it. This conclusion also accords with the Supreme Court's description in Sparrow of the 
need to reconcile power and duty. 
Brian Slattery describes the division of powers in the constitution as being itself a 
along with the federal government, for a failure to negotiate in good faith. The court 
rejected the argument, made on a preliminary motion by the province that, because it was 
a province, it had no fiduciary obligations to Aboriginal peoples. This, too, may be a 
fiduciary obligation that is triggered by the unilateral undertakings on the part of the 
provincial Crown to engage in the modern treaty negotiations. That is, once a province 
determines to treat with the Indians, it cannot, dishonour the Crown it represents by 
reneging on its promise. However, what these various situations illustrate is that, just as in 
any other fiduciary context, the nature of the specific relationship is what gives rise to 
specific fiduciary obligations. 
24For example, Slattery and Rotman. I use the term "home" as opposed to a word 
like "source". There is no doubt that the relationship pre-dates Confederation and is rooted 
in history and the fact that the Crown took to itself the obligation of protecting Indians from 
dispossession by Europeans (while conveniently protecting the Crown's own sovereignty). 
"fiduciary s t r~c tu r e " .~~  However, his description is contained in the development of his 
theory of the constitutional trust, and from this perspective, the trust, and the fiduciary 
obligations that flow from it, are not limited to Aboriginal peoples. In this context, all 
governments are constrained in their exercise of power to govern "for the welfare of the 
people". This broader sense of the constitutional trust is not likely to result in specific legal 
obligations that can be enforced in courts. To put it another way, in this sense, Aboriginal 
peoples have no greater claim on any government than do any other citizens of Canada. 
Nevertheless, Slattery certainly posits that while "the trust relationship attaches primarily to 
the Federal g~vernment ,"~~ it attaches also to the provincial Crown because: 
The rearrangement of constitutional powers and rights accomplished at 
Confederation did not reduce the Crown's overall fiduciary obligations to 
First Nations. Rather, these obligations tracked the various powers and 
rights to their destinations in Ottawa and the provincial capitals. Since 
section 9 l(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867 makes the Federal government 
responsible for "Indians and Lands reserved for the Indians", the main burden 
of the trust clearly falls on its shoulders. However, so long as the Provinces 
have powers and rights enabling them to affect adversely Aboriginal 
interests protected by the relationship, they hold attendant fiduciary 
 obligation^.^^ [emphasis added] 
Interestingly, Slattery cites the decision in St. Catherine S Milling and Lumber Co. 
v. The Queen28 as the example to demonstrate his point. In that case, the Privy Council held 
2 5 " ~  Question of Trust", supra note 21 at 270. 
261rA Question of Trust," supra note 21 at 274. 
"Ib id. 
"(1 888), 14 A.C. 46 (P.C.) [hereinafter St. Catherine 's Milling]. 
that where the Province of Ontario, as the owner of the land within its boundaries at 
Confederation, received the benefit of the surrender of Indian lands to the federal 
government, it also assumed the corresponding obligations. Of course, the Privy Council did 
not come to its decision on the basis of the fiduciary concept; as we have seen that 
characterization of the relationship between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples did not occur 
until almost exactly 100 years later. Subsequent cases dealing with the Robinson-Huron 
Treaty and Treaty 3 described Ontario's obligations as moral, not legal. And in the prairie 
provinces, the problem that St. Catherine S Milling created in respect of the original 
provinces at Confederation was avoided by the federal government's retaining ownership of 
the land until 1930. Furthermore, the various Natural Resources Transfer Agreernent~~~ 
entered into in that year between the federal government and the provinces of Manitoba, 
Saskatchewan and Alberta dealt with this "s. 109 problem" by ensuring constitutionally that 
the provinces were obliged to provide the federal government with any land necessary for 
the federal government to fulfill its obligations to Aboriginal peoples in addition to providing 
to the provinces a limited jurisdiction in relation to the regulation of hunting, fishing and 
trapping by Indians. 
So, whether or not the matter may be resolved in the same fashion in other parts of 
Canada, it appears that on the prairies the NRTA provides a constitutional answer to the 
issue of obligation, and one that comports well with the idea that fiduciary obligations arise 
out of relationships. This approach provides an alternative interpretive possibility to that put 
29Constitution Act, 1930,20 & 21 Geo. V, c. 26 (U.K.) [hereinafter NRTA]. 
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forward by Slattery, Rotman and others, the crux of which centres on the fact that a fiduciary 
relatioizship must exist in order to give rise to fiduciary obligations and, in the case of 
Aboriginal peoples, that fiduciary relationship is embedded in s. 9 l(24). 
This is the position adopted by Richard Boivin in his article, "A qui appartient 
l'obligation de fiduciare a l'egard des autochtones?" who said: 
L'obligation de fiduciare apres 1867 a donc dt6 acheminee exclusivement a 
la Couronne federale par l'intermediaree d'artcile 91(24) de la Loi 
constitutionnelle de 1867. La relation privilegiee et le r81e protecteur avec 
les autochtones qui Cmanent de cette competence appartiennent uniquement 
a la Couronne federale. Les Couronnes provinciales en sont eclues. Le 
devoir de fiduciare s'exerce en contrepartie d'un pouvoir qui kchappe aux 
provinces et don't l'assise constituionnelle est prkvue dans l'article 9 l(24) de 
la Loi constitutionnelle de 1867. Cette interpretation est confrom a l'essence 
du partage des compitei~ces.~~ 
By 1984, when Guerin was decided by the Supreme Court of Canada, Aboriginal 
rights (including treaty rights) had been constitutionally recognized and affirmed and the 
litany of injustices perpetrated against Aboriginal peoples since European contact was 
30(1 994) 35 Les Cahiers de Droit 3-2 1 at 13. A rough translation is as follows: 
The fiduciary obligation after 1867 has thus been conveyed exclusively to 
the federal Crown by means of s. 91 (24) of the Constitution Act, 1867. The 
privileged relationship and the role ofprotector of Aboriginal peoples that 
emanates from this power belongs only to the federal Crown. The 
provincial Crowns are excluded from it. Fiduciary obligations are 
exchanged for apower that is outside the competency of the provinces, the 
legal foundation for which is contained in s. 91(24). This interpretation 
conforms to the essence of the constitutional division ofpowers. 
becoming known even in the dominant ~ul ture .~ '  Although constitutional protection for 
Aboriginal rights resulted from explicit constitutional amendment, the constitution's reference 
to "existing" rights signalled a change in course for the future rather than a complete break 
with the past. It has been in this sense necessary for the courts to look to the past while 
moving forward with the "unfolding political narrative" of Aboriginal rights.32 
Thus, the words ofjudgments in cases already decided are assembled to forge the link 
between the present and both the past and the future. Some may argue that those past words 
will not support the new uses to which they are being put. Others will respond that such 
connections are only historical facts, that the words of the past don't determine their uses in 
3'It is interesting to me to observe on a purely personal level how true it is that 
history is written by the victors. I consider myself to be a reasonably well-educated person. 
I have an extensive university education and I have always read voraciously. The community 
within which I live and work is also well-educated and well-read. However, I recall as a 
teenager learning of the Winnipeg General Strike not in school (although I attended school 
in the North end of Winnipeg until grade ten) but in my own reading. I completed high 
school and university in Regina, but learned very little about the Regina Riot (perhaps more 
pointedly, I learned to call the event the "Regina Riot1', not the "On to Ottawa Trek") or the 
Estevan Coal Miners Strike, other than that there was one. Similarly, I learned nothing of 
Aboriginal issues as a law student in the early 1970s (perhaps I simply chose the wrong 
classes) nor did I learn that the Royal Proclamation dealt with Indians as well as Quebec until 
I became involved in the Charlottetown constitutional negotiations in 1992. 
32 The "invention" of the fiduciary relationship appears to be the equitable instrument 
by which the law can be made to secure some rough justice. The court's pronouncement on 
its existence accords well with Ronald Dworkin's description of what courts do: 
Legal claims are interpretive judgments and therefor combine backward- and 
forward-looking elements; they interpret contemporary legal practice seen as 
an unfolding political narrative. 
From Law 's Empire (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1986) at 225. 
the future. In either case, the process of adjudication in which the courts engage is 
essentially an interpretive one in which legal actors acknowledge the inherent "slipperiness" 
of words as " ~ i ~ n i f i e r s " ~ ~  rather than brute facts that control interpretive possibilities. 
Law as interpretation is more than mere semantics; it is the entangling of value and 
content.34 In this entangling process history is significant, and the account of the Supreme 
Court's decision to describe the relationship between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples as 
a fiduciary one must address that history. 
The story of the development of the fiduciary relationship begins with the extraction 
of a confirmation of rights in the Royal Proclamation of 1763. On the prairies, it continues 
with the imposition on Parliament of a constitutional obligation to protect Indians and their 
lands contained in s. 9 l(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867, the assumption by Canada of the 
equitable obligations of the Imperial Crown to Aboriginal peoples with the transfer of 
Rupert's Land and the North-Western Territory in 1 870, the conclusion of treaties with First 
Nations in Western Canada in the 1870s, the creation of the prairie provinces and the 
constitutional handing over of lands and resources to the provinces via the NRTA. It 
33(With apologies to Ferdinand Saussure, Jacques Lacan and Jacques Derrida.) I 
have a "B.C." cartoon that I think sums it up: In the first panel, the two women are sitting 
on a rock but they're facing in opposite directions. In the second panel, one of them has a 
line across the back of her hand, which she is holding up and looking at. "I've gotta scratch," 
she says. "So, go ahead," says the other. In the last panel, the first woman faces the reader 
and says, "Language is a stupid form of communication". 
34Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire, at 48. 
culminates with the entrenchment in the Constitution of a recognition and affirmation of 
"existing aboriginal and treaty rights" in s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. 
This thesis therefore explores the fiduciary concept and, in particular, its judicial 
development in the case of the Crown and Aboriginal peoples in order to attempt to answer 
the question already posed of whether or not there is a fiduciary relationship between the 
provincial Crown and Indians in Saskatchewan and to identify the fiduciary obligations that 
might arise out of such a relationship if it exists. To this end, Chapter 2 examines the 
fiduciary context, generally and its application in the context of Aboriginal peoples. Chapter 
3 briefly examines the historical/legal context of First Nations on the prairies and their 
relationship with the Crown in its various manifestations. Chapter 4 re-examines the section 
109 cases in which provinces were held to receive the benefit of the removal of Aboriginal 
title to lands. Chapter 5 reviews the application of provincial laws to Indians to ascertain the 
extent of provincial power over them. Finally, Chapter 6 concludes that in the absence of 
provincial power, there is no fiduciary relationship between provinces and Aboriginal peoples 
and, therefore, there can be no fiduciary obligations. 
CHAPTER 2 
THE FIDUCIARY CONCEPT AND ABORIGINAL PEOPLES 
The Fiduciary Concept 
Fiduciary obligations arise in equity in the same manner as does the trust. They are 
a constraint on the ability of persons who have legal power to affect the beneficial interests 
of others in the exercise of that legal power. That is, where fiduciary obligations exist, 
strictly legal power cannot be exercised at the whim of its holder, without regard for the 
interests of the beneficiaries who will be affected by the exercise of that power. 
Equity's control over the common law functions in a manner similar to that by which 
constitutional conventions constrain the exercise of legal power under the Con~t i tu t ion.~~ 
However, the significant difference between equity and constitutional conventions is that, 
as a result of the merger of the common law and chancery courts by virtue of the Judicature 
Acts of the late 19th century, modern courts of law are obliged to enforce equitable rules as 
well as strictly legal rules.36 Equity acts as the law's conscience and it is for that reason that 
35The law, for example, permits a Governor General to choose any one to serve as 
Prime Minister of the country. Constitutional convention requires that the leader of the 
political party with the largest number of seats in the House of Commons is chosen. In fact, 
our written constitution doesn't mention the Prime Minister at all. Legal power is actually 
vested in the Governor General. 
36The terms "equitable" and "legal" are used here in their technical senses. The 
popular use of the term "equitable" as the equivalent of "fair" or "just" (usually as a 
equitable rules are privileged at law, with the result that, in common parlance, "equity trumps 
law".37 The whole concept of the fiduciary relationship and the fiduciary obligations that it 
gives rise to results from the desire of equity to produce justice. 
Nevertheless, the fiduciary concept has attracted a certain modishness in recent years 
that mitigates against its careful understanding. As Madame Justice Southin, of the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal observed: 
The word "fiduciary" is flung around now as if it applied to all breaches of 
duty by solicitors, directors of companies and so forth. But "fiduciary" 
comes from the Latin '[fiducia" meaning "trust". Thus, the adjective, 
"fiduciary" means of or pertaining to a trustee or trusteeship. That a lawyer 
can commit a breach of the special duty of a trustee, e.g., by stealing his 
client's money, by entering into a contract without full disclosure, by sending 
a client a bill claiming disbursements made and so forth is clear. But to say 
that simple carelessness in giving advice is such a breach is a perversion of 
~ o r d s . ~ '  
This concept of trust underlies the fiduciary concept and the stringent standards of 
conduct to which fiduciaries are held. A duty of loyalty therefore arises out of the state of 
reliance that results when persons, or their affairs, are in the hands of a fiduciary, for the 
reason that the fiduciary then has unilateral power over the other, "placing the latter at the 
contradistinction to what is legal, which is an historically interesting usage) inaccurately 
suggests a status that is lesser than law. 
'7See in particular subsection 52(2) and subsection 52(1) and sections 53 to 56 of 
The Queen's Bench Act, 1998, S.S. 1998 c. Q-1.01. 
"Quoted with approval by LaForest J. in Hodgkinson v. Simms, El9941 3 S.C.R. 377 
at para. 123. 
mercy of the former's d i~cre t ion."~~ 
The relationship between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples is one in which the 
element of faith and trust is possibly at its highest. In almost all of the other established cases 
of fiduciary relationships, the beneficiary always has the potential ability to choose another 
fid~ciary;~' in the case of Aboriginal peoples, there is no other fiduciary that may be chosen. 
The Crown has taken a clear, long-standing and explicit control over Aboriginal peoples by 
interposing itself between them and the white man, leaving them vulnerable and dependent 
upon the Crown's actions. 
The Fiduciary Relationship 
In 1989, LaForest J. succinctly pointed out the problem of the fiduciary relationship 
when he wrote, in LAC Minerals Ltd. v. International Corona Resources Ltd, "There are 
few legal concepts more frequently invoked but less conceptually certain than that of the 
fiduciary re la t i~nsh i~ . "~ '  This observation has been echoed, in some form or another, by 
391bid, at para. 133. 
40 For example, in the relationships of doctorlpatient, directorlcorporation, 
partnerlpartner, lawyer (or other professional)lclient, the beneficiary can, at any time select 
another to fulfill the fiduciary role. It is aclmowledged that the issue of choice is 
complicated by the fact that a fiduciary may well control the beneficiary's awareness of 
sufficient facts to make a reasoned choice of a fiduciary, and the issue is more complicated 
still in the case of children who are the beneficiaries in a fiduciary relationship. However, 
where the fiduciary relationship is one ofparentlchild, the relationship eventually ends when 
the child becomes an adult. 
41[1989] 2 S.C.R. 574 at para. 145. 
virtually every judge called upon to adjudicate in relation to such issues and by every 
commentator writing on the subject. 
It wasn't until 1994, in the case of Hodgkinson v. Sirnrn~,~* that Justice LaForest was 
able to articulate what he described as a "fiduciary principle" that, in his words, "can be 
defined and applied with some measure of p re~ is ion"~~ .  He began his analysis with a 
quotation from the judgment of Mr. Justice Dickson, as he then was, in the Guerin case a 
decade earlier. In Guerin it was necessary for Dickson J. to consider whether the established 
list of relationships on which fiduciary obligations had been founded was an exhaustive or 
closed list or whether it was possible to link the established cases together in some manner 
so as to provide for the possibility of expansion of the fiduciary concept to be applicable in 
new situations. Justice Dickson opted for the latter approach and described the connecting 
thread among the cases in this way: 
... where by statute, agreement, or perhaps by unilateral undertaking, one 
party Izas an obligation to actfor the benefit of another, and that obligation 
carries with it a discretionary power, the party thus empowered becomes a 
fiduciary . . . 
It is sometimes said that the nature of the fiduciary relationships is both 
established and exhausted by the standard categories of agent, trustee, 
partner, director, and the like. I do not agree. It is the nature of the 
relationslzip, not the specific category of actor involved that gives rise to 
thefiduciary duty. The categories of fiduciary, like those of negligence, 
42Supra, note 39. 
431bid, at para. 29. 
should not be considered closed.44 
According to LaForest J, Justice Dickson's approach was "conceptual"; it formed 
only the basic idea of the fiduciary relationship. The analytical structure, or flesh on the 
bones, was provided later in the guidelines developed by Madam Justice Wilson in Frame 
v. Smith: 
Yet there are common features discernable in the contexts in which fiduciary 
duties have been found to exist and these common features do provide a 
rough and ready guide to whether or not the imposition of a fiduciary 
obligation on a new relationship would be appropriate and consistent. 
Relationships in which a fiduciary obligation have [sic] been imposed seem 
to possess three general characteristics: 
(1) The fiduciary has scope for the exercise of some discretion or 
power. 
(2) The fiduciary can unilaterally exercise that power or 
discretion so as to affect the beneficiary's legal or practical interests. 
(3) The beneficiary is peculiarly vulnerable to or at the mercy of 
441bid. Emphasis is Justice LaForest's as quoted in Hodgkinson v. Simms. It has 
generally been assumed, as emphasized in this passage, that fiduciary obligations arise out 
of fiduciary relationships, and not otherwise. Thus, the establishment of the relationship is 
usually a necessary first step. For example, Wilson J. in LAC Minerals, found that when 
confidential information was provided by one corporation to another, a temporary fiduciary 
relationship was established. As Binnie J. observed, writing for the Court in Cadbury 
Schweppes Inc. v. F. B.I. Foods Ltd., [I9991 1 S.C.R. 142, at para. 3 1, "This approach was 
not accepted by the other members of the court." The majority decision was based on the 
existence of a constructive trust for the very reason that it was difficult for them to see how 
a fiduciary relationship could be understood to exist in an arm's length commercial context. 
See also Terra Energy, in which the Alberta Court of Appeal held very explicitly that 
fiduciary obligations arise out of fiduciary relationships and the Supreme Court refused an 
application for leave to appeal. This point is critical to the analysis presented in this thesis 
and is returned to later. 
the fiduciary holding the discretion or power.45 
LaForest J. emphasizes that Justice Wilson's guidelines are "indicia" that assist in 
recognizing a fiduciary relationship, without actually defining it.46 And, even though given 
in dissent, these guidelines have been adopted by the majority of the court in virtually every 
subsequent Supreme Court of Canada decision relating to this subject. As guidelines, 
however, their precise formulation and emphasis may vary.47 
LaForest J. concludes that, outside the established categories of fiduciaries (which 
include relationships such as those of director and corporation, solicitor and client, trustee 
and beneficiary, agent and principal, life tenant and remainderman, partner and partner -- 
"relationships that have as their essence discretion, influence over interests and an inherent 
45[1987] 2 S.C.R. 99, at 136. 
46This same view was expressed by Sopinka J. in LAC Minerals, supra note 42. See, 
in particular, paras. 33 and 34. 
47For example, Mr. Justice Sopinka, in LAC Minerals, supra note 42, adopted or 
endorsed Justice Wilson's guidelines but noted, as well, that it was possible for a fiduciary 
relationship to be found although not all of these characteristics were present. He took the 
position that the converse was also true: the presence of all three characteristics would not 
automatically lead to the conclusion that a fiduciary relationship existed. He made these 
remarks in a commercial context in which one party to a potential joint venture used 
confidential information received from another to make enormous profits. Sopinka J. stated 
that it would be extremely rare to find the existence of a fiduciary relationship in an arm's 
length commercial transaction. However, all members of the Court agreed that vulnerability 
is an essential criterion of a fiduciary relationship. Even so, LaForest J. has pointed out that 
while vulnerability is essential to the existence of a fiduciary relationship it is not a hallmark 
of one. Indeed, he describes it as a "golden thread" that links many related causes of action 
such as undue influence, unconscionability and negligent misrepresentation, as well as a 
breach of a fiduciary duty. 
~ulnerability"~~) it is necessary to demonstrate the existence of a "mutual understanding that 
one party has relinquished its own self-interest and agreed to act solely on behalf of the other 
party" .49 
Aboriginal Peoples 
As mentioned earlier, the well-known case of Guerinju establishes the existence of 
a fiduciary relationship between the federal Crown and Indian people. The case involved a 
situation in which an Indian Band had surrendered a portion of its reserve to the Crown in 
order to lease it to a golf club. The terms of the lease that were finally obtained by the 
Crown on behalf of the Band were much less favourable than those that were approved by 
the Band for the purposes of the surrender. The trial judge found the Crown in breach of 
trust and awarded damages. The Federal Court of Appeal set the judgment aside. 
The Supreme Court of Canada in allowing the appeal arrived at a unanimous result, 
but the judges took several different routes to arrive at the same conclu~ion.~' Mr. Justice 
Estey decided the issue on the basis of the law of agency.j2 The remaining judges found that 
48Hodgkinson v. Sinzms, supra note 39 at para. 3 1. 
491b id. 
50 Supra, note 4. 
51All nine judges sat on the case, although Chief Justice Laskin did not participate in 
the judgment. Dickson J. wrote for himself and three others, Wilson J. wrote for herself and 
two others, and Estey J. wrote his own decision. 
j2This approach has not been taken up in any subsequent case. 
a fiduciary relationship existed but they described it in somewhat different ways. According 
to Mr. Justice Dickson: 
The fiduciary relationship between the Crown and the Indians has its roots 
in the concept of aboriginal, native or Indian title. The fact that Indian Bands 
have a certain interest in lands does not, however, in itself give rise to a 
fiduciary relationship between the Indians and the Crown. The conclusion 
that the Crown is a fiduciary depends upon the further proposition that the 
Indian interest in the land is inalienable except upon surrender to the 
Crown.53 
Thus, Dickson J's conclusion that a fiduciary relationship existed is predicated on both the 
existence of Aboriginal title and its inalienability except to the Crown. 
Madam Justice Wilson also concluded that fiduciary obligations existed that were 
enforceable at law, but she expressed her similar view in somewhat different language: 
While I am in agreement that s. 18 [of the Indian Act] does not per se create 
a fiduciary obligation in the Crown with respect to Indian reserves, I believe 
that it recognizes the existence of such an obligation. The obligation has its 
roots in the aboriginal title of Canada's Indians as discussed in Calder v. 
A. G. B. C. [citations omitted]54 
She continues: 
I think that when s. 18 mandates that reserves be held by the Crown for the 
use and benefit of the bands for which they are set apart, this is more than 
just an administrative direction to the Crown. I think it is the 
- 
53Guerin, supra note 4 at 494. 
541bid, at 5 18. 
acknowledgement of a historic reality, namely that Indian bands have a 
beneficial interest in their reserves and that the Crown has a responsibility to 
protect that interest and make sure that any purpose to which reserve land is 
put will not interfere with it.55 . , . 
The discretion conferred on the Governor in Council [by s. 18 of the Indian 
Act] is not an unfettered one to decide the use to which reserve lands rnay be 
put. It is to decide whether any use to which they are proposed to be put is 
"for the use and benefit of the band". This discretionary power must be 
exercised on proper principles and not in an arbitrary fashion.56 
Mr. Justice Dicltson also described the specific fiduciary obligation operative in the 
Guerin case as: 
"an equitable obligation, enforceable by the courts, to deal with the land for 
the benefit of the I n d i a n ~ " . ~ ~  
Thus the source of the fiduciary obligation in the Crown lies in the historical fact of 
Aboriginal title, recognized in the Royal Proclamation, together with the assumption by the 
Crown of "dominion" over the land that became Canada and the subsequent vesting by 
Parliament, by virtue of the surrender provisions of the Indian Act, of a discretion in the 
Governor General (the Crown's representative federally) to dispose of Indian lands in the 
best interests of the Indians affected. Because the Crown has thus taken control over 
Aboriginal lands and granted to itself this discretion, the Crown's obligation is transformed 
into a fiduciary one. In coming to this conclusion, the Court adopted the statements made 
by Ernest J. Weinrib in his article, "The Fiduciary Obl igat i~n,"~~ to the effect that the 
"hallmark" of a fiduciary relationship is that one party is at the mercy of the other's 
d i~cre t ion .~~  Weinrib also described the fiduciary obligations that arise out of fiduciary 
relationships as "the law's blunt tool for the control of this di~cretion.~' 
The Guerin case establishes not just that a fiduciary relationship exists between the 
Crown and Indian peoples, it also establishes that the relationship is sui generid' -- that is, 
it is unique; it is not the same as the other established categories of fiduciaries. As a result, 
it would not be surprising that the duties or obligations that arise out of the relationship 
might also be unique. Indeed, it seems inescapable that that should be so. However, the 
Court's emphasis on this point in subsequent cases appears to indicate an insistence that 
arguments about obligations that arise in other fiduciary relationships will not necessarily be 
convincing. From another perspective, this sui generis character may be no more than a 
restatement of another point the Court emphasizes in all fiduciary cases, and that is that the 
specific nature of fiduciary obligations is determined by the specific nature of the relationship 
out of which they arise. 
58(1 975), 25 U.T.L.J. I.  
59As quoted in Guerin, supra note 4 at 501. 
601bid. 
6'Ibid, per Dickson J. at 499. 
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The Guerin case has been most often cited for the proposition that the list of 
categories of fiduciary relationships that will be recognized at law is not a closed one. It was 
this critical finding that enabled the Court to declare that this previously unrecognized 
relationship between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples could now be described as fiduciary. 
As already noted, the Court went on to conclude, in this regard, that: 
I t  is tlze nature of tlze relationship, not the specific category of actor 
involved that gives rise to the fiduciary [emphasis added] 
Specifically, the Court determined in Guerin that the Crown's obligations in respect 
of the surrender of land were fiduciary in nature because the Indian interest in land arises 
outside the actions of the legislative and executive branches of government. That is to say, 
the origin of Indian title is in the Indians' use and occupation of the land prior to contact and 
not in the Indian Act. Consequently, the discretion in the Act given to the Governor in 
Council to apparently do what he or she wishes with surrendered Indian lands is a legal 
power that is constrained by the fiduciary obligation to act in the Indians' best interests. 
The point is illustrated by the particular facts of the Guerin case. The Musqueam 
Band had agreed to surrender certain lands to lease them for use as a golf course, on the 
understanding that the Band would get a certain amount of revenue from the lands by doing 
so. When the Crown was unable to secure the lease price it had originally told the Band 
would be available, the Court held it was obliged to inform them and to seek their 
concurrence to this change. The Crown's failure to do so was a breach of its fiduciary 
obligation to the Band. The Court described the situation in this way: 
The oral representations [as to the terms of the lease] form the backdrop 
against which the Crown's conduct in discharging its fiduciary obligation 
must be measured. They inform and confine tlzefield of discretion within 
which tlze Crown was free to act. After the Crown's agents had induced the 
band to surrender its land on the understanding that the land would be leased 
on certain terms, it would be unconscionable to permit the Crown simply to 
ignore those terms. . . . Equity will not countenance unconscionable 
behaviour in a fiduciary, whose duty is that of tlze utmost loyalty to his 
principal.63 [emphasis added] 
As is always the case in such matters, there are those who promote a narrow reading 
of the Guerin case and those who promote a larger understanding. Brian Slattery, whose 
writings are often quoted with approval by the Court, has maintained that the relationship 
ought to be understood more broadly than just in relation to the Indians' interest in land. 
According to him: 
The Crown has a general fiduciary duty toward native people to protect them 
in the enjoyment of their aboriginal rights and inparticular in the possession 
and use of their lands.64 [emphasis added] 
Slattery argues that the origin of the fiduciary duty lies in the Crown's offer of 
protection to Indians from European settlers, which itself arises from the Royal Proclamation 
631bid, at 504. 
64"Understanding Aboriginal Rights" (1 987) 66 C.B.R. 727, at 753. 
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and the declaration by the Crown that the Indian interest in land was inalienable except 
through the Crown. In cases subsequent to Guerin, the Court has adopted this view. For 
example, in Paul v. C. P. R. ,65 the Indian interest in land was described as "personal and 
usufructuary" to the extent that it was inalienable, except to the Crown, and that 
inalienability was itself "a protective measure for the Indian population lest they be persuaded 
into improvident  transaction^"^^. 
In Roberts v. Canada,67 the Court confirmed that the obligation owed by the Crown 
to Indians in respect of their lands is recognized by the Indian Act surrender provisions, not 
created by them. The case involved a dispute between two different Bands over which of 
them was entitled to a certain reserve. The Court said that: 
"The Crown must hold the land comprising Reserve No. 12 for the use and 
benefit of the   and."^' [emphasis added] 
This same sentiment is expressed again by the Court in Mitchell v. Peguis Band9, 
where Dickson J. wrote: 
65[1988] 2 S.C.R. 654. 
661bid, at para 34. 
67[1989] 1 S.C.R. 322. 
681bid, at para. 22. 
69[1990] 2 S.C.R. 85. 
The Indians ceded traditional lands to the Crown on the understanding that 
the Crown would thereafter protect them in the possession and use of such 
lands as were reserved to their use . . . interposing the Crown between the 
Indians and the market forces which, if left unchecked, had the potential to 
erode Indian ownership of their reserve lands. . . .70 
The Crown has always acknowledged that it is honour bound to shield 
Indians from any efforts by non-natives to dispossess Indian~.~'  
The fiduciary thread was picked up by the Court in the subsequent case of R. v. 
Sparrow.72 The Court held in Sparrow that the generally fiduciary relationship between the 
federal Crown and Indians affected the manner in which the Aboriginal and treaty rights that 
were recognized and affirmed by s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 would be understood. 
Mr. Sparrow was a member of the Musqueam Indian Band and was charged with 
offences under the federal Fisheries Act relating to the use of drift nets while fishing. His 
defence was that he was exercising an "existing aboriginal right" to fish and that the net 
length restriction contained in the Band's food fishing licence infringed the protection 
provided to these rights by s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. Therefore, he argued, the 
restrictions were invalid and he could not be convicted of an offence for breaching them. 
The Sparrow case marks the first time that the Supreme Court was called upon to 
consider the scope and import of s. 35. It is jointly authored by then Chief Justice Dickson 
701bid, at para. 85. 
7'Ibid, at para. 87. 
72Supra, note 7. 
and Mr. Justice La Forest. They begin their analysis by quoting with approval ftom 
Professor Noel Lyon, who wrote: 
. . . the context of 1982 is surely enough to tell us that this is not just a 
codification of the case law on aboriginal rights that had accumulated by 
1982. Section 35 calls for a just settlement for aboriginal peoples. It 
renounces the old rules of tlze game under which the Crown established 
courts of law and denied tlze courts the autlzority to qiiestion sovereign 
claims made by the ~ r o w n . ' ~  [emphasis added] 
The two justices then outlined the following as a framework within which s. 35 ought to be 
interpreted: 
1. s. 35 requires a purposive, generous liberal interpretati~n;~~ 
2. treaties and statutes relating to Indians should be liberally construed and 
doubtful expressions resolved in favour of the I n d i a n ~ ; ~ ~  
3. the honour of the Crown is involved and therefore fairness to the Indians is 
a governing c~nsiderat ion;~~ 
4. the federal government has the responsibility to act in a fiduciary capacity 
with respect to Aboriginal peoples and any contemporary understanding of 
731bid, at para. 54. 
741bid, at para. 56. 
751bid, at para. 60. 
761bid, at para. 58. 
Aboriginal rights must be defined in light of this historic re la t i~nship .~~ 
The court went on to hold that s.35 is a solemn commitment to Aboriginal peoples and that: 
. . . the words "recognition and affirmation" incorporate the fiduciary 
relationship referred to earlier and so import some restraint on the exercise 
of sovereign power. Rights that are recognized and affirmed are not absolute. 
Federal legislative powers continue, including, of course, the right to legislate 
with respect to Indians pursuant to s. 9 l(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867. 
These powers must however, now be read together with s. 35(1). In other 
words, federalpower must be reconciled with federalduty and the best way 
to achieve that reconciliation is to demand the justification of any 
government regulation that infringes upon or denies aboriginal rights. 
[emphasis addedI7' 
Thus, the court concluded that the way in which a legislative objective is obtained must both 
"uphold the honour of the Crown" and "be in keeping with the unique contemporary 
relationship, grounded in history and policy, between the Crown and Canada's aboriginal 
peoples."79 
The Sparrow case, although it can be narrowly interpreted as authority only for the 
proposition that s. 35 constrains federal power under s. 91 (24), comments on these judicial 
developments as emphasizing "the responsibility of the Government to protect the rights of 
771bid, at para. 59. 
781bid, at para. 62. 
791bid, at para. 64. 
Indians arising from the special trust relationship created by history, treaties and 
legislation".80 The Court cited Guerin as authority for this proposition and went on to hold 
that one of the fiduciary obligations that arises out of that special trust relationship is the 
necessity to reconcile federal power with federal duty. Sparrow therefore emphasizes the 
important pro-active obligation on the Crown; it is not just acts of the Crown that may 
violate its fiduciary duties, it is also non-acts." 
During this period of the Court's development of the fiduciary relationship between 
the Crown and Aboriginal peoples, there are also a number of important fiduciary cases that 
do not involve Aboriginal issues at all. These cases do, however, make an important 
contribution to a proper understanding of the nature of fiduciary obligations generally. 
In LAC Minerals LaForest J., writing for the majority, said: 
The obligation imposed may vary in its specific substance, depending on 
the relationship, though compendiously it can be described as the fiduciary 
duty of loyalty and will most often include the avoidance of a conflict of duty 
"Ibid, at para. 58. 
'*This is a point made by now Supreme Court Justice W.I.C. Binnie, in his article, 
"The Sparrow Doctrine: Beginning of the End or End of the Beginning?", 15 Queen 's Law 
Journal 21 7-253 at 220, where he said: 
Equally serious for governments is at least the possibility that the fiduciary 
duty places on Parliament apositive duty to act under section 91(24) of the 
Constitution Act, 1867 in relation to Indians and lands reserved for Indian. 
It will be argued on behalf of Aboriginal organizations that Parliament no 
longer has a mere legislative power. It may now have a power coupled with 
a duty. [emphasis in original] 
and interest and a duty not to profit at the expense of the beneficiary. The 
presumption that afiduciary obligation will be owed in the context of such 
a relationslzip is not irrebuttable, but a strong presumption will exist that 
such an obligation i~present .~'  [emphasis added] 
In Norberg v. Wynrib, McLachlin J. wrote: 
Inherent in the judgments of this Court in Guerin and Canson, is the 
requirement that the fiduciary have [sic] assumed or undertaken to "look 
after" the interest of the beneficiary. As I put it in Canson, at p. 543, quoting 
from this Court's decision in Canadian Aero Service Ltd. v. O'Malley, supra, 
at p. 606, "[tlhe freedom of the fiduciary is diminished by the nature of the 
obligation he or she has undertaken -- an obligation which 'betokens loyalty, 
good faith and avoidance of a conflict of duty and self-intere~t"'.'~ 
Madame Justice McLachlin went on to describe the fiduciary concept as one that provides 
"a greater measure of justice for the ex~ lo i t ed" .~~  
In Hodgkinson v. Simms, the Court referred back to Guerin to emphasize that it is 
"the nature of the relationship, not the category of actor, that gives rise to fiduciary 
~b l i~a t ions" . '~  [emphasis added] 
And in K. M. v. H.M, LaForest J. emphasized the point as follows: 
In Lac Minerals I stressed the point, which also emerges from Frame v. 
82Supra, note 42 at para. 149. 
83[1992] 2 S.C.R. 226, at 292. 
841bid, at 293. 
85Supra, note 39 at para. 29. 
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Smith, that the substance of the fiduciary obligation in any given case is not 
derived from some immutable list of duties attached to a category of 
relationships. In other words, the duty is not determined by analogy with the 
"established" heads of fiduciary duty. Rather, the nature ofthe obligation will 
vary depending on the factual context of the relationship in which it arises. 
Recently, I had occasion to return to this point in the context of a 
doctor-patient relationship in Mclnerney v. MacDonald, 119921 2 S.C.R. 
138. I there stated, at p. 149: 
In characterizing the physician-patient relationship as 
"fiduciary", I would not wish it to be thought that a fixed set 
of rules and principles apply in all circumstances or to all 
obligations arising out of the doctor-patient relationship. As 
I noted in Canson Enteryrises Ltd. v. Boughton and Co., 
[I9911 3 S.C.R. 534, not all fiduciary relationships and not all 
fiduciary obligations are the same; these are shaped by the 
demands of the situation. A relationship may properly be 
described as "fiduciary" for some purposes, but not for 
others.86 
It is this point that underlies the principal issue explored by this thesis. If it is the 
nature of the relationship that gives rise to fiduciary obligations, then it is the relationship 
between the provincial Crown and Aboriginal peoples that must be examined to determine 
if it is a fiduciary one, and, if so, what obligations arise out of it. 
86[1992] 3 S.C.R. 6 at 65-66. 
CHAPTER 3 
THE HISTORICALILEGAL CONTEXT 
Introduction 
When, in 1982, Canada and the Provinces asked the Parliament of the United 
Kingdom to enact the Canada Act, patriating Canada's Constitution, Indian organizations 
from Alberta, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, concerned about the implications of the 
Canada Bill on treaty and other rights, applied to the English courts for a declaration "that 
treaty [or other] obligations entered into by the Crown to the Indian peoples of Canada are 
still owed by Her Majesty in right of Her Government in the United K i n g d ~ m . " ~ ~  Their 
counsel argued that the Royal Proclamation of 1763 illustrated the concern of the Imperial 
Crown for the rights of Indian peoples and constituted an undertaking on the part of the 
Imperial Crown to preserve and protect their lands and their rights. None of this was 
changed, they said, with the Constitution Act, 1867. 
The Court of Appeal disagreed. The judges acknowledged that the Imperial Crown 
had been in its origins single and indivisible - the basis on which the Indians argued that the 
obligations to them undertaken by the Crown remained with the Imperial Crown - but 
through constitutional usage and practice, the Court said, the Crown became separate and 
divisible. The original concept of the Crown had been developed in the context of a unitary 
87 R. v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Exparte Indian 
Association of Alberta and Others, [I9821 1 Q.B. 892, at 909 [hereinafter Secretary of 
State]. The larger purpose of the Indian litigants was, of course, to persuade Parliament at 
Westminster that it could not pass the Canada Bill affecting Indian rights without Indian 
consent. 
state and was reinforced by the British notion of its empire. Although the colonies might 
have enjoyed a measure of self-regulation, local laws were subject to being displaced by the 
laws of the Parliament at Westminster." 
It is difficult to pinpoint the time at which the concept of the Crown was altered. The 
majority of the Court was of the view that although the Crown remained single and 
indivisible at the time of confederationg9 and at least as late as 1888 when the St. Catherine 's 
Milling case was decided by the Privy Co~ncil ,~ '  either by the time of the Imperial 
Conference of 1926 the Crown was "separate and divisible for each self-governing dominion 
or province or territ~ry,"~' or, if not by then, certainly no later than the Statute of 
Westminster in 193 1 .92 The result of this conceptual division of the Crown, according to 
Lord Denning, was: 
that those obligations which were previously binding on the Crown 
simpliciter are now to be treated as divided. They are to be applied to the 
Dominion or Province or territory to which they relate: and confined to it.93 
g8~olonial Laws Validity Act, 1865,211 & 29 Vict., c. 63 (U.K.). 
g9Supra, note 88. Lord Denning at 913, states that executive power in relation to 
Indians and their lands "was vested in the Governor-General of the Dominion, acting 
through his representative: and he in turn represented the Queen of England, that is, the 
Crown - which, as I have said, was in our constitutional law at that time regarded as one and 
indivisible". 
"Ibid, Lord Denning at 91 5 states, "That judgment was given at a time when, in 
constitutional law, the Crown was single and indivisible". 
921bid, May L.J., at 933, states, "I have no doubt that any treaty or other obligations 
which the Crown had entered into with the Indian peoples of Canada in right of the United 
Kingdom had become the responsibility of the Government of Canada with the attainment 
of independence, at the latest with the Statute of Westminister 193 1". 
Clearly, the emergence of the concept of the divisible Crown was necessary to the 
development of the former colonies into self-governing and autonomous nations. If it were 
otherwise, the Imperial Crown would have continued to rule. Indeed, this was a significant 
facet of the argument presented to the Court of Appeal on the Indians' behalf: since section 
7 of the Statute of Westminster, 193 1 continued the requirement for any alteration to the 
Canadian Constitution to be made by the British Parliament, Canada was not fully 
autonomous from Great Britain, even in 1982 before the Canada Bill was passed, and the 
responsibilities of the Imperial Crown in respect of its obligations to the Indian peoples had 
not been devolved. Of course, this was the significant part ofthe Canada Bill that the Indian 
applicants were concerned about: a patriated amending formula that provided for the 
Canadian Constitution to be amended, if at all, in Canada. Ifthe patriated amending formula 
came to be, it would result, even on the basis of the argument presented to the Court by the 
Indian applicants, in the complete devolution of the Imperial Crown's obligations to the 
Indians and otherwise to the Crown in Canada. 
However, once the U.K. Court of Appeal found that the Crown was divisible, and 
after in Guerin it was decided that the relationship (on the facts of that case) between the 
federal Crown and Aboriginal peoples was a fiduciary one, it has been assumed that the fact 
that the Crown is divided resulted in the provincial Crown also assuming fiduciary 
obligations. This assumption ignores the history of the relationship between the Crown and 
Aboriginal peoples in Canada, out of which any fiduciary obligations must flow. 
The Royal Proclamation 
The critical origin of the legal relationship between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples 
is found in the Royal Proclamation of 1763, wrested by Chief Pontiac from George 111. 
Ronald Wright describes it this way: 
With the French crushed, native nations no longer held the balance of power 
in North America. From now on, the victorious English saw them not as 
buffer states but as obstacles to settlement. Even their importance in the fur 
trade was evaporating; skins were becoming scarcer and many white 
frontiersmen, having learned Indian skills, wanted the Indians gone so they 
could take their place. 
Foreseeing this, resenting the hostile and disdainful attitude of Amherst, and 
inspired by the messianic visions of a Delaware prophet, the Ottawa chief 
Pontiac united the northern tribes and came close to driving Britain from the 
Great Lakes in 1763. Pontiac lost, but his war was not entirely in vain. In 
October, King George signed a Royal Proclamation setting a boundary line 
between white and native America along the Appalachian chain. This 
document remains the legal basis for Indian reserves, land claims, and 
aboriginal rights in the United States and Canada to this day. Like much 
protective legislation decreed in European capitals, the proclamation was not 
only flouted b unruly colonists but did much to sharpen their thirst for 
independence. g 
The Royal Proclamation provided that the "several Nations or Tribes of Indians with 
whom We are connected and who live under our protection, should not be molested or 
disturbed in the Possession of such Parts of Our Dominions and Territories as, not having 
been ceded to or purchased by Us, are resewed to them or any of them, as their Hunting 
~ r o u n d s . " ~ ~  In that connection, surveys or grants of Indian lands were forbidden, except 
through the Crown. 
The Royal Proclamation has long been described as the Aboriginal Magna Carta96, 
because it confirms the rights of Aboriginal peoples, speaks of them as "nations", and forms 
the basis of the relationship between Aboriginal peoples and the Crown in Canada, as 
"Stolen Continents: The New World Thpough Indian Eyes Since 1492, (Toronto: 
Viking, 1991) at 1 10. See also 223, where this latter point is buttressed by a quotation from 
George Washington's confidence to a business associate, "I can never look upon that 
proclamation in any other light (but I say this between ourselves) than as a temporary 
expedient to quiet the minds of the Indians." [!I 
95 See Bernard W. Funston & Eugene Meehan, Canadian Constitutional Documents 
Consolidated (Toronto: Carswell, 1994) at 75 [hereinafter "Funston & Meehan"]. 
96See for example St. Catherine S Milling (1 888) 14 App. Cas. 46. 
successor to the Imperial Crown. It is referred to in section 25 of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms as one of the categories of included Aboriginal rights that may not be 
diminished in interpreting the individual rights guaranteed by the Charter. It is the bridge 
between Aboriginal peoples pre-contact and the arrival of the British Crown on North 
American soil. But it is also the unilateral undertaking on the part of the Crown that 
underlies the fiduciary re la t i~nship .~~ Without it, the fiduciary characterization the Supreme 
Court of Canada adopted in Guerin is impossible. 
The Transfer of Rupert's Land and the North- Western Territory 
Hudson Bay Company [hereinafter "HBC"] lands are a notable exception to the 
explicit territorial operation of the Royal Proclamation." In 1763, of course, the governance 
of HBC lands rested with the Company by virtue of its Letters Patent of May 2, 1670. The 
exception of HBC lands in the Royal Proclamation was a recognition of that historical fact. 
However, when provision was made for the transfer of Rupert's Land to the new Dominion 
of Canada in 1 867,99 Schedule A to the Imperial Order in Council promulgated for that 
purpose expressly stated: 
97Even though different judges have chosen different ways of explaining the fiduciary 
relationship involving Aboriginal peoples, for all of them it has its roots in aboriginal title. 
The Royal Proclamation recognized aboriginal title and by itself represents the Crown's 
decision to initiate the relationship through assuming power over aboriginal title. 
"The Royal Proclamation reserves "for the use of the said Indians, all the Lands and 
Territories not included within the Limits of Our said Three New Governments, or within 
the Limits of the Territory granted to the Hudson's Bay Company, as also all the Lands and 
Territories lying to the Westward of the sources of the Rivers which fall into the Sea from 
the West and North West, as aforesaid; and We do hereby strictly forbid, on Pain of Our 
Displeasure, all Our loving Subjects from making any Purchases or Settlements whatever, 
or taking Possession of any of the Lands above reserved, without Our especial Leave and 
Licence for that Purpose first obtained." See Funston & Meehan at 78. 
99See section 146 of the Constitution Act, 1867, which provided for the admission 
of other colonies to Confederation upon issuance of an Imperial Order in Council. 
. . . claims of the Indian tribes to compensation for lands required for 
purposes of settlement will be considered and settled in conformity with the 
equitable principles which have uniformly governed the Britislz Crown in 
its dealings with aborigines. '0° [emphasis added] 
Thus, the argument may be advanced that not only did the principles articulated in 
the Royal Proclamation apply, but that they had been elevated to constitutional status as 
early as 1870 by virtue of their embodiment in the Rupert's Land and North-Western 
Territory Order."' This was the view of Mr. Justice Morrow as he expressed it in the case 
of Re Paulette's Application: 
It would seem to me from the above that the assurances made by the 
Canadian Government to pay compensation and the recognition of Indian 
claims in respect thereof did, by virtue of s. 146 [of the Constitution Act, 
1867 . . ., become part of the Canadian Constitution . . . . To the extent, 
therefore, that the above assurances [contained in the Imperial Order in 
Council effecting the transfer of Rupert's Land and the North-Western 
Territory] represent a recognition of Indian title or aboriginal rights, it may 
be that the Indians living within that part of Canada covered by the proposed 
caveat may have a constitutional guarantee that no other Canadian Indians 
have. '02 
TJze Numbered Treaties on the Prairies 
Historian Olive Dickason describes Canada's promise to Imperial authorities to 
'''As quoted in Northern Justice: The Memoirs of Mr. Justice William G. Morrow, 
W.H. Morrow ed., (Jointly published by the Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History 
and the Legal Archives Society of Alberta, 1995) at 175. 
'''The Order is listed in the Schedule to the Canada Act, 1982 as one of the 
instruments comprising the "Constitution of Canada". 
'02[1 9731 6 W.W.R. 97 at 136. Mr. Justice Morrow held that the Registrar of Land 
Titles was under a duty to file a caveat protecting Aboriginal interests in Crown lands 
located in the Northwest Territories. His decision was overturned by the Supreme Court 
of Canada on the technical ground that a caveat could not be filed against unpatented Crown 
lands. This decision was critical since, once the lands were granted from the Crown to a 
third party, there was no Aboriginal "interest in land" that could be protected by a caveat 
under the land titles system. However, the Supreme Court made no comment at all about 
the Rupert's Land Order or any of the related issues. (See R. v. Paulette, [I9771 1 W. W.R. 
321 (S.C.C.)). 
honour the provisions of the Royal Proclamation as leading directly to the numbered 
treaties.'03 She goes on to summarize treaty-making fiom the point of view of both Canada 
and the First Nations at the time: 
[Tlreaties had become the federal government's tool for extinguishing Indian 
land rights; it regarded them as the final, once-and-for-all means of opening 
up Indian lands for settlement and development. This was missed by the 
Amerindians at first because, by their custom, agreements were not 
considered permanent, subject as they were to changing conditions that 
would necessitate renegotiation and renewal. The phrase "as long as the sun 
shines and the water flows" was introduced by the whites; once it became 
part of treaty language, however, Natives expected whites to live up to their 
word. In their view, treaties were a means by which they would be able to 
adapt to the demands of the contemporary world within the framework of 
their own traditions. In return they agreed to be loyal subjects of the Crown, 
respecting its laws and customs. In the context of Indian-white relations in 
Canada, a treaty has been defined as a compact or set of fundamental 
principles that formed the basis for all future negotiations between Indians 
and whites. '04 
The numbered treaties on the prairies, including Saskatchewan, were negotiated with 
the Indians by the Government of Canada.'05 That is they were entered into post- 
Confederation, by the federal Crown, before the province of Saskatchewan was created. 
Their purpose was to expedite settlement and make the eventual creation of the province 
possible, and to avoid the costly Indian wars that were, at that time, occurring in the United 
States. It must be emphasized that these treaties were not entered into by the Imperial 
Crown to be passed on later to its constitutional heirs. They were entered into directly by the 
federal Crown in Canada, and in this factual context it is difficult to understand how it can 
be possible that any obligations would devolve to the provinces through the constitutional 
division of powers. In addition, these treaties were entered into after 1867. At that time the 
division of powers created by the Constitution Act, 1867 had already been established, and 
'03Supra, note 10 at 273. 
Io4Ibid, at 275. 
'''See Badger, supra note 7 at para. 39. 
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Saskatchewan didn't exist. There was no relationship arising between Saskatchewan and the 
Aboriginal peoples through the treaty-making process. 
Creation of the Prairie Provinces 
In 1905 the provinces of Alberta and Sasltatchewan were created out of a portion of 
the Northwest Territories. By this time, the problems resulting from the extinguishment of 
the burden of Aboriginal title were well-known as a result of the s. 109 cases involving 
Ontario and ~ u e b e c . " ~  The federal government had lost the benefits of the removal of 
Aboriginal title and retained the burden of the treaty promises by which surrender of 
Aboriginal tile was obtained. Thus, when Saskatchewan was created the lands and 
resources within its boundaries remained in the hands of the federal go~ernment . '~~  Dickson 
J. commented on the significance of this fact in Guerin, when he pointed out that because 
in British Columbia title to all Indian reserves in the province had been transferred to the 
federal Crown in 1938, the problems that arose on surrender of reserve lands in Ontario and 
Quebec did not arise in B.C.'08 The same situation obtains in Manitoba, Saskatchewan and 
Alberta, as a result of the NRTA which ensured that Canada retained ownership and control 
of Indians reserves when lands and resources were transferred to those provinces in 1930. 
The NRTA and Section 109 
The principal purpose of the NRTA was to effect a transfer of lands and resources 
to the prairie provinces, so as to put the provinces in the same position as those who 
originally entered Confederation. The preamble to the agreement sets out Canada's desire 
Io6These cases, starting with St. Catherine S Milling, are described in more detail in 
Chapter 4. 
'07Section 21 of the Saskatchewan Act, 1905,4 & 5 Edward VII, c. 42. 
'08S~pra, note 4 at 498. 
"that the Province should be placed in a position of equality with the other provinces of 
Confederation with respect to the administration and control of its natural resources as from 
its entry into Confederation in 1905."'09 The province apparently tool< the position that 
Canada had no authority to keep the natural resources in the first place.l1° However, the 
federal government ensured both that it would retain ownership and control of Indian 
reserves and that Canada's treaty obligations to the Indians were passed on as obligations 
owed by the province back to the federal government, in the form of an obligation to provide 
land. The specific provisions of the NRTA in Saskatchewan are paragraphs 10 to 12: 
10. All lands included in Indian reserves within the Province, including those 
selected and surveyed but not yet confirmed, as well as those confirmed, shall 
continue to be vested in the Crown and administered by the Government of 
Canada for the purposes of Canada, and the Province will from time to time, 
upon the request of the Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, set aside, 
out of the unoccupied Crown lands hereby transferred to its administration, 
such further areas as the said Superintendent General may, in agreement with 
the appropriate Minister of the Province, select as necessary to enable 
Canada to fulfil its obligations under the treaties with the Indians of the 
Province, and such areas shall thereafter be administered by Canada in the 
same way in all respects as if they had never passed to the Province under the 
provision hereof. 
1 1. The provisions of paragraphs one to six inclusive and paragraph eight of 
the agreement made between the Government of the Dominion of Canada 
and the Government of the Province of Ontario on the 24th day of March, 
1924, which said agreement was confirmed by statute of Canada, fourteen 
and fifteen George the Fifth chapter forty-eight, shall (except so far as they 
relate to the Bed of Navigable Waters Act) apply to the lands included in 
such Indian reserves as may hereafter be set aside under the last preceding 
clause as if the said agreement h been made between the parties hereto, and 
the provisions of the said paragraphs shall likewise apply to the lands 
included in the reserves heretofore selected and surveyed, except that neither 
the said lands nor the proceeds of the disposition thereof shall in any 
circumstances become administrable by or be paid to the Province. 
12. In order to secure to the Indians of the Province the continuance of the 
supply of game and fish for their support and subsistence, Canada agrees that 
the laws respecting game in force in the Province from time to time shall 
'09Funston & Meehan, at 3 17. 
' I0Ibid. 
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apply to the Indians within the boundaries thereof, provided, however, that 
the said Indians shall have the right, which the Province hereby assures to 
them, of hunting, trapping and fishing game and fish for food at all seasons 
of the year on all unoccupied Crown lands and on any other lands to which 
the said Indians may have a right of access."' 
When the NRTA was ratified and confirmed by the Saskatchewan Legislature, the Canadian 
Parliament and the Parliament at Westminster, it was enacted to have effect 
"notwithstanding" anything in the Constitution Act, 1867 or in any other constitutional 
enactment.'I2 Thus, the NRTA has constitutional status. It should also be noted that while 
paragraph 12 provides jurisdiction to the province to enact hunting laws that will apply to 
Indians, paragraph 1 1 maltes it clear that the results of the s. 109 cases will not apply on the 
prairies. 
The Divisible Crown Revisited 
This brief recitation of the significant legal historical events in the development of 
Saskatchewan reveals that in fact there is no actual relationship between the provincial 
Crown and Aboriginal peoples in this province. So, while there is no doubt that the Crown 
is divisible, it hardly seems to matter. This is not to deny that the decision of the English 
Court of Appeal in Secretary of State refers to provinces in the constitutional division of 
powers sense. That is, jurisdiction is devolved through the constitution to the authorities 
created by the constitution. However, in Canada, jurisdiction over Indians and their lands 
was provided constitutionally to the federal government, not to the provinces. Provincial 
jurisdiction under the constitution is not altered by the notion that the Crown can be divided. 
But, in the absence of a relationship in fact, can there still be a relationship in law? 
"*~ection 1 of the Constitution Act, 1930, 20 & 21 Geo. V, c. 26 (U.K.), ibid, at 
298. 
CHAPTER 4 
THE PRE-GUERIN CASES 
Introduction 
Those who argue that fiduciary obligations follow the division of powers under s. 9 1 
and s. 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867 look for a connection between Guerin, which was 
decided in 1984, and cases involving Aboriginal interests that were decided over the previous 
century. They see a foreshadowing of Guerin in the equitable concerns expressed by the 
judges over the perceived unfairness of the provinces receiving the benefit of the removal of 
the "burden" of Aboriginal title, without being subjected to the corresponding liabilities of 
so doing. While it is true that the language of fairness operates to stir equity's conscience, 
it is only in the most vague and ambiguous of senses that a link can be found between these 
old cases and the explicitly equitable foundation to the Supreme Court's decision in Guerin. 
Nevertheless, these decisions merit close analysis from that perspective. 
Section 109 - Who "owns" the land; who pays? 
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Guerin, in which the relationship between 
the federal Crown and Aboriginal peoples was first described as fiduciary, a number of cases 
had dealt with issues involving questions of Aboriginal title to land, the Royal Proclamation 
and treaties with the Indians. However, while Indian interests were being determined by 
these cases, Indian interests were not represented. The parties to this litigation were federal 
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and provincial governments, or interests derived from them. Their concern was the effect 
of various provisions of the Constitution Act, 1867 on Indian lands surrendered to the Crown 
via treaties. The primary provision is s. 109, which provides that: 
all lands, mines, minerals or royalties, shall belong to the several provinces 
of Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia, andNew Brunswick, in which the same are 
situate or arise, subject to any trusts existing in respect thereof, and to any 
interest other than that of the Province in the same. 
Thus, the effect of s.109 was to give to the confederating provinces the entire 
beneficial interest in all Crown lands within the boundaries of each of them at the time of 
Confederation. The first question that arose in relation to the effect ofIndian land surrenders 
under treaties was the impact of s. 109 on Indian lands that were surrendered under treaties 
with the federal government entered into after Confederation. Were Indian lands that had 
not been surrendered "Lands reserved for the Indians" within the meaning of s. 9 1 (24), and 
therefore federal lands? Or were they, too, vested in the provincial Crown by virtue of s. 
109? 
The first such case was St. Catherine's Milling'I3 It is usually cited for the 
proposition that the Indian title to land is a "personal and usufructary right" that is a "mere 
burden" on the Crown's underlying title. The case involved the question of whether or not 
the federal or provincial Crown had the right to dispose of the timber on the land that was 
surrendered by the Indians under Treaty No. 3, which was concluded with the federal Crown 
113 Supra, note 97. 
in 1873. Once the treaty was concluded, the federal government granted a timber permit to 
St. Catherine's Milling and Lumber Co. The Province of Ontario challenged the right of the 
federal government to do so, arguing that the underlying title in the lands was at all times 
vested in the "Crown" and, once the Indian title was surrendered, the beneficial interest in 
the lands passed to the province because of s. 109 of the Constitution Act, 1867.'14 
Ultimately, the Privy Council agreed with Ontario. According to Lord Watson: 
[Tlhere has been all along vested in the Crown a substantial and paramount 
estate, underlying the Indian title, which became a plenum dominium 
whenever that title was surrendered or otherwise e~tinguished."~ 
The Privy Council held that, although a surrender could only be given to the federal 
Crown (because only the federal Crown had jurisdiction to do so under s. 91(24) of the 
Constitution Act, 1867'16), once the surrender occurred, s. 109 resulted in the province 
'I4The federal government's position was that lands reserved to the Indians by virtue 
of the Royal Proclamation were federal lands over which Parliament had not only 
jurisdiction, but also ownership or beneficial entitlement. In this respect, the Royal 
Proclamation applied geographically to all lands within the Crown's dominion and outside 
the boundaries of the governments the Crown erected in Quebec, East Florida, West Florida 
and Grenada after the Treaty of Paris. 
''5Supra, note 97 at 55. This use of the term "Crown" is in a type of generic sense. 
It refers to the political notion of parliamentary government and is nicely explained by Lord 
Denning in Secretary of State. In 1888, when St Catherine's Milling was decided, the 
prevailing concept of the Crown was as one and indivisible. Subsequent maturation of the 
"Dominions", and in particular in federal states such as Canada, have resulted in the notion 
of the divisible Crown. So, to say that lands are vested in the Crown simply posits a notion 
of the state; it doesn't deal with the issue of which Crown, federal or provincial. 
Il6This point is confirmed in the more recent case of Delganzu'ukw v. British 
Columbia, [I9971 3 S.C.R. 1010. The case arose in British Columbia, where few treaties 
obtaining the benefit of it. The Privy Council rejected the federal argument that because s. 
9 l(24) gave jurisdiction to Parliament over Indians and lands reserved for them, including 
lands reserved (in a different sense) by virtue of the Royal Proclamation, it also provided the 
federal Crown the beneficial ownership of that land when the burden of the Indian title was 
removed through entering into a treaty. According to the Privy Council, the provisions of 
the Constitution Act, 1867 that purport only to allocate jurisdiction (ie. sections 91,92, etc.) 
could not be understood to deprive the provinces of the rights to land that were specifically 
provided to them under s. 109. 
Lord Watson also said that, since the benefit of the surrender accrued to Ontario, 
Ontario ought to fulfill the obligations under the treaty for payments of money that the 
federal government had undertaken in the name of the Crown. It is this reference that has 
been seized upon now to "suggest" the "existence of concurrent federal and provincial 
fiduciary obligations to aboriginal peoples".'I7 It is these comments that have been described 
as hinting at the trust or fiduciary relationship with the province. 
However, St. Catherine S Milling does not speak at all to the fiduciary issue. Its 
answer to the question of which manifestation of the Crown is entitled to the benefit of the 
with the Indians have been concluded. The Province argued that it had extinguished the 
Indian title to the land prior to the enactment of s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, which 
recognizes and affirms "existing aboriginal and treaty rights". The Supreme Court said that 
the province does not have the constitutional competence to extinguish Aboriginal title. 
Il7Rotman, supra note 21 at 226. 
produce of the land within the boundaries of a province was that it falls to be determined by 
the terms of Confederation itself. Section 9 l(24) gave the federal Crown legislative power 
over Indians, but s. 109 gave the land to the provinces. Removal of the "burden" of Indian 
title could only be accomplished by the federal Crown, but once removed the province 
benefits - because of the constitution. The obligations that the Privy Council decided 
belonged to the province were not thereby transformed into obligations to Aboriginal 
peoples; nor were they fiduciary in nature. At best, they were obligations owed by the 
province to the federal government and seem to result from some notion of fairness, which 
the Privy Council did not explain. But the consequences of treaty surrenders were explored 
further in the subsequent cases of Ontario Mining Company and Attorney General for 
Canada v. Seybold and Attorney General for Ontario"' and Re Treaty No. 3 Annuities.'I9 
InSeybold, questions similar to those inst. Catherine 's Milling arose when aportion 
of a reserve set aside under Treaty No. 3 was itself surrendered. On October 8, 1886, the 
Rat Portage band surrendered a portion of its reserve, known as Reserve 38B, to the Crown 
in trust to sell it and to invest the proceeds of the sale on behalf of the band. Both the federal 
and provincial governments originally claimed to be entitled to dispose of the land 
surrendered from the Reserve, but the parties to the litigation were those claiming to have 
obtained title to the land from the federal and provincial Crowns, respectively, and not the 
Crowns themselves. In fact, the two Crowns had entered into an agreement, which was 
'18[1 9031 A.C. 73 [hereinafter Seybold]. 
"9[1910] A.C. 637 (P.C.). 
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incorporated into two identical statutes enacted by both Parliament and the Ontario 
Legislature, by which the federal government acknowledged that it had, after concluding 
Treaty No. 3, purported to set aside Indian reserves in an area that later it was discovered 
lay within the boundaries of Ontario and by which Ontario agreed to concur in these land 
selections in order to avoid disruption. The agreement also provided for the establishment 
of a joint commission to settle and determine any questions that might arise between the two 
governments in relation to the reserves thus created.I2O The Privy Council thus took the 
position that, because of its view of the rights of the two governments, it did not need to 
discuss the effect of the 1886 surrender, although, in that respect it agreed with the decisions 
below, which held that while jurisdiction over Indian reserves rested with Parliament by 
virtue of s. 9 1 of the Constitution Act, 1867, the territorial and proprietary rights to the land 
once surrendered out of the Indian reserve passed to the province under s. 109. 
Nevertheless, the Privy Council commented that the 1873 surrender, by which the 
treaty was achieved, required the province to adhere to the conditions under which the treaty 
was obtained, if it was to receive the benefits of the treaty. As Lord Davey, put it: 
Let it be assumed that the Government of the province, taking advantage of 
the surrender of 1873, came at least under an honourable engagement to fulfil 
the terms on the faith of which the surrender was made, and, therefore, to 
concur with the Dominion Government in appropriating certain undefined 
portions of the surrendered lands as Indian reserves. The result, however, 
is that the choice and location of the lands to be so appropriated could only 
I2OSee, Statutes of Canada, 54 & 55 Vict. c. 5 and Statutes of Ontario, 54 Vict. c. 
3 (1894). 
be effectively made by the joint action of the two governments.'21 
The phrase "at least. . . an honourable engagement," while it implies something other than 
a legal obligation, foreshadows the equitable arguments arising 80 years later. But this 
honourable engagement does not arise out of the province's relationship with the Indians, 
nor is it an obligation owed to the Indians; it is an obligation owed to the federal Crown.'22 
Treaty No. 3 Annuities dealt with the issue of who had to pay the annuities provided 
for under Treaty No. 3. The Privy Council held here that there was no legal obligation on 
the province to make the payments under the treaty because the province did not enter into 
the agreement with the Indians. As Lord Loreburn remarked: 
It may be that, as a matter of fair play between the two Governments, as to 
which their Lordships are not called upon to express and do not express an 
opinion, the province ought to be liable for some part of this outlay. But in 
point of law, which alone is here in question, the judgment of the Supreme 
'21Seybold, supra note 1 18 at 82-83. 
122See Rotman, supra note 21 at 233 - 235. Rotman criticizes the notion of 
"honourable engagement7' because it results in the Indian signatories to a treaty being unable 
to enforce their right to have reserves set aside for them. It should be noted that this case 
was not about the enforcement of Indian rights under the treaty. It was about who gets to 
sell the land surrendered by them. In the Divisional Court, Street J. said, at 81, that "the 
surrender [under the treaty] was undoubtedly burdened with the obligation imposed by the 
treaty to select and lay aside special portions of the tract covered by it for the special use and 
benefit of the Indians [that is, the creation of Indian reserves in the sense we understand that 
term today]. The Provincial Government could not without plain disregard of justice take 
advantage of that surrender and refuse to perform the condition attached to it". No doubt, 
then, if the issue before the court had been the failure of Ontario to consent to the 
establishment of any reserves, the court would have viewed that as a failure of an essential 
condition of the treaty bargain, and Ontario would not have received the benefit of the land 
because the land would have remained subject to the Indian interest. 
Court appears une~ceptionab1e.l~~ 
The Robinson Treaties A n n ~ i t i e s ' ~ ~  case was an appeal from an arbitration award on 
the question of whether the federal or the provincial government was responsible for paying 
the increase in the annuity payments under the Robinson-Huron and the Robinson-Superior 
treaties of 1850. These treaties had been entered into between the Indians and the old 
Province of Canada, prior to Confederation. One of the annuities provided for in the treaties 
was a payment tied to increased revenues from the surrendered lands. The arbitrators held 
that, because the lands surrendered were all located in Ontario, Ontario was responsible for 
the payments since it had received the benefit of the treaties. However, the Supreme Court 
of Canada, affirmed by the Privy Council, decided the case on the basis of sections 1 1 1 and 
1 12 of the Constitution Act, 1867, which capped the amount of debt from the old Province 
of Canada that Ottawa would be obliged to accept. So, if the increased annuities were a 
"debt" within the meaning of those provisions, they had to be assumed by the province to 
the extent that they exceeded the limit contained in s. 1 12. 
These cases consistently illustrate the Privy Council's view that while only the federal 
government has the power to make treaties, it cannot thereby bind the provinces to accept 
the terms it has negotiated in their absence. None of the cases remark upon the existence 
of any kind of obligation by the provinces to Aboriginal peoples in such situations, although 
I2'Rotman, supra note 21 at 237. 
'24[1897] A.C. 199 (P.C.). 
they do remark on the apparent injustice of the provinces receiving the best of both worlds, 
as it were.'25 Furthermore, these cases were all decided long before the Supreme Court of 
Canada determined that a fiduciary relationship existed between the Crown and Aboriginal 
peoples, out ofwhich relationship there arose obligations on the Crown that placed limits on 
the Crown's ability to exercise its legal powers without regard to the interests of the 
Aboriginal peoples for whose benefit it acted. 
Leonard Rotman describes these cases as being about provincial responsibility for 
treaty obligations, and argues that "because Indian treaties are concrete manifestations of the 
Crown's fiduciary obligations to aboriginal peoples, these cases demonstrate one basis for 
the existence of provincial fiduciary duties to Native peoples."'26 However, even Rotman 
notes that the "judges found it difficult to find that the provinces could be held liable for 
obligations undertaken by the federal Crown".'27 This is, of course, the point. This quartet 
of s. 109 cases has clearly established that treaties with the Indians must be entered into with 
the federal Crown in order to validly extinguish the Aboriginal title, but that once the 
Aboriginal title is surrendered to the federal Crown, the provincial Crown receives the 
benefit of the surrender. The obligations assumed by the federal Crown in exchange for the 
surrender of Aboriginal title is binding on the federal Crown, although the provincial Crown 
may be under some form of moral obligation that would require it to repay the federal 
'25Rotman, supra note 21 at 240. 
'26~otman, supra note 21 at 237. 
'271bid. 
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Crown.'28 However, if the amount involved exceeds the limitation on debts assumed by the 
provinces at Confederation by virtue of sections 1 1 1 and 1 12 of the Constitution Act, 1867, 
the federal Crown would not, in any event, be able to require the province to pay. Most 
importantly, any requirement, moral or legal, for the province to pay for the benefit of the 
surrender it receives is an obligation that it owes not to the Aboriginal peoples who signed 
the treaty, but to the federal Crown. 
The Subsequent Cases 
Rotman argues that subsequent cases to these four contain inferences of provincial 
fiduciary obligations to Aboriginal peoples. He cites Snzith v. RI2" Gardner v. The Queen 
in Right of O n t a r i ~ , ' ~ ~  Cree Regional Authority v. RobinsonI3' and Delganzu 'ukw v. British 
Columbia at the trial l e ~ e 1 . I ~ ~  However, the issue of provincial fiduciary obligations was not 
analyzed in any of them. 
In fact, Smith confirms the position articulated in St. Catherine 's Milling and Seybold 
I z 8 ~ t  best, aprovince's failure to provide land to enable the federal Crown to live up 
to its treaty obligations may result in the failure of a condition precedent that would then 
negate the surrender and leave the province unable to deal with the land thus burdened by 
the Aboriginal title. 
'29[1983] 1 S.C.R. 554. 
I 3 O  [I9841 45 O.R. 760, online: QL (O.J.) 
'31[1991] 4 C.N.L.R. 84 (F.C.T.D.) 
'32[1991] 3 W.W.R. 97 
that the proprietary interest in lands from which the Indian title is removed vests in the 
Crown in right of the province, and specifically declines to deal with issues beyond that one. 
Rotman describes the Court as "hint[ing] that a provincial Crown may be found liable for 
discharging the obligations stemming from an Indian land treaty or from the effects of a 
surrender of Indian reserve lands to the Crown."'33 The case is another example of the s. 
109 problem in Ontario and Quebec, but this time the lands in question were located in New 
Brunswick. The Court held, again, that because of s. 109 the province "owned" the land in 
question subject to the burden of Aboriginal title. Once that burden was removed by a 
surrender to the federal Crown - because only the federal Crown has such authority by virtue 
of s. 91(24) - the land fell under the ownership and control of the province. The hints to 
which Rotman points are contained in the quotations taken from Seybold, but the Court 
makes no further comment in this regard. 
Gardner dealt with a preliminary issue of whether or not the Eagle Lake band was 
able to maintain concurrent actions in both the Ontario and Federal Courts seeking a 
declaration that it had a right of possession of headlands in the parts of its reserve that were 
bordered by bodies ofwater. This was another case involving Treaty No. 3, and Ontario had 
entered into an agreement with Canada, implemented through complementary legislation, by 
which it had acknowledged this right. It later reneged on that agreement by passing 
unilateral legislation. In this context, the Ontario High Court of Justice was called upon to 
decide whether or not a cause of action existed and could be maintained in that court and in 
'33Rotman, supra note 21 at 240. 
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the Federal Court. White J. refused to grant the motion to strike that was requested by 
Ontario. In a decision that is remarkable in its foreshadowing of the Supreme Court's 
declaration of the existence of a fiduciary relationship only six months later in Guerin, he 
concluded: 
It is my view that the cases leave it open for the Crown to stand in the 
position of trustee with regard to an asset such as the Band's reserve. 
Furthermore, as I read the cases, there is no absolute requirement for the 
capacity of the Crown to act as trustee to exist, that some statute or 
agreement explicitly accepts on the part of the Crown that it is a trustee. In 
other words, the relationship of trustee as between the Crown and the Band 
could arise by implication from statute or  circumstance^.'^^ 
Nevertheless, White J. was not called upon to make a determination about the 
relationship between the provincial Crown and Aboriginal peoples, nor did he. In addition, 
the nature of the issue was complicated by the fact that the province had entered into an 
agreement with Ottawa that both had implemented through legislation. Under these 
circumstances, perhaps, indeed, a trust-like relationship might have been created. 
The evidence to support a provincial fiduciary relationship in Cree Regional 
Authority and in Delgamu 'ukw is also subtle. In the former case, the Cree Regional 
Authority applied for injunctive relief to compel the Federal Administrator to comply with 
the federal environmental and social impact assessment and review procedures contemplated 
by sections 22 and 23 of the "James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement" and the James 
'34Supra, note 130 at 9 (Q.L.). 
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Bay and Northern Quebec Native Claims Settlement Act. The court held that federal and 
provincial law each required an assessment procedure. The injunction obtained compelled 
the administrator to comply with the federal government's duty under the Agreement. 
Rouleau J. observed: 
Crown counsel [for the province] also submitted that, if the JBNQ 
Agreement leads to confusion or is open to two possible interpretations, it 
should be construed in such a manner as to ensure that one area of 
jurisdiction will not intrude upon the other. In light of the fiduciary 
obligation imposed upon the federal government in its dealing with the native 
population, I perceive no ambiguity; the Agreement mandates the protection 
of the aboriginal people who relinquished substantial rights in return for the 
protection of both levels of government. 
Crown counsel also pointed out to me that Sparrow, supra, does not 
distinguish between the federal and provincial Crown; that the provincial 
authorities are also responsible for protecting the rights of the native 
population. I agree. I am not suggesting that the province of Quebec will 
not be vigilant vis-a-vis the Cree or Inuit populations. However, the issue 
with which I am charged is to determine the responsibility of the federal 
government and whether or not it should live up to its responsibility. ... 
16 years ago all parties obviously realized that there were areas exclusive to 
the federal domain which could be affected by any future development; that 
further development of Northern Quebec would certainly implicate the Inuit 
and Cree communities. As a result, the 1975 Agreement fully recognized 
that at some future date two jurisdictions would be involved, as well as the 
aboriginal people; all parties were cognizant of the necessity of reducing to 
writing a procedure for future cooperation. I find it incomprehensible that 
on the one hand the intervenors, the Attorney General for Quebec and 
Hydro-QuCbec declare themselves bound to abide by the JBNQ Agreement, 
but on the other hand other signatories to the same agreement are 
excluded. '35 
In other words, the existence of the special relationship between the federal Crown 
'35Supra, at note 13 1. 
and Aboriginal peoples supports fiduciary obligations to protect their interests even when 
those interests are taken into account by the provincial Crown. In fact, this passage suggests 
that the Provincial Crown has no fiduciary obligations. 
In the trial decision in Delgamu'ukw, McEachern C.J.B.C. found that the province 
had a fiduciary obligation based on the special facts of that case: 
Keeping in mind the general obligation of the Crown towards Indians, and 
that "the categories of fiduciary, like those of negligence should not be 
considered closed," (Guerin, p. 384), it is my view that a unilateral 
extinguishment of a legal right, accompanied by apromise, can hardly be less 
effective than a surrender as a basis for a fiduciary 0b1igation.I~~ 
He specifically rejected the idea that Sparrow could be understood as establishing a "general 
comprehensive fiduciary duty in every ~ituat ion". '~~ But he went on to conclude that in the 
case before him: 
where a general obligation has been recognized, a promise made and acted 
upon for well over 100 years is sufficient to support an enforceable, fiduciary 
or trust-like obligation upon the Crown.I3' 
What is important about his statement about the fiduciary obligation ofthe provincial Crown 
is that it is based on a specific, long-standing relationship. 
'36Supra, note 132 at 41 6. 
'37Supra, note 132 at 417. 
13'Ibid. 
The Supreme Court's decision in Bear Island was a brief one. The question for the 
court was whether or not the Temagami Indians had sufficient title in certain lands covered 
by Treaty 3 to support the filing of a caution or caveat under the provincial land titles 
legislation. The Court concluded that whatever Aboriginal title had existed, it was 
extinguished by the treaty and therefore the cautions could not be filed. According to the 
Court: 
It is unnecessary, however, to examine the specific nature of the aboriginal 
right because, in our view, whatever may have been the situation upon the 
signing of the Robinson-Huron Treaty, that right was in any event 
surrendered by arrangements subsequent to that treaty by which the Indians 
adhered to the treaty in exchange for treaty annuities and a reserve. It is 
conceded that the Crown has failed to comply with some of its obligations 
under this agreement, and thereby breached its fiduciary obligations to the 
Indians. These matters currently form the subject of negotiations between 
the parties. It does not alter the fact, however, that the aboriginal right has 
been extinguished. 
The Court's reference to ongoing negotiations has been taken to imply that the provincial 
Crown has fiduciary duties to Aboriginal peoples because it was the province that was in 
negotiation with the Temagami people at the time.139 This is rather slim support for such a 
conclusion, particularly given the existence of the 1894 agreement between Canada and 
Ontario that brought Ontario into all subsequent treaty  negotiation^.'^^ It may also be 
noteworthy that, in a subsequent case involving a motion to quash the cautions appeals filed 
139Rotman, supra note 21 at 242. 
140See Alan Pratt, "The Problem of Extinguishment in the Numbered Treaties", A 
Discussion Paper for the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, May 10,1995 (revised 
September 1996) at 12. 
by the Temagami Indians under the Land Titles Act, the Indians argued that the Crown had 
breached its fiduciary duty to them by breaching the treaty. In this regard, the motions judge 
stated: 
Moreover, the lands subject to the cautions are held by the Crown in Right 
of the Province of Ontario, but it is the federal government that is signatory 
to the treaty.14' 
It should be noted that all of these cases have arisen in parts of Canada to which s. 
109 of the Constitution Act, 1867 applies, not the NRTA. As we have seen, the provisions 
of the NRTA were specifically designed to avoid the problems that Canada had experienced 
as a result of s. 109 in the rest of Canada. Paragraph 11 specifically provides for the 
application of the agreement between Ontario and Canada dated March 24,1924, by which 
the long struggle between them starting with St. Catherine's Milling was finally resolved, 
with the result that Indian reserves remain vested in Canada's name and may be dealt with 
by Canada if surrendered. As well, paragraph 10 specifically obliges the provinces to supply 
land to Canada to enable it to fulfill its treaty promises. Saskatchewan's continuing 
obligation to do so was recently confirmed by Gerein J. in Lac La Ronge Indian Band v. 
Canada'42 who held: 
Accordingly, unless lawfully amended, s. 10 remains in full force without any 
limitations. The authority of Canada to request land is unchanged as is 
Saskatchewan's obligation to provide land. The Province remains bound by 
I4'Bear Island Foundation v. Ontario, [I9951 O.J. No. 3431, at para. 34. 
'42[2000] 1 C.N.L.R. 245. 
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the section and must abide by its  requirement^.'^^ 
There is very little in any of these cases to suggest that the provincial Crown has 
fiduciary obligations to Aboriginal peoples falling outside the existence of any fiduciary 
relationship. Of course, the most significant area in which the actions of provincial Crowns 
have been examined by the courts in the post-Guerin cases involves situations invoking the 
protection of s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 for infringement of Aboriginal and treaty 
rights. 
Professor Slattery appears to locate the fiduciary relationship in the Constitution, 
since he describes the Crown's fiduciary obligations as having been "constitutionalized by 
section 35".'44 He also observes that "so long as the Provinces have powers and rights 
enabling them to affect adversely Aboriginal interests protected by the [fiduciary] 
relationship, they hold attendant fiduciary  obligation^".'^^ I have already argued that 
fiduciary obligations arise only out of fiduciary relationships. But if that relationship is 
embodied in the Constitution through the protection afforded to Aboriginal and treaty rights 
by s. 35, then it would also follow that it is only when provinces are able to affect such rights 
adversely that they have a fiduciary relationship and hence fiduciary obligations. This raises 
the question of the extent to which provinces may enact laws that have such effects and 
1431bid, at para. 36 1. 
1 4 4 ' i ~  Question of Trust," supra note 21 at 263. 
'451bid, at 274. 
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requires a consideration of the manner in which provincial laws of general application apply 
to Aboriginal peoples ex proprio vigore. 
CHAPTER 5 
THE APPLICATION OF PROVINCIAL LAWS TO INDIANS 
Introduction 
The power to enact laws in relation to Indians and their lands rests with Parliament 
by virtue of s. 9 l(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867. However, the courts have long held that 
Indian reserves are not federal enclaves and that provincial laws of general application also 
apply to Indians and to their lands,'46 because Indians are people in the province. So, while 
provinces cannot enact laws that are directed at, that single out, or that are otherwise "in 
relation to" Indians or their lands, they can enact laws that will apply to Indians along with 
everyone else. Even so, the application of such laws to Indians or their lands is limited by 
the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity. The classic statement of the doctrine is set out 
by Beetz, J. in Bell Canada v. Que'bec: 
'461n R. v. Jim (1915), 4 C.N.L.C. 328, the British Columbia Supreme Court held 
that the provincial Game Protection Act did not apply to an Indian who killed a deer for 
food on the reserve on which he lived, on the basis that the "management" of Indian reserves 
was governed by the Indian Act and beyond provincial jurisdiction. It is noteworthy that this 
case was decided before the enactment of the NRTA, a point which was of significance in 
Cardinal v. A-G Alberta (1973), 7 C.N.L.C. 307, which is cited as authority for the 
proposition that Indian reserves are not "federal enclaves". In Cardinal the accused was an 
Indian who was charged with an offence against provincial wildlife legislation for selling 
moose meat to a non-Indian on the reserve where the accused lived. A majority of the 
Supreme Court of Canada specifically rejected the argument made by the accused that Indian 
reserves were enclaves to which provincial laws did not apply, pointing out that the double 
aspect doctrine was well-established and valid provincial legislation could always incidentally 
affect a subject matter assigned to federal jurisdiction. 
Works, such as federal railways, things, such as land reserved for Indians, 
and persons, such as Indians, who are within the special and exclusive 
jurisdiction of Parliament, are still subject to provincial statutes that are 
general in their application,. . .provided however that the application of these 
provincial laws does not bear upon those subjects in what makes them 
specifically of federal juri~dict ion. '~~ 
While it is difficult to set out the precise boundary between this doctrine and the pith 
and substance doctrine, by which validity of a law must first be established, generally, those 
provincial laws that affect a vital part of a matter of federal jurisdiction will be "read down" 
in order to operate within the limits of their scope of validity. However, the important result 
of the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity is that, where it applies, "it renders provincial 
regulation inapplicable even in the absence of federal legislation governing the matter at 
issue".'48 In other words, a provincial law that is not overridden by a federal law as a result 
of actual operational conflict can still be rendered inapplicable to a matter falling within 
federal jurisdiction, whether or not there is a federal law with which it does or might conflict. 
Of course, the difficult question to answer is when, in the words of Beetz, J, does a 
law bear on a subject in such a manner as to affect it in that character that makes it a matter 
of federal jurisdiction. According to Professor Hogg: 
This formulation seems to involve ajudicial judgment as to the severity of the 
impact of a provincial law on the federal subject to which the law ostensibly 
'47[1988] 1 S.C.R. 749 at para.20. 
'48SIGA v. CAW- Canada, [2000] 8 W.W.R. 338 (Sask. Q.B.) 
extends. If the provincial law would affect the "basic, minimum and 
unassailable" core ofthe federal subject, then the interjurisdictional immunity 
doctrine stipulates that the law must be restricted in its application (read 
down) to exclude the federal subject. If, on the other hand, the provincial 
law does not intrude heavily on the federal subject, then the pith and 
substance doctrine stipulates that the provincial law may validly apply to the 
federal subject. '49 
The matter is further complicated by the fact that even provincial laws that would 
otherwise be read down on the basis of the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity apply to 
Indians by virtue of s. 88 of the Indian Act. That is, Parliament has exercised its jurisdiction 
under s. 91 (24) to extend the application of such provincial laws to Indians, as long as the 
provincial laws do not infringe on treaties or federal statutes and as long as they are 
provincial laws of general application. This reference to provincial laws of general 
application is not to be confused with such laws that already apply to Indians exproprio 
vigore. Here the requirement that the provincial law be one of general application is found 
in s. 88, and is intended to restrict federal incorporation by reference under that section to 
only those provincial laws that do not single out Indians. That is, s. 88 does not and cannot 
invigorate provincial laws that deliberately and obviously go beyond provincial jurisdiction; 
to do so would no doubt amount to an invalid delegation of power fi-om one constitutional 
authority to another. It is also important to recognize that, as a provision of the Indian Act, 
s. 88 only extends the application of provincial laws to Indians as defined by that Act. As 
a result, provincial laws thus made applicable to status Indians may not apply to non-status 
Indians and MCtis. 
'49Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1997), 
looseleaf edition, at 15-33 [hereinafter Hogg]. 
However, since s. 9 l(24) is a head of power that is a group of people, any of the laws 
that Parliament could make in relation to those people will be listed in s. 92 as heads of 
provincial power, not in other categories of federal power under s. 91. That is, in making 
laws in relation to Indians and their lands, Parliament would not find independent jurisdiction 
under other heads of federal power enumerated in s. 91. Thus, except for the fact that 
Parliament in legislating in relation to Indians and their lands is legislating under s. 9 1 (24), 
such laws would otherwise, in pith and substance, be laws in relation to matters such as 
property and civil rights or matters of a local or private nature, and fall within provincial 
jurisdiction. The use of federal power under s. 91(24) to provide for the application of all 
relevant provincial laws to this group of people in each province is thus a convenient and 
expedient mechanism by which to establish a body of law applicable to them, and avoids the 
necessity of developing a complex regime of what would otherwise be provincial law at the 
federal level, subject to the limitation of the treaties and other federal legislation. 
As an illustration of this point, it is interesting to compare the decision of the 
Supreme Court in Four B Manufacturing Ltd. v. United Garment Workers o f ~ m e r i c a , ' ~ ~  
and the decision of the Saslcatchewan Court of Appeal in Whitebear Band Council v. 
Carpenters Provincial Council of Saskatchewan et al. 15' Both cases dealt with the question 
of whether it was provincial or federal labour laws that applied to activities on reserve. In 
Four B, Beetz, J . ,  in the Supreme Court, pointed out that the Indian Act did not regulate 
'50[1980] 1 S.C.R. 1031. 
15'(1982), 135 D.L.R. (3d) 128. 
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labour relations on reserve, nor did the Canada Labour Code. As a result, he said, "these 
labour relations accordingly remain subject to laws of general application in force in the 
Province as is contemplated by s. 88 of the Indian Acty'. In other words, provincial labour 
laws applied because they were laws of general application invigorated by section 88. 
In Whitebear, however, provincial labour laws did not apply. Relying on the 
interpretation given to the Supreme Court's decision by the Federal Court of Appeal in 
Francis v. Canada Labour Relations ~ o a r d , ' ~ *  the Court of Appeal found that where the 
Band Council carried out programs expressly within the authority conferred upon it by the 
Indian Act, the activity was a "federal work, undertaking or business" within the meaning 
of the Canada Labour Code, and that employees involved in it were "very directly involved 
in activities closely related to Indian status" as this phrase was used by Beetz J. in Four B 
Manufacturing.' 53 
Thus, the apparent narrowness of the scope of s. 91(24) is misleading. While 
virtually all provincial laws apply to Indians in the province, it is as a result of the exercise 
of both provincial and federal power in this complex fashion, and it is important to determine 
whether a provincial law applies to Indians of its own force, or because it has been adopted 
by the exercise of federal jurisdiction. This distinction is important in the context of specific 
cases of infringement of Aboriginal rights by provincial laws. Notable first of all, is that 
' 5 2  [I9811 1 F.C. 225. 
'531bid, at para. 46. 
treaty rights, which are, together with Aboriginal rights, protected by s. 35 of the 
Constitution Act, 1982, cannot be infringed by a provincial law applicable to Indians by s. 
88 of the Indian Act, because s. 88 contains this explicit,limit on the provincial laws that it 
breathes life into. Furthermore, the extension of provincial laws via s. 88 does not include 
laws that are in relation to Indian lands. 
Secondly, a provincial law that applies to Indians by virtue of s. 88 and infringes an 
Aboriginal right, would, in my view, fall to be justified by the federal government because 
it is federal jurisdiction that has been exercised in relation to Indians, even though in the form 
of a provincial law. The provincial law is made applicable by the exercise of federal power. 
This point was recognized by Madam Justice Smith in SIGA, where she said: 
This section [s. 881 has been interpreted as a federal adoption, or 
incorporation by reference, of provincial laws of general application, making 
such laws applicable as a part of federal law'54. 
Later, she said, "It is clear that provincial laws cannot affect aboriginal or treaty 
rights."[emphasis added] This is also the argument made by Richard Boivin, : 
Ainsi, une loi provinciale d'application gknerale qui touche $i la quidditd 
indienne serait incorporde par renvoi dans le droit federal, et c'est donc sous 
la coupe d'une loi fdddrale que la provinciale incorporee en virtu de l'article 
88 de la Loi sur les Indiens passerait le test de l'article 35 de la Loi 
'54S~pra,  note 148 at para. 33. 
Is5Ibid, at para. 69. 
constitutionelle de 1 982.156 
Clearly, the Sparrow justification of such provincial laws by the federal Crown will 
be difficult, if not impossible. Parliament will have had nothing to do with the development 
of the provincial law and will not be knowledgeable of the reasons for its enactment. But 
surely these practical problems do not transform the provincial Crown into a fiduciary. 
Rather than burden the provincial Crown with obligations that are not connected to any 
relationship that the provincial Crown has to Indians, it should more appropriately fall back 
to Parliament to justify its enactment of a law in relation to Indians that incorporates 
provincial law in so sweeping a manner as to permit such law to infringe Aboriginal or treaty 
rights. Indeed, Sparrow suggests that s. 88 is itself a breach of the federal Crown's fiduciary 
obligations and ought not to be permitted to extend the application of provincial laws to 
situations in which those laws might infringe Aboriginal or treaty rights. 
In Sasltatchewan, though, as in the other prairie provinces, provincial jurisdiction 
over Indians is also available under paragraph 12 of the NRTA. Under paragraph 12, the 
province is authorized to make laws respecting hunting, fishing and trapping that will also 
be applicable to Indians, again, with some notable limitations. First of all, the provincial 
legislation enacted under this authority must be for the purposes of conservation. Secondly, 
'56Supra, note 30 at 20. Translation: 
Thus, a provincial law of general application that touches on Indians qua 
Indians would be incorporated by reference into federal law and it would be 
under the scope of federal jurisdiction that a provincial law incorporated by 
virtue of s. 88 of the Indian Act would be able to pass the s. 35 test. 
Indians cannot be prevented by provincial law from hunting for food at any time of year on 
unoccupied Crown lands and lands to which they have a right of access. The NRTA can 
therefore be seen as a special case or variation on the s. 88 situation, by which federal 
application of certain provincial laws in certain provinces occurs, this time supported by a 
constitutional amendment rather than just a federal statute.'57 
As a result, Saskatchewan statutes may validly be applicable to Indians if they fall 
into one of three categories: 
They are provincial laws of general application and apply to Indians in the 
same way that they apply to everyone in the province. These laws are made 
pursuant to provincial jurisdi~tion. '~~ 
They are wildlife laws, enacted for the purposes of conservation, but they 
don't prevent Indians from hunting for food at any time on certain lands. 
These laws are made pursuant to specific provincial jurisdiction provided for 
'57Martland J. seems to make this point in Calder when he describes the impact of 
the NRTA and refers to section 69 of the Indian Act, 1927, which provided to the 
Superintendent General the power to declare provincial gaming laws to apply within a 
province or territory and which ceased to have effect on the prairies when the several natural 
resources transfer agreements were entered into and confirmed by constitutional amendment. 
However, under the NRTA, the province is not limited in respect of laws that affect treaties 
- although s. 35 now provides for that limitation subject to justification - and presumably 
valid provincial laws would also be subject to federal paramountcy on the assumption that 
s. 91(24) provides the federal government with authority to enact such laws if it chose to. 
'58As in R v. Hill (1907), 5 O.L.R. 406 (C.A.), in which an Indian was convicted of 
the unauthorized practice of medicine under a provincial statute, or Four B Manufacturing 
v. United Garment Workers, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 103 1, in which provincial labour laws applied 
to a shoe manufacturing business located on a reserve and owned by a corporation that was 
owned by Indians, and in which the workers were mainly Indians, or R. v. Francis, [I9881 
1 S.C.R. 1025, in which provincial traffic laws were held to be applicable to Indians on 
reserve 
in the NRTA and therefore in the Con~titution. '~~ 
They are provincial laws of general application that do affect Indians as 
Indians, but they don't infringe on treaty rights or federal statutes and they 
are made applicable to them by virtue of federal law. These laws are made 
pursuant to federal jurisdi~tion. '~~ 
However, it can only be those laws that can adversely affect Indians as Indians that 
attract a fiduciary component. That is, laws that apply to Indians because they apply to 
everyone else are obviously not burdened with fiduciary concerns, or at least not with the 
specific fiduciary concerns that relate to the Aboriginal peoples of Canada. They don't arise 
in the context of a fiduciary relationship as is clear from the fact that they are laws of general 
application. And, since provincial laws that affect Indians qua Indians are invalid, it seems 
that it is not possible for provincial laws, other than those enacted under the authority of the 
NRTA, to infringe Aboriginal or treaty rights nor, therefore, to be subjected to fiduciary 
criteria. That is, only where the province has power over Indians and their lands, can it have 
fiduciary obligations to them. However, this issue is confused by the apparent general 
application of s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 to both federal and provincial laws. The 
IS9The many cases relating to the NRTA determine that provincial gaming laws apply 
to Indians, both on and off reserve, within the limitations sets out in the NRTA relating to 
hunting for food on lands to which Indians have a right of access. While the cases grapple 
with the application of these general concepts to particular cases, the basic rule is that the 
province is competent to enact laws in relation to Indians in this limited area ofjurisdiction. 
I6OAs in R. v. Dick, [I9851 2 S.C.R. 309, in which provincial wildlife legislation, 
assuming it to be "in relation to" Indians, was incorporated by reference into the federal law 
by virtue of section 88. Compare this result to the one in Derrickson v. Derrickson, [I9861 
1 S.C.R. 285, where provincial matrimonial property legislation was held not to apply to 
reserve lands because, since the provincial law was inconsistent with the provisions of the 
Indian Act relating to the management of reserves, it was caught by the exception in section 
88. 
implication that therefore arises is that provincial laws are caught by the Sparrow justification 
requirement. There seems to be no doubt that any infringing laws must be measured against 
the fiduciary criteria by which limitations on federal jurisdiction under s. 91(24) were 
imposed by virtue of Sparrow. It is not my argument that infringing provincial laws would 
not be subject to Sparrow; I argue the preliminary point that, generally speaking, provincial 
laws that infringe s. 35 are either invalid or inoperative. 
Tlze Application of s. 35 to Provincial Laws 
Sparrow was the first case in which the Supreme Court considered s. 35 and it 
addressed a number of important issues for the first time.I6' In the midst of that discussion, 
which on its facts was confined to the situation of an infringing federal law, the Court's 
decision contains one provocative line referring to provinces: 
It [s. 3 51 also affords constitutional protection against provincial legislative 
power. 16' 
Dickson J., in his reasons for decision in the case of Mitchell v. Peguis Indian Band,'63 which 
was rendered by the Court only three weeks after Sparrow, made a similar generalized 
remark (and also in obiter) about s. 35 and provinces, stating "the newly entrenched s. 35 
1611ncluding such issues as what constitutes an "existing" right. 
'62[1990] 1 S.C.4. 1075, at p. 1105. The published judgment is about 35 pages long. 
'63[1990] 2 S.C.R. 85. 
of the Constitution Act, 1982, applies to all levels of government in Canada". '64 And in R. 
v CGte', Cory J., speaking for the majority, said: 
The text and purpose of s. 35(1) do not distinguish between federal and 
provincial laws which restrict aboriginal or treaty rights, and they should both 
be subject to the same standard of constitutional scmtiny.lG5 
It is to be noted that the statement about s. 35's application to provincial law in CGte' 
is grounded on the Court's decision in R. v. ~ a d g e r ' ~ ~ ,  and while more must be said about 
this case in due course, it is sufficient to observe at this juncture that Badger dealt with a 
provincial law enacted under the authority of the NRTA, which provides to the province a 
IG4Ibid, at pp.108-9. Justices Dickson and La Forest co-authored the Sparrow 
decision for the Court. Mitchell involved a statutory interpretation question concerning 
whether or not a reference to "Her Majesty" in section 90 of the Indian Act was a reference 
to both the federal and provincial Crowns. The question arose after Manitoba agreed to 
return an invalid tax collected by Manitoba Hydro to the Indian Band from which the tax had 
been collected. The Band's lawyers sued for their fees for representing the Band in the 
negotiations and obtained a pre-judgment garnishee to attachthe tax rebate funds being held 
in trust for the Band by the government of Manitoba. The trial judge held that the funds due 
from Manitoba could not be garnished because of section 90 and the appeal by the plaintiff 
lawyers was dismissed. Although the court was unanimous in its conclusion to dismiss the 
appeal, the members of the Court came to this conclusion for very different reasons. Justice 
Dickson's decision was effectively in dissent. The majority view was that the references in 
section 90 to "Her Majesty" did not include the provincial Crown, but for other reasons the 
funds were not liable to garnishment. Even if the court had been unanimous on this point, 
it does not follow that provinces thereby gain fiduciary responsibilities. Justice Dickson's 
decision was not premised on a fiduciary argument. He only mentions the word "fiduciary" 
once, in relation to his description of Guerin. His judgment is based on a liberal approach 
to statutory interpretation that has its roots in the mischief rule developed more than 400 
years ago in Heydon's Case (1 584) 76 E.R. 637. 
IG5[1996] 1 S.C.R. 771 at para. 74. 
'66[1996] 1 S.C.R. 771, [I9961 4 W.W.R. 457. 
limited constitutional authority to make laws in relation to 111dians.I~~ Badger cannot be 
taken for a more generalized authority in relation to provincial laws. It should be noted also 
that the Court found in C6te' that the provincial law in question did not in fact infringe any 
treaty or Aboriginal right.'@ Thus, the case did not involve a consideration of whether or 
not an infringing provincial law could be valid. 
So while it is accurate to say that s. 35 does not distinguish between federal and 
provincial laws, this may well result from the fact that it is not necessary to frame the 
recognition and affirmation of Aboriginal and treaty rights in this way. Regardless of where 
the possibility of infringement may lie, Aboriginal and treaty rights are recognized and 
affirmed. And once protected in this manner, any laws that may infringe them must be 
subjected to the same level of constitutional scrutiny. The question that remains open is 
whether or not it is possible for provincial laws (apart from those authorized under the 
NRTA) to infringe on such rights. 
Jurisdiction Concerning Indians and their Lands 
The basic ground ofjurisdiction in a federal state is the anchoring of laws in the heads 
of power assigned to the enacting authority by the constitution. In Canada, s. 91 and s. 92 
provide the primary division of powers between the federal and provincial governments and 
1671f the application of general provincial laws about hunting does not affect Indians 
qua Indians, then paragraph 12, and certainly its constitutionalization, was not required. 
'68The law imposed a fee for bringing vehicles into a fishing area. 
the fundamental tenets of federalism require that any law enacted by either must be 
characterized as being a law "in relation to" a matter that is set out in the relevant provision 
of the constitution. Various authorities have described this task of characterization in 
various ways. Hogg cites many of them: 
"a distillation of the constitutional values represented by the challenged legislation" 
"an abstract of the statute's content" 
"the true meaning of the challenged law'' 
"what in fact does the law do and why?" 
"the content or subject matter" 
"the leading feature" 
"the true character or substance" 
But, as Professor Hogg then summarizes: 
[Ulsually they described it as "the pith and substance" of the law. The 
general idea ofthese and similar formulations is that it is necessary to identify 
the dominant or most important characteristic of the challenged law.'69 
However, even when a law is characterized as being in relation to a matter that falls 
within federal or provincial jurisdiction, it is still possible that the other legislating authority 
may affect the matter incidentally, by legislating in relation to a matter that falls within its 
own competence. The idea that different laws may be enacted "in relation to" the same 
general subject matter because in one aspect they fall in the list of federal powers and in 
another aspect they fall in the list of provincial powers, is called the "double aspect" doctrine, 
and is firmly entrenched in Canadian constitutional jurisprudence. Dickson referred to this 
'69Hogg at 15-6 and 15-7. 
l7OFirst articulated by the Privy Council in the case of Hodge v. The Queen (1 883), 
9 App. Cases. 1 17. 
phenomenon in the Aboriginal context: 
One can over-emphasize the extent to which aboriginal peoples are affected 
only by the decisions and actions of the federal Crown. Part and parcel of 
the division of powers is the incidental effects doctrine according to which 
a law in relation to a matter within the competence of one level of 
government may validly affect a matter within the competence of the other; 
as recently stated in Alberta Government Telephones v. Canada (Canadian 
Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission), supra, at p. 275, 
"Canadian federalism has evolved in a way which tolerates overlapping 
federal and provincial legislation in many respects.. . ." As long as Indians are 
not affected qua Indians, a provincial law may affect Indians, and 
significantly so in terms of everyday life. Section 88 of the Indian Act greatly 
increases the extent to which the provinces can affect Indians by 
acknowledging the validity of laws of general application, unless they are 
supplanted by treaties or federal law.I7' 
The idea that a matter may have a double aspect seems like it ought to be precluded 
by the language of s. 91 and s. 92, which assign jurisdiction over the enumerated subjects 
"exclusively" to Parliament and the legislatures, respectively. Nevertheless, as Hogg 
explains: 
The courts have not explained when it is appropriate to apply the double 
aspect doctrine, and when it is necessary to make a choice between the 
federal and provincial features of the challenged law. Lederman's 
explanation seems to be the only plausible one: the double aspect doctrine is 
applicable when "the contrast between the relative importance of the two 
features is not so sharp". In other words, the double aspect doctrine is the 
course of judicial restraint. When the court finds that the federal or 
provincial characteristics of a law are roughly equal in importance, then the 
conclusion is that laws of that kind may be enacted by either the Parliament 
or a Legi~1ature.l~~ 
'7 '~i tchell ,  supra note 155 at 108-109. 
'7215.5(~), p. 15-1 1. And, as Dickson J. commented in General Motors of Canada 
Ltd. v. City National Leasing (1989), 58 D.L.R. (4th) 255 at 274: 
And, conversely, when the federal or provincial characteristics of a law are not equal, 
the law will be characterized as falling into one or the other category. In the context of 
provincial laws affecting Indians, then, the issue can be restated in this way: are the federal 
characteristics of a law that infringes an Aboriginal or treaty right so great that the law must 
fall into federal jurisdiction or can such a law be validly enacted by a province? 
"In fringing" vs. "Affecting " 
It is difficult to understand how a law that infringes an Aboriginal or treaty right 
could be characterized as anything other than a law "in relation to" Indians or their lands, 
thus falling within the jurisdiction of Parliament under s. 9 l(24). Indeed, Professor Hogg 
states that "provincial legislative power does not extend to laws that would impair aboriginal 
or treaty rights, because such laws affect '~ndianness'".'~~ 
This point is emphasized by the Supreme Court's definition of Aboriginal rights. In 
order to constitute an Aboriginal right, "an activity must be an element of apractice, custom 
or tradition integral to the distinctive culture of the aboriginal group asserting the right" and 
In determining the proper test it should be remembered that in a federal 
system it is inevitable that, in pursuing valid objectives, the legislation of each 
level of government will impact occasionally on the sphere of power of the 
other level of government; overlap of legislation is to be expected and 
accommodated in a federal state. Thus a certain degree of judicial restraint 
in proposing strict tests which will result in striking down such legislation is 
appropriate. 
the activity must have developed prior to contact with E~r0peans . l~~  A law that infringed 
such a right would clearly be in relation to Indians qua Indians and not just a law that 
incidently affected them; any provincial aspect to the law that might exist would surely be 
outweighed by this federal dimension. This is clearly the conclusion that Smith, J. had in 
mind when she said in SIGA: 
. . . it is clear from the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in 
Delgamuuhw that, if SIGA operates this casino as a matter of aboriginal 
right, then the test for "Indianness" is met and the matter would fall within 
federal jurisdiction (if, indeed, it is subject to non-aboriginal regulation at 
all). ' 75 
Similarly, treaty rights are rights that are recognized - prior to Confederation by the 
Imperial Crown and subsequently by the federal Crown - in solemn documents entered into 
with the representatives of Indian nations. Again, the rights embedded in treaties are integral 
to their Indian character and therefore clearly fall within Parliament's jurisdiction. This point 
is bolstered by the fact that only the federal Crown had the capacity prior to 1982 and the 
enactment of s. 35 to extinguish Aboriginal or treaty rights, as has been recently confirmed 
by the Supreme Court's decision in Delgamu ' u k ~ . ' ~ ~  In that case, Chief Justice Lamer (as 
he then was) wrote: 
It follows, at the very least, that this core [of "Indianness"] falls within the 
scope of federal jurisdiction over Indians. That core, for reasons I will 
'74Van der Peet, supra note 7. 
'75Supra, note 147 at para. 57. 
'76[1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010. 
develop, encompasses aboriginal rights, including the rights that are 
recognized and affirmed by s. 35(1). Laws which purport to extinguish 
those rights therefore touch the core of Indianness which lies at the heart of 
s. 91(24), and are beyond the legislative competence of the provinces to 
enact. The core of Indianness encompasses the whole range of aboriginal 
rights that are protected by s. 35(1). Those rights include rights in relation 
to land; that part of the core derives from s. 91 (24)'s reference to "Lands 
reserved for the Indians". But those rights also encompass practices, 
customs and traditions which are not tied to land as well; that part of the core 
can be traced to federal jurisdiction over "Indians". Provincial governments 
are prevented from legislating in relation to both types of aboriginal rights.177 
[emphasis added] 
Of course, infringement is not the same thing as extinguishment. The question that is left 
unanswered by Delgamu'ukw is whether or not an infringement of a constitutionally 
protected Aboriginal or treaty right also touches on the "core of Indianness," although 
Lamer, C.J., may have provided a hint about how that question should be answered later in 
his decision when he said: 
[A]s I mentioned earlier, s. 9 l(24) protects a core of federal jurisdiction even 
from provincial laws of general application, through the operation of the 
doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity. That core has been described as 
matters touching on "Indianness" or the "core of Indianness" . . . The core 
of Indianness at the heart of s. 91 (24) has been defined in both negative and 
positive terms. Negatively, it has been held to not include labour relations 
(Four B) and the driving of motor vehicles (Francis). The only positive 
formulation of Indianness was offered in Dick. Speaking for the Court, 
Beetz J. assumed, but did not decide, that a provincial hunting law did not 
applyproprio vigore to the members of an Indian band to hunt and because 
those activities were "at the centre of what they do and what they are" (at p. 
320). But in Van der Peet, I described and defined the aboriginal rights that 
are recognized and affirmed by s. 35(1) in a similar fashion, as protecting the 
occupation of land and the activities which are integral to the distinctive 
aboriginal culture of the group claiming the right. It follows that aboriginal 
'771bid, at para. 178. 
are part of the core of Indiarzness at the heart of s. 91(24). 
[citations omitted; emphasis added]179 
If the courts are weighing the provincial and federal characteristics of the law as 
being roughly equivalent when they determine that a provincial law may be valid, even 
though it may in some sense or aspect be viewed as falling within federal jurisdiction, then 
the use of the term "infringe" rather than "affect" gains some significance. Surely a law that 
infringes constitutionally protected rights goes beyond the "merely incidental" implication 
that flows from the word "affecting" so as to tip the balance in favour of characterizing the 
law as being within federal jurisdiction. However, one of the problems with the 
jurisprudence in this area as it has been developing is that it does not frequently approach the 
problem from this perspective. 
British Columbia Court of Appeal Cases 
The approach taken by the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Kitkatla Band v. 
British Columbia (Small Business, Tourism and Culture)lS0 illustrates a more appropriate 
methodology. In that case, the Minister, acting pursuant to the province's Heritage 
Conservation Act, which authorized the issuance of permits to "damage, alter or remove" 
aboriginal artifacts or heritage objects, wished to provide a permit to International Forest 
178This case only involved a question of Aboriginal rights, not treaty rights, but there 
is no reason to believe that the Court would treat treaty rights differently. 
179Supra, note 173 at para. 18 1. 
l S 0  [2000] 2 C.N.L.R. 36. 
Products Limited (Interfor) to cut certain culturally modified trees (CMTs)."' The Act also 
contained a provision that stated that the Act did not "abrogate or derogate from the 
aboriginal or treaty rights of a first nation or of any aboriginal peoples". The Kitkatla Band 
argued that certain aspects of the legislation were invalid as provincial legislation because 
they constituted legislation in relation to Indians or their lands. The Band also applied for 
an order to prohibit the Minister from issuing a site alteration permit that would allow 
Interfor to cut down CMTs, on the basis that to do so would derogate from their Aboriginal 
rights. 
The majority of the British Columbia Court of Appeal held that the British Columbia 
Heritage Conservation Act was valid provincial legislation of general application that applied 
to Aboriginal peoples ex proprio ~ i g o r e ' ~ ~ ,  or, alternatively, even if it was legislation "in 
relation to" Indians, it was invigorated by virtue of section 88 of the Indian Act. As 
Braidwood J.A., writing for the majority, stated: 
I8'This phrase refers to "a tree that has been altered by native people as part of their 
traditional use of the forest". They are common in British Columbia and are registered in 
a register of archaeological sites maintained by provincial government authorities. The 
Kitkatla Band argued that these trees have cultural and spiritual significance to them. 
Is2The majority referred to the Act's stated purpose which was to protect all heritage 
property, whether or not it is of Aboriginal origin, whi16conceding that the vast majority of 
property that would be caught by these general provision would, in fact, be Aboriginal - 
especially since the Act referred to the time of European contact in the province (pre- 1846) 
as being the defining time at which property would become heritage property. The majority 
also was of the view that the fact that the Act specifically provided that it was not intended 
to derogate from Aboriginal rights reinforces the conclusion that the Act, or portions of it, 
is not "in relation to" Indians, either in purpose or effect. 
A provincial law which regulates all heritage objects and sites'83 in the 
Province cannot be said to impair the status or capacity of aboriginal peoples 
nor can it be said to regulate them qua Indians. The HCA [Heritage 
Conservation Act] is unlike the Wildlife Act provisions prohibiting the 
hunting of food, which Lambert J.A., in Dick found to give shape and 
meaning to the lives of the Alkali Lake Band and which is at the centre of 
what they do and who they are. Sections 12(2), 13(2)(c) and (d) of the 
HCA, by contrast, simply regulate the protection of heritage objects and 
sites, and that right to regulate includes the right to impose limits on that 
protection. 
Accordingly, I am of the opinion that the impugned provisions of the HCA 
do not affect "Indians in their Indianness", "Indians in relation to the core 
values of their society", "Indians qua Indians" or the "status and capacity of 
Indians." Therefore, the provisions are valid ex proprio vigore and the 
appellants' argument must fai1.Is4 
But, in any event, he said, since the Act was a law of general application within the meaning 
of section 88 of the Indian Act it was extended in its application by virtue of that section 
even if it would otherwise be caught by the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity. Prowse 
J.A., in dissent, held that the legislation went beyond provincial jurisdiction and was not 
extended via section 88 because: 
In my view, just as s. 88 cannot be applied to extinguish aboriginal rights, it 
cannot be applied to effectively destroy or interfere with aboriginal culture 
or heritage by authorizing the destruction of aboriginal heritage objects. 
In coming to this conclusion, I do not wish to be understood as saying that 
every CMT [culturally modified tree], Indian arrowhead or other heritage 
object pre-dating 1846 [the date of European contact in British Columbia as 
established in Delgamu 'ukw] must be preserved in order to enable aboriginal 
' 8 3 B ~ t  it is worth noting that he misstates the test set out in Dick of what is a law of 
general application. Casting a law in general terms does not necessarily end the inquiry. The 
purpose and effect of the law must also be considered. 
Is4Supra, note 176 at paras. 72 and 73. 
peoples to maintain and pass on their heritage and culture to future 
generations. Rather, I am saying that legislation authorizing the 
destruction or interference with aboriginal heritage objects is 
fundamentally a matter for Parliament to deal with pursuant to its powers 
under s. 91(24), or for the governments and First Nations people to work 
out by agreement. [emphasis added] ' 85 
The important point about this case is that the court focussed its preliminary inquiry on the 
issue of whether or not the provincial law in question was valid. This is the more precisely 
accurate inquiry that is required as an initial first step in assessing the relationship between 
provincial laws and Aboriginal or treaty rights. More frequently the courts explore the 
question of whether the law in question infringes upon an existing Aboriginal or treaty right 
without speaking first to the issue of the law's validity. It may be, however, that the courts 
are in fact determining this more fundamental first question by answering the second. In 
Kitkatla the majority's view was that the provincial law was valid, but it was also of the view 
that there was no infringement of an Aboriginal or treaty right.Is6 
Another recent British Columbia Court of Appeal case illustrates how the issues are 
transformed when characterized differently. In Halfway River v. British C ~ l u r n b i a ' ~ ~  the 
right to hunt asserted by the Band was based on Treaty 8. No provincial laws were 
challenged as unconstitutional; the Band was challenging the administrative actions of 
's5Supra, note 172 at paras. 150 and 15 1. 
Ig6Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was granted in this case on 
August 17, 2000. A hearing date is not yet scheduled. 
lg7[1999] 9 W.W.R. 645. 
provincial officials in the granting of cutting permits. But the province asserted that it had 
a right under the Treaty "to require or to take up land as the basis for its legislative scheme 
in respect of f~restry".'~' The three judges on appeal issued three separate reasons for their 
decision; one of them in dissent. The majority dismissed the appeal (which had the effect of 
granting the application sought by the Band) on the ground that the Crown had not properly 
consulted, as required by Sparrow, in order to justify an infringement of an Aboriginal or 
treaty right. However, the two judges in the majority disagreed about what the specific 
requirements of Sparrow were. Southin J.A., in dissent, would have allowed the appeal 
because she was of the view that the scope of the treaty right to hunt could not be 
determined in a judicial review application about the validity of a cutting permit. Instead, 
she said, it should be determined in an action: 
The question in such an action would be whether what the Crown has done 
throughout the Halfway River First Nation's traditional lands by taking up 
land for oil and gas production, forestry, and other activities has so affected 
the population of game animals as to make the right of hunting illusory. "To 
make the right of hunting illusory" may be the wrong test. Perhaps the right 
test is "to impair substantially the right ofhunting" or some other formulation 
of words.'89 
Finch, J.A. observed that the fact that the right to hunt in this case was a treaty right 
did not result in the Sparrow test being inapplicable. As he put it: 
In my view the fact that the Crown asserts its rights under Treaty 8 can place 
it in no better position vis-a-vis a competing or conflicting aboriginal treaty 
'881bid, at para. 126. 
lp91bid, at para. 225. 
right than the position the Crown enjoys in exercising the powers granted in 
either s. 91 or 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.I9O 
If he is saying that the Crown cannot improve its position by not enacting laws, or 
that the administration of otherwise valid provincial laws is also limited by the constitutional 
division of powers, surely he is correct. But if he is suggesting that the source of provincial 
jurisdiction is in the treaty, surely he is wrong. The distinction is important. As he states 
later in his reasons: 
I am therefore of the view that it is unrealistic to regard the Crown's right to 
take up land as a separate or independent right, rather than as a limitation or 
restriction on the Indians' right to hunt. In either case, however, the Crown's 
right qualifies the Indians' rights and cannot therefore be exercised without 
affecting those rights.I9' 
This cannot be correct. The treaty does not confer jurisdiction; jurisdiction is derived 
from the Constitution. The province has the right to take up lands because, once it is 
surrendered and the burden of the Aboriginal title is removed, section 109 of the 
Constitution Act, 1867 says that the control and benefit of the land passes to the province. 
However, the province is at all times limited by its own constitutional authority, and if it 
purports to legislate or act in relation to treaty rights, its actions are ultra vires. The 
province can only act if its actions merely "affect" treaty rights "incidentally." It is only at 
this point that the question of Sparrow justification is raised, to justify provincial laws that 
merely affect Aboriginal or treaty rights. 
Ig0lbid, at para. 129. 
I9lIbid, at para. 136. 
However, Finch, J.A. found that the treaty right to hunt of the Halfway River First 
Nation was infringed because the issuance of the cutting permit was recognized as affecting 
that right "in some way,"'92 or, as he described it: 
The granting of [the cutting permit] was the de facto assertion of the 
government's right to take up land, a right that by its very nature limited or 
interfered with the right to hunt.'93 
Once an infringement is proven, the onus then shifts to the Crown to prove that it is minimal. 
And, while Finch, J.A. found that the impairment of the right in this case was indeed minimal, 
he still concluded that the permit had to be voided because of the failure of provincial 
officials to consult: 
As laid down in the cases on justification, the Crown must satisfy all aspects 
of the test if it is to succeed. Thus, even though there was a sufficiently 
important legislative objective, the petitioners [sic?] rights were infringed as 
little as possible, and the effects of the infringement are outweighed by the 
benefits to be derived from the government's conduct, justification of the 
infringement has not been established because the Crown failed in its duty to 
consult. It would be inconsistent with the honour and integrity of the Crown 
to find justification where the Crown has not met that duty.'94 
The honour and integrity of the Crown to which he refers is the honour and integrity 
of the federal Crown, which negotiated and signed Treaty 8. But he has placed the burden 
of the treaty obligation on the provincial Crown by characterizing the province's jurisdiction 
'921bid, at para. 138. 
'931bid. 
'941bid, at para. 167. 
over land and resources as a right that arises also out of the treaty, rather than as an exercise 
of jurisdiction under the Constitution. Seen in this latter light, the province's actions are 
limited in the usual way by its inability to legislate in relation to matters of federal jurisdiction 
falling under the authority of s. 9 1 (24), and the question ofjustification in the Sparrow sense 
doesn't arise. That is, he could have simply held that the actions of the province were ultra 
vires because they entrenched on federal jurisdiction under s. 91(24). 
Madame Justice Huddart did not agree with Justice Finch's Sparrow analysis, but 
saw the issue as one of shared use. That is, the province's ability to put in place a valid 
forestry program was limited by the treaty right to hunt. In other words, in order to be valid, 
the provincial scheme had to be compatible with the treaty right to hunt that is protected. 
She described it in this manner: 
I do not think the District Manager for a moment thought he was "taking up" 
or "requiring" any part of the Halfway traditional hunting grounds so as to 
exclude Halfway's right to hunt or to extinguish the hunting right over a 
particular area, whatever the Crown may now assert in support of his 
decision to issue a cutting permit. At most the Crown can be seen as allowing 
the temporary use of some land for a specific purpose, compatible with the 
continued long-term use of the land for Halfway's traditional hunting 
activities. The Crown was asserting a shared use, not a taking up of land for 
an incompatible use. There was evidence before the District Manager to 
support a finding that the treaty right to hunt and Canfor's tree harvesting 
were compatible uses. That finding must underpin his conclusion that CP212 
would not infringe the treaty right to hunt.'95 
This is closer to the jurisdictional approach that seems most appropriate to the analysis of 
'951bid, at para 173. 
this issue. However, she went on to engage in a Sparrow analysis in addition: 
Just as the impact of a statute or regulation may be scrutinized to ensure 
recognition and affirmation of treaty rights of aboriginal peoples, so may the 
impact of a decision made under such a statute or regulation by an employee 
of the Crown. The District Manager can no more follow a provision of a 
statute, regulation, or policy of the Ministry of Forestry in such a way as to 
offend the Constitution than he could to offend the Criminal Code. '96 
And, while this is no doubt correct, it may be misplaced. That is, if a provincial official in 
following the requirements of a provincial statute infringes treaty rights, his or her actions 
are invalid, not subject to ju~tificati0n.l~~ 
Huddart, J.A. went on to conclude that the failure ofthe provincial official to engage 
in an adequate and meaningful consultation with the Halfway River First Nation deprived 
them of an appropriate opportunity to establish the scope of their right to hunt. She stated: 
[Tlhe District Manager was under a positive obligation to the Halfway River 
First Nation to recognize and affirm its treaty right to hunt in determining 
whether to grant Cutting Permit 2 12 to Canfor. This constitutional obligation 
required him to interpret the Forest Act and the Forest Practices Code so 
that he might apply government forest policy with respect for Halfway's 
'961bid, at para. 177 
'971n a practical sense the difference may not be significant. That is, if the only way 
to ensure that provincial action does not infringe an Aboriginal or treaty right is to discuss 
with the holders of the rights their preferred means of exercising it and in recognizing the 
Aboriginal priority, the necessary provincial action that must be taken to ensure incidental 
effects only, and therefore validity, may be more or less the same actions that must be taken 
to demonstrate justification of a law that infringes. However, a provincial law that infringes 
on the core of Indianness in a manner that requires justification must be constitutionally 
invalid, and the important legal distinction is in the preservation of this integrity so as to 
confine provincial power within the parameters of s. 92. 
rights. Moreover, the District Manager was also required to determine the 
nature and extent of the treaty right to hunt so as to honour the Crown's 
fiduciary obligation to the first nation: Delgamuukw v. B. C. [I 9971 3 S.C.R. 
101 0 at 1 1 12-1 1 13 per Lamer C.J.C.; and see the discussion by Williams 
C.J.S.C. in Cheslatta Carrier Nation v. B. C. (1998), 53 B.C.L.R. 1 at 
14-15.'98 
This, too, is an odd way of conceptualizing the obligations of provincial officials. 
Recognition and affirmation of treaty rights is provided by the Constitution directly, not 
through "positive ob1igations"imposed on government officials. The result of such 
constitutional recognition is that treaty rights cannot be interfered with unless the 
interference results from a valid exercise of law-making authority that can be justified. In 
Sparrow there was no need to deliberate over the validity of the federal law in question, 
because it was unquestioningly valid in the absence of s. 35. However, validity isn't enough 
and even valid laws must be justified, as Sparrow has made clear. In this case, however, the 
validity of the provincial action cannot be assumed. The actions taken by officials in issuing 
cutting permits are taken under provincial laws of general application. If these laws infringe 
treaty rights, they must clearly be read down under the doctrine of interjurisdictional 
immunity so that they do not have that result. Justification, including the issue of 
consultation, is a question that doesn't arise. 
I9'Ibid, at para. 178. The references to Delgamuuk'w and Cheslatta are to those 
aspects of those judgments in which the consultation requirements of Sparrow were 
discussed. Lamer C.J., in particular, did not differentiate in his discussion of this issue 
between the federal and provincial Crowns. However, it is one thing to say that fiduciary 
obligations to consult will arise in the context of potentially infringing laws, whether they are 
federal or provincial, and it is quite another to say provincial laws that might affect 
Aboriginal peoples attract a duty to consult. This point is taken up later in this Chapter. 
The Saskatchewan Cases 
A number of the Saskatchewan cases that make reference to the fiduciary relationship 
between Aboriginal peoples and the Crown do so in the context of hunting offences and the 
NRTA."' Some discuss the issue in the context of claims against Canada or federal 
legislation.200 Only one case approaches the issue from a jurisdictional perspective, and this 
is R. v. Keepness.201 Keepness was charged with trafficking in wildlife when he sold some 
deer meat to an undercover conservation officer on the reserve. The prosecution argued that 
the legislation in question applied to all people in the province, including Indians on Indian 
reserves, because of the jurisdiction provided to the province under the NRTA and because 
the law was justifiable under Sparrow. However, Keepness was acquitted because the judge 
held that the provincial law did not apply on reserve. His rationale for this conclusion was 
based on his view that the Indian Act and the Constitution Act, 1930 (the NRTA) maintain 
federal jurisdiction on reserve and the sale or bartering of wild meat thus fell under federal 
jurisdiction.202 
"'See, for example, R. v. Janvier, [I9951 4 C.N.L.R. 29 and R. v: McIntyre, [I9901 
S.J. No. 694. 
200R. V. Catarat, [I9991 4 C.N.L.R. 139 (Q.B.), R. v. Couillonneur, [I9971 1 
C.N.L.R. 130, and R. v. Ironeagle, [2000] 2 C.N.L.R. 163. 
20'[2000] 2 C.N.L.R. 195. 
*02Smith Prov. Ct. J. specifically stated that he was not intending to attempt to revive 
the enclave theory and, indeed, the rejection of the enclave theory did not suggest that 
Parliament is unable to enact laws under s. 91(24) relating to Indian reserves, nor that the 
laws it might enact must be the same as provincial laws on the same subject matter. The 
enclave theory addressed the issue of provincial laws and their possible application to Indians 
and their lands and posited that provincial laws, whether or not of general application, could 
never apply to Indians and Indian lands. 
While the Provincial Court Judge did not articulate his reasons explicitly in this 
manner, it appears that he concluded that the provincial law could not apply on reserve 
because it conflicted with the specific provisions of the Indian Act relating to the 
management of reserves.'03 Thus, because the provincial law did not apply, the question of 
justification did not arise. Leaving aside the question of whether or not his conclusions on 
these preliminary questions are appropriate, his approach to the problem is the correct one. 
Supreme Court of Canada Cases 
To this point, there are only three Supreme Court decisions in which the issue of the 
relationship of s. 35 to provincial laws actually arises: R. v. Badger, R. v. CGte' and R. v 
Sundown. C6tk is a Quebec case and Badger and Sundown are prairie cases involving 
hunting rights and the NRTA. 
In R. v. C6tk, the Court had to consider whether or not a provincial regulation 
infringed a treaty right to fish. Lamer C.J. observed from the outset that as the issue 
involved the alleged infringement of a treaty right, it was necessary to examine the provincial 
law in light of the protection provided to treaty rights by virtue of section 88 of the Indian 
'03At paragraph 38a of his judgment he says that The Wildlife Act provision "cannot 
be a provincial law of general application pursuant to section 88 . . . because the sale or 
barter of deer . . . is clearly reserved to the federal government by the provisions of the 
Indian Act". This is not exactly accurate. What he must have meant is that while The 
Wildlife Act may be a law of general application, it is not incorporated by reference under 
section 88 because it conflicts with the other provisions of the Indian Act. In cases of such 
conflict, section 88 does not incorporate the provincial law by reference so that the 
provincial Act would not then apply to Indians. 
Act. He set out the task of the court in this manner: 
As a general rule, where a claimant challenges the application of a federal 
regulation under s. 35(1), the characterization of the right alternatively as an 
aboriginal right or as a treaty right will not be of any consequence once the 
existence of the right is established, as the Sparrow test for infringement and 
justification applies with the same force and the same considerations to both 
species of constitutional rights: R. v. Badger, [I9961 1 S.C.R. 771, at paras. 
37, 77, 78 and 79. However, in this instance, the appellants challenge a 
provincial regulation which allegedly restricts their aboriginal or treaty right 
to fish within the Z.E.C. [a control zone] by imposing a financial burden on 
their access to the land in question. As such, even if the Regulation 
respecting controlled zones is not found to infringe their constitutional rights 
unjustifiably under the Sparrow test for s. 35(1), if the right to fish is 
characterized as a treaty right, it may still be open to the appellants to 
challenge the provincial regulation under the federal statutory protection 
extended to aboriginal treaties under s. 88 of the Indian 
This is an odd order in which to proceed. As already recounted, it has long been 
established that section 88 does not apply to those provincial laws that apply ex proprio 
vigore; it applies only to those provincial laws that would be otherwise read down.205 Thus, 
if it is necessary to refer to section 88 at all, it is because the provincial law in question bears 
on Indians in some essential respect and should be read down or is "in relation to" Indians 
and is otherwise ultra vires. It would be more logical to determine first of all if the 
provincial law is valid - either exproprio vigore or by virtue of section 88 - and then, if it 
is, to proceed to the next question of whether or not it infringes Aboriginal or treaty rights. 
204[1996] 4 C.N.L.R. 26, at 40-41. 
205R. V. Dick, [I9851 2 S.C.R. 309. 
Strangely, in addressing the issue of treaty rights and even after pointing out that 
section 88 operates so that "provincial laws which would otherwise not apply to Indians 
under the federal and provincial division of powers are made applicable as incorporated 
federal law",206 the court was not moved to consider this preliminary jurisdictional point. It 
might be argued that this failure indicates an assumption by the Court that provincial laws 
may infringe such rights and still be valid. If that were true, however, there would be no 
need to consider first whether the Sparrow test for s. 35 was met and then to consider 
whether the provincial law interfered with a treaty so as to be precluded by section 88. In 
order to get to that second step, the provincial law must be one that is made operative by 
section 88 and would therefore, by definition, be inoperative in relation to Indians in any 
event. However, as the Court concluded that the provincial law in question did not infringe 
206R. V. CGte', supra note 7 at para. 86. Lamer goes on to reflect on the protection 
afforded to treaty rights by s'ection 88 as compared to s. 35: 
But I note that, on the face of s.88, treaty rights appears to enjoy a broader 
protection from contrary provincial law under the Indian Act than under the 
Constitution Act, 1982. Once it has been demonstrated that a provincial law 
infringes "the terms of [a] treaty", the treaty would arguably prevail over s.88 even 
in the presence of a well-grounded justification. The statutory provision does not 
expressly incorporate ajustification requirement analogous to thejustification stage 
required in thesparrow framework. But the precise boundaries ofthe protection of 
s.88 remains a topic for future consideration. I know of no case that has 
authoritatively discounted the potential existence of an implicit justification stage 
under s.88. In the near future, Parliament will no doubt feel compelled to re- 
examine the existence and scope of this statutory protection in light of these 
uncertainties and in light ofthe parallel constitutionalization oftreaty rights under 
s.35(1). 
With respect, it appears that he has overlooked the fact that the effect of section 88 is to 
adopt as federal law certain provincial laws that would otherwise be invalid. That is, if 
section 88 did not exist, the provincial law would be invalid and the question ofjustification 
under s. 35 would not arise. However, infringing federal laws are permissible if they can be 
justified. 
any Aboriginal or treaty rights, that specific question did not really come before it. 
In Badger, the Court was called upon to consider the relationship between s. 35, 
provincial legislation relating to hunting, and the NRTA. Badger and two others were status 
Indians who had been convicted of shooting moose outside the permitted hunting season, 
contrary to the Alberta Wildlife Act, on certain private land within the territory covered by 
Treaty 8. The majority held that the treaty right to hunt for food was protected and 
expanded by virtue of the NRTA. Furthermore, while "the regulation of Indian hunting 
rights would ordinarily come within the jurisdiction of the Federal government and not the 
Province," the issue of vires did not arise in respect of the provincial legislation in this case 
because of the NRTA: 
It follows that by the terms of both the Treaty and the NRTA, provincial 
game laws would be applicable to Indians so long as they were aimed at 
conserving the supply of game. However, the provincial government's 
regulatory authority under the Treaty and the NRTA did not extend beyond 
the realm of conservation. It is the constitutional provisions of s. 12 of the 
NRTA authorizing provincial regulations which make it unnecessary to 
consider s. 88 of the Indian Act and the general application of provincial 
regulations to Indians.207 
In other words, under the NRTA, the prairie provinces have constitutional 
jurisdiction to legislate in relation to the hunting rights of Indians when the legislation they 
enact is for the purposes of conservation. The Court then went on to determine that the 
particular provincial law in question constituted aprima facie infringement of the treaty right 
207R. V. Badger, [I9961 2 C.N.L.R. 77, at p. 104. 
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to hunt for food and that the infringement must be justified. While both Aboriginal and 
treaty rights are protected by s. 35, they are not absolute, and government infringement may 
be permissible if justification can be demonstrated. Justification is required because the 
honour of the Crown is engaged through the fact of entering into a treaty with the Indian 
peoples in which hunting rights were an important consideration: 
The rights granted to Indians by treaties usually form an integral part of the 
consideration for the surrender of their lands. For example, it is clear that the 
maintenance of as much of their hunting rights as possible was of paramount 
concern to the Indians who signed Treaty No. 8. This was, in effect, an 
Aboriginal right recognized in a somewhat limited form by the treaty and 
later modified by the NRTA. To the Indians, it was an essential element of 
this solemn agreement.208 
Thus, when the province succeeded to the position of federal power over Indian hunting by 
virtue of the constitutional amendments effected through the NRTA, it, too, was required 
to justify its laws. The court summarized its conclusion in this way: 
[Jlustification of provincial regulations enacted pursuant to the NRTA should 
meet the same test for justification of treaty rights that was set out in 
Sparrow. The reason for this is obvious. The effect of s. 12 of the NRTA 
is to place the provincial government in exactly the same position which the 
federal Crown formerly occupied. Thus the provincial government has the 
same duty not to infringe unjustifiably the hunting right provided by Treaty 
8 as modified by the NRTA. Paragraph 12 of the NRTA provides that the 
province may make laws for a conservation purpose, subject to the Indian 
right to hunt and fish for food. Accordingly, there is a need for a means to 
assess which conservation laws will if they infringe that right, nevertheless be 
justifiable. The Sparrow analysis provides a reasonable, flexible and current 
method of assessing conservation regulations and enactments.209 
In other words,provincialpower must be reconciled with the duty of the Crown,210 but only 
when the province has power in respect of Indians is this possible. 
In R. v. S~ndown,~"  John Sundown, a Cree Indian in Treaty 6 territory in 
Saskatchewan, was charged with constructing a permanent dwelling in a provincial park 
without a permit. He had built a log cabin in Meadow Lake Provincial Park as a hunting 
shelter, in accordance with traditional Cree hunting practices over that territory. His 
conviction was overturned on appeal. The principal issue on the appeal was whether or not 
the building of a log cabin could be viewed as reasonably incidental to the right to hunt. The 
Court held that it was. In so doing, it briefly considered the effect of paragraph 12 of the 
NRTA and concluded, as it did in Badger, that "provincial laws that pertain to conservation 
could properly restrict treaty rights to hunt provided they could be justified under 
The significance of this concise summary of the ability of the province to 
legislate under paragraph 12 is the requirement that any such provincial laws must both be 
for the purposes of conservation and justifiable under Sparrow. Prior to Badger, it was 
2'0Justices Sopinka and Lamer dissented in respect of the relationship between the 
treaty and the NRTA. They were of the view that the NRTA replaces the treaty right to 
hunt for food and is thereby transformed into a constitutional right to which s. 35 does not 
apply. They would nevertheless apply the Sparrow test by analogy, as a useful means by 
which to balance the Indians' right to hunt for food constitutionally protected in the NRTA 
with the province's right to legislate in relation to conservation derived from the NRTA. 
211[1999] 2 C.N.L.R. 289. 
2121bid, at para 38. 
thought that if a provincial law under paragraph 12 pertained to conservation, it was valid 
without any further examination. It is now clear that when provincial laws can be made in 
relation to Indians, they too must be justified; that is the import of s. 35. 
It is clear then that provincial laws that infringe Aboriginal or treaty rights are indeed 
required to be justified under the framework established in Sparrow, but it is also clear in 
Saskatchewan that, except for laws enacted under the authority of paragraph 12 of the 
NRTA, provincial laws that infringe are invalid or, in the absence of section 88 of the Indian 
Act would be read down and thus appIy only as federal law.*I3 If that is correct, there is a 
very narrow range of jurisdiction that the province possesses and to which fiduciary-like 
obligations may attach. 
*I3I am not here referring to provincial laws extended by virtue of section 88 of the 
Indian Act because these laws apply only because of the exercise of federal jurisdiction. As 
such provincial laws apply to Indians in the province they are federal enactments. And the 
exercise of jurisdiction that must be justified is federal. 
CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
This thesis began with the observation that the character of the relationship between 
the federal Crown and Aboriginal peoples had only been judicially recognized as being 
fiduciary in 1984, even though the fiduciary concept has existed in the law for at least 250 
years. This characterization is most obviously apt in the facts and circumstances of the 
Guerin case, in which the fiduciary relationship was first declared to exist. It will be 
remembered that, in that case, reserve lands had been surrendered to federal authorities to 
be leased on the basis of a particular understanding about the nature of the lease that would 
be entered into on the Indians' behalf. However, federal officials entered into a very different 
lease arrangement, with significant negative financial consequences for the Musqueam Band. 
The decision in Guerin did not put Aboriginal issues to rest, it awakened a host of 
new ones. Perhaps the first of these was the question of when fiduciary obligations would 
arise out of this newly recognized relationship. To begin with, the federal Crown argued that 
it was only in cases of surrenders of land that such obligations might exist. The Court 
determined very quickly that the relationship and the obligations arising out of it were not 
to be so narrowly construed as all that. 
In Kruger,*I4 for example, the Federal Court of Appeal held that fiduciary obligations 
were more far-reaching and existed in an expropriation context, as well as in the context of 
surrender. Still, however, it looked like the fiduciary relationship could be confined to 
matters tied to land. As early as 1983 (and independent of its fiduciary analysis of the 
relationship between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples), the Court had already determined 
that "treaties and statutes relating to Indians should be liberally construed and doubtful 
9, 215 expressions resolved in favour of the Indians . 
And then in 1990 the Supreme Court released its decision in Sparrow, clearly 
providing for the existence of the fiduciary relationship in a context reaching far beyond just 
land and issues surrounding Aboriginal title, invoking the fiduciary relationship as a means 
to reconcile "federal power" with "federal duty". What then of the Aboriginal relationship 
with the provincial Crown? As we have seen, there have been very few cases in which 
provinces have been involved. In non-Aboriginal fiduciary contexts, the courts have stressed 
that it is the specific relationship that gives rise to specific fiduciary obligations. In other 
words, it is the specific circumstances of each particular relationship that define and refine 
the obligations that arise out of it. And while it is true that the relationship between the 
Crown and Aboriginal peoples has been described as sui generis or unique, it is nevertheless 
still fiduciary. As a result it must retain the essential elements of what it is to be fiduciary. 
214[1986] 1 F.C. 3. 
2 ' 5 ~ o ~ e g i j i ~ k  V. The Queen, [I9831 1 S.C.R. 29 at 36. 
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We can conclude that the essential ingredient of a fiduciary relationship is power and 
vulnerability. This is what the court recognized in Sparrow, by framing the constitutional 
reconciliation it sought between s. 91 (24) and s. 35 as being a reconciliation of power and 
duty. But what power does a province have in relation to Aboriginal peoples? And what 
relationship? 
In Saskatchewan, there is no historical/legal relationship between the Crown and First 
Nations. Treaties were negotiated by the federal Crown after Confederation and before the 
province was created. There were no obligations of the Imperial Crown that could devolve 
to the provinces via the division of powers in the manner suggested by some. Perhaps more 
importantly, though, the provincial Crown possesses virtually no power over Aboriginal 
peoples in their capacity as such. 
As we have seen, in the case of laws that are applicable to Aboriginal peoples ex 
proprio vigore, the province is exercising the power that it has in relation to all people in the 
province. This type of an exercise of power is not about Aboriginal or treaty rights and there 
is therefore no reason why there should be any distinctions made in respect of Aboriginal 
peoples who are affected by such laws of general application. If these laws are to be valid 
provincial laws, they cannot be about Aboriginal peoples. And, if they're not, s.35 and any 
fiduciary relationship does not arise. 
Laws that are of general application but that apply by virtue of s. 88 of the Indian 
Act, on the other hand are about Aboriginal peoples and they apply because of federal 
power. They arise in the context of the relationship of Aboriginal peoples to the federal 
Crown. These laws are caught by s. 35 and can only infringe on Aboriginal or treaty rights 
ifthey can be justified. But it is federal legislative power that must be justified in such cases. 
Laws that are applicable because of paragraph 12 of the NRTA are true exercises of 
provincial power in relation to Indians. The fiduciary relationship between Aboriginal 
peoples and the Crown provides the same limitation on the ability of the province to legislate 
as applies to the federal Crown in exercising power under s. 91 (24). In this one limited case 
the province inherits the fiduciary obligations of the federal Crown as it wields the power 
that has been constitutionally devolved to it. 
A provincial law that incidentally affects Aboriginal peoples in the limited sense 
permitted by the double aspect doctrine, is not an exercise of power over Indians by the 
province, and is not subject to fiduciary considerations. However, where there is a 
possibility that Aboriginal or treaty rights may be infringed by provincial actions, a failure to 
consult or to recognize Aboriginal priority can transform what would otherwise be an 
incidental effect into an infringement. Once the law infringes, it is invalid because it must be 
characterized as being in relation to a matter of federal jurisdiction. In this context, the 
doctrine of interjurisdictibnal immunity will render the law inapplicable to Aboriginal 
peoples. In this sense, Sparrow justification of provincial laws does not arise. 
There is one other context in which the fiduciary relationship may be invoked, but 
that has not (yet) been placed before a court for its consideration: the negotiation of self- 
government agreements with Aboriginal peoples and the issues that may ultimately arise out 
of the agreements that are negotiated. Such negotiations are themselves a manifestation of 
the necessary reconciliation of power and duty that s. 35 requires. Canada has taken the 
position that an inherent right of self government is an existing Aboriginal right and is 
prepared to enter into agreements with Aboriginal peoples to give expression to that right.216 
To that end, a number of self-government negotiations have been concluded and an even 
larger number of negotiations are on-going. 
Alan Pratt argues that provinces have an obligation to participate in these processes 
"to formalize and complete the treaty relationship and to reconcile honourably their laws and 
policies governing the use of Crown lands with the existence of Aboriginal title".217 
Although not stated quite so explicitly, this view, or a similar one, appears to also be 
supported by Hutchins, Schulze and Hilling in their article "When Do Fiduciary Obligations 
to Aboriginal Peoples   rise?"^'^ As we have also seen, Slattery and Rotman would also 
agree. But again the issue comes down to the question of what is the extent of provincial 
2'6See 1995 "Federal Policy Guide - Aboriginal Self-Government", www.ainc- 
inac.gc.ca/pr/pub/sg/plcy-e. html 
2'7"The Problem of Extinguishment in the Numbered Treaties, A Discussion Paper 
for the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, May 10,1995 (revised September 1996) 
at 77. 
218Saskatchewan Law Review, 1995, Vol. 59(1), 97-140 at 1 17-122. 
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power. If a province has no legislative ability to affect Aboriginal or treaty rights, why is its 
participation in self-government negotiations legally necessary? 
Self-government agreements must be based on either Aboriginal or treaty rights.*I9 
In either case, the agreements recognize the exercise of a right of self-government, including 
jurisdiction to enact laws, within the framework that the agreement articulates. This is not 
to say that a right of self-government could not operate outside the agreed-upon framework, 
but the practical implementation of self-government will obviously work more smoothly in 
a recognized context. However, the recognition and affirmation contained in s. 35 does not 
require an explicit recognition and affirmation on behalf of other governments, legislatively 
or otherwise. The rights that s. 35 recognizes and affirms are those that existed at the time 
of its enactment in 1982 and these rights are whatever the courts may declare them to be, not 
just what other governments may agree to. And so in this context, the question is again, 
what provincial power must be reconciled with provincial duty? 
"90ne view is that self-government is an inherent right that arises out of the 
existence of a "people". The federal government has recognized an inherent right, and if the 
right inheres in peoples it will by definition fall into the category of Aboriginal right. On the 
other hand, the recently concluded Nisga'a agreement, for example, is supported by both 
federal and provincial legislation that declares that "The Nisga'a Final Agreement is a treaty 
and a land claims agreement within the meaning of sections 25 and 35 of the Constitution 
Act, 1982." See Nisga'a Final Agreement Act, S.C. 2000, c. 7, s. 3 and Nisga'a Final 
Agreement Act, S.B.C. 1999, c. 2., s. 2. Others would argue that explicit constitutional 
amendments are required to give effect to new constitutional arrangements of powers, as in 
Campbell v. British Columbia (Attorney Genera1)[2000] B.C.J. No. 1524 (B.C.S.C.), where 
the leader of the provincial Opposition argued that the Nisga'a treaty was unconstitutional. 
As we have seen, the fiduciary obligations of the Crown are either a brake on legal 
powers that it exercises or a spur to exercise the powers that it can in order to ensure the 
honour of the Crown in the recognition and affirmation of Aboriginal and treaty rights that 
is provided by s. 35 .220 The provinces have no ability to infringe Aboriginal or treaty rights, 
because they lack the jurisdiction to do so. A province that declines to reconcile its laws 
with the framework established in a self-government agreement - particularly one recognized 
by Parliament - will find its laws struck down or read down. Prudence and harmonious 
intergovernmental relations require provincial involvement, not the law. 
2201t will be remembered, also, that now Justice Binnie of the Supreme Court of 
Canada is of the view that the Crown can be forced into action by its fiduciary obligations 
and not just prevented from acting. See supra note 82. 
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APPENDIX B 
CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE 
Aboriginal Fiduciary Cases at the Appellate Level in Canada 
Guerin v. Canada 
Federal Court of Appeal 
December 10, 1982 
The Court upheld the judgment of the Trial Division, which declared the federal 
Crown to be in breach of trust in respect of the leasing by it in 1958 of about 162 
acres of surrendered land in the Musqueam Indian Reserve No. 2 in Vancouver. The 
word "fiduciary" has not yet been used in the Aboriginal context. 
Guerin v. Canada 
Supreme Court of Canada 
November 1,1984 
The Supreme Court finds that the relationship between the Crown and Aboriginal 
peoples is fiduciary in nature, and out of the relationship fiduciary obligations arise. 
The relationship is based on the Crown's interposing of itself between Aboriginal 
peoples and European settlers (as acknowledged in the Royal Proclamation and the 
Indian Act) and the inalienability of Aboriginal title except to the Crown. The case 
involves the federal Crown's dealings with surrendered reserve lands. 
Kruger et al. v. The Queen 
Federal Court of Appeal 
March 18, 1985 
Action was taken against the federal Crown in respect of reserve lands that were 
originally expropriated when the rent requested was considered by the Department 
of Transport to be too high. Later the lands were surrendered. The action was 
brought for breach of trust. The fact of the existence of the fiduciary relationship is 
not challenged. Fiduciary obligations arising out of it are extended to include the 
expropriation situation. 
Canada (Attorney General) v. Aluminum Co. of Canada Ltd. 
British Columbia Court of Appeal 
February 1 1, 1987 
The Indian plaintiffs allege that the Minister of Fisheries has a constitutional 
authority to regulate water flows from Alcan's dams and a fiduciary obligation to the 
Indians to exercise that authority for the restoration and protection of their interests 
in the fishery. The chambers judge had granted the B.C. Wildlife Federation 
intervenor status. Alcan and the Attorney General of British Columbia appealed and 
the appeal was allowed. Although the fiduciary obligations of the federal Crown 
were pleaded by the Indian plaintiffs, this was a procedural motion and those issues 
were not discussed by the court. 
Paul v. CP 
Supreme Court of Canada 
December 15,1988 
CP obtained a permanent injunction to restrain an Indian Band from blocking its line 
where it crossed the reserve. Because CP's 1890 lease had been confirmed and 
ratified by both the provincial legislature and the federal Parliament, the legislation 
amounted to an acknowledgment that permission had been given for the railway to 
be built where it was. It was an open question as to whether the government of New 
Brunswick had failed to carry out any obligations to the Band it may have had - 
whatever those might have been. The existence of the fiduciary relationship, as 
established in Guerin, and the fact that obligations arise out of it was noted by the 
Court, but this had no impact on the decision regarding the injunction. 
Roberts v. Canada 
Supreme Court of Canada 
March 9, 1989 
A dispute arose between two Indian bands relating to use and occupation of a 
reserve. One of the Bands sought a declaration against the federal Crown that it had 
the right to use and occupy the reserve and a permanent injunction against the other 
Band to restrain its members from trespassing on the reserve, alleging that the 
Crown breached its fiduciary duty to protect and preserve the Band's interest in that 
reserve . The Supreme Court held that the Federal Court had jurisdiction to hear the 
claim because the law of aboriginal title is federal common law. There was no 
discussion about the nature of the fiduciary relationship or the obligations arising out 
of it. 
Tsawout Indian Band v. Saanichton Marina Ltd. 
British Columbia Court of Appeal 
March 30, 1989 
Saanichton Marina Ltd. proposed to build a marina on Saanichton Bay Pursuant to 
a license of occupation granted by British Columbia. The Tsawout Indian Band 
opposed the construction of the marina on the grounds that it would interfere with 
their right of fishery in Saanichton Bay, granted by treaty with Governor Douglas of 
the colony of British Columbia in 1852. The court held that the grant of the license 
of occupation by the provincial Crown to Saanichton Marina interfered with the 
treaty right of the Indians and the construction of the marina would derogate from 
their treaty rights. The province could not act to contravene the treaty rights of 
Indians, nor could it authorize others to do so. As a breach of treaty rights, the 
province's actions could not be saved by section 88 of the Indian Act. The Court's 
liberal interpretation of the treaty was based on the principles established in 
Nowegijick. The court did not engage in any particular discussion of the fiduciary 
relationship or its application to the provincial Crown. 
Westar Timber Ltd. v. Gitksan Wet'suwet'en Tribal Council 
British Columbia Court of Appeal 
June 9, 1989 
These appeals were taken in relation to interlocutory orders of injunctive relief in 
"satellite proceedings" accompanying the Delgarnu 'ukw litigation. The case deals 
with the appropriateness of interim injunctions and does not discuss fiduciary 
relationships or obligations. 
R. v. Sparrow 
Supreme Court of Canada 
May 31, 1990 
Sparrow was charged with a contravention of the federal fishery regulations. The 
Court held that, while Aboriginal and treaty rights protected by s. 35 were not 
absolute, because of the fiduciary relationship between the Crown and aboriginal 
peoples, s. 35 required that there be a reconciliation between "federal power" and 
"federal duty". That is the federal government was not free to pass any laws it 
wished under s. 9 l(24); if those laws infringed Aboriginal or treaty rights they would 
have to be justified in a context of upholding the honour of the Crown. 
Mitchell v. Peguis Indian Band 
Supreme Court of Canada 
June 2 1,1990 
The Government of Manitoba settled the Band's claim in respect of an invalid 
provincial tax levied on reserve. The Appellants were creditors of the Band and 
obtained a prejudgment garnishing order against the settlement to the extent of their 
fees for representing the Indians in the settlement negotiations. The court set aside 
the garnishing order. Personal property given pursuant to treaty and deemed to be 
on a reserve is not subject to attachment by a non-Indian because the words "Her 
Majesty" in s. 90(l)(b) of the Indian Act include not only the federal Crown but also 
the provincial Crown. The case contains only a passing reference to the fiduciary 
relationship in the context of referring to the Guerin case. 
British Columbia (Attorney General) v, Mount Currie Indian Band 
British Columbia Court of Appeal (In Chambers) 
January 2 8, 1 99 1 
The province argued that it held title to the land on which a provincial highway , 
built in 1947, running through the Indian Reserve was located. The Indian Band 
argued that the land was part of the Reserve and that the Province had no right to 
encroach on Reserve lands. The Province based its position on a reservation 
contained in its conveyance of certain lands to the federal government in 1938. 
Several Bands sought to intervene. There was no discussion of the fiduciary 
relationship. 
Canada v. Fort Alexander Indian Band 
Federal Court of Appeal 
February 6, 199 1 
The action was originally commenced by statement of claim by the respondent on his 
own behalf and on behalf of the members of the Fort Alexander Indian Band. The 
suit alleged breach of fiduciary obligations on the part of the federal Crown. The 
issue before the court was a jurisdictional one, and didn't discuss the nature of the 
fiduciary relationship. 
Montana Band v. Canada 
Federal Court of Appeal 
February 1 8,199 1 
In 1868, the Imperial Parliament passed the Rupert's LandAct, 1868, enabling Her 
Majesty to accept a surrender from the Hudson's Bay Company of its lands, 
privileges and rights in Rupert's Land. On May 28, 1869, the Senate and the House 
of Commons passed a resolution calling on the Canadian Government to provide for 
the "protection ofthe Indian tribes whose interests and well-being are involved in the 
transfer". Rupert's Land and the North-Western Territory became part of Canada as 
of July 15, 1870 (the Rupert's Land Order). The Band sought declarations that by 
virtue of the Constitution Act, 1867, the terms, conditions and obligations of the 
Rupert's Land Order became constitutional instruments binding on Canada and 
therefore part of the Constitution of Canada and that the undertaking given by 
Canada in 1869 entails a fiduciary obligation to them. Their claim was struck on a 
motion for that purpose, but their appeal was allowed on the basis that the issues 
raised by them were real and not theoretical, they had a vital and real interest in 
those issues and because the Crown was the proper contradictor, with a true interest 
in opposing the declarations sought, without having to show a breach of the alleged 
fiduciary obligation. 
British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Mount Currie Indian Band 
British Columbia Court of Appeal 
March 25, 199 1 
The case was an appeal from a judgment granting the Crown an interlocutory 
injunction preventing the obstruction of traffic on a road passing through the Indian 
reserve. The appeal was dismissed on the basis that the Crown had an arguable case 
that should go to trial. There was no discussion of the fiduciary relationship. The 
word was contained in a quotation from Guerin by Southin JA in dissent. 
Cree Regional Authority v. Canada (Federal Administrator) 
Federal Court of Appeal 
May 14,1991 
The issue was whether or not the federal Court had jurisdiction to entertain an 
application for a mandamus against the federal administrator appointed by an Order 
in Council specifying the James Bay and Northern QuCbec Agreement as authority. 
According to its principal provisions and guidelines, the Agreement was intended to 
be legislated into effect by both Canada and Quebec and to derive all legal force, 
even as contract, from laws giving it effect and validity. The court held that the 
administrator was a "federal board". There was no discussion of the fiduciary 
relationship. 
Ontario (Attorney General) v. Bear Island Foundation 
Supreme Court of Canada 
August 15,1991 
After the Bear Island Foundation had registered cautions against tracts of unceded 
land on behalf of the Temagami Band of Indians, Ontario sought a declaration that 
the Crown in right of Ontario had clear title. The Foundation then counterclaimed 
and sought a declaration of quiet title by virtue of the Temagami's Aboriginal rights 
in the land. The trial judge found that the Temagami had no Aboriginal right to the 
land, and that even if such a right had existed, it had been extinguished by the 
Robinson-Huron Treaty of 1850, to which the Temagami band was originally aparty 
or to which it had subsequently adhered. The Crown breached its fiduciary 
obligations to the Indians by failing to comply with some of its obligations under this 
agreement. 
Dumont v. Canada (Attorney General) 
Manitoba Court of Appeal 
December 30,1991 
The defendant attorneys general appealed a refusal by a motions court judge to order 
particulars of numerous allegations in a statement of claim. The Metis plaintiffs in 
the action sought to impugn the vires of twenty-one federal enactments, both 
statutes and orders, and nine provincial enactments. The motions court judge 
concluded that the Attorney-General for Canada was attempting to force the 
plaintiffs to supply as particulars the very evidence intended to be relied on at trial. 
The claim alleged breaches of fiduciary obligations. 
R. v. McIntyre 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal 
April 7, 1992 
McIntyre was convicted of unlawful possession of wildlife, contrary to s. 3 1 of The 
Wildlife Act, a provincial statute. The court held that section 12 of the Natural 
Resources Transfer Agreement is the sole and exclusive "existing" source of the 
entitlement of Indians to hunt, trap and fish for food in Saskatchewan. Provincial 
action that has the effect of limiting the Indians' right to hunt for food as authorized 
by paragraph 12 is not controlled by the fiduciary duty owed by the Crown to 
Aboriginal peoples as set out in R. v. Sparrow - ie. such rights are not "existing 
aboriginal or treaty rights". Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was 
dismissed on December 10, 1992, and yet the issue of hunting rights under the 
NRTA was later considered by the Supreme Court of Canada in Badger in 1996, and 
the majority of the Court held that provincial hunting laws based on the NRTA are 
subject to the Sparrow justification test because treaty rights are not "merged and 
consolidated" in the NRTA. 
Carrier-Sekani Tribal Council v. Canada (Minister of the Environment) 
Federal Court of Appeal 
May 8,1992 
The tribal council sought to have a certain project subjected to a full environmental 
review. They brought an action in Federal Court in April 1988, but took no further 
steps after the defence was filed. The instant proceedings were commenced in 
October 1990 by originating motions for certiorari and mandamus against the 
execution of an Agreement, ministerial approvals, and orders-in-council, alleging 
breaches of fiduciary duties. Appeals were allowed granting a motion to strike the 
originating motions. The court did not discuss the content of the fiduciary duty of 
the Crown, and the actions were directed to the federal Crown in any event. 
Montana Band v. Canada 
Federal Court of Appeal 
October 8, 1992 
The appeals of the plaintiffs and third parties to overturn a decision of the motions 
judge refusing to strike the third party notice were dismissed. The Federal Court had 
jurisdiction over this matter which involved the issue of the relationship between 
Aboriginal peoples and the federal administration and governmbnt. 
Eastmain Band v. Canada (Federal Administrator) 
Federal Court of Appeal 
November 20,1992 
In construing the meaning of the 1975 James Bay and Northern ~ u e b e c  Agreement, 
the court held that the existence of the fiduciary relationship did not require every 
ambiguity in the agreement to construed in favour of the Aboriginal parties must be 
tempered by the Crown's need to have other interests in mind. It must seek a 
compromise between that interest and the interest of the whole of society. 
R. v. Vincent 
Court of Appeal for Ontario 
January 22, 1993 
The accused was found guilty of unlawful importation of goods into Canada. The 
court held that the Jay Treaty was not a treaty within the meaning of s. 35 and did 
not provide the accused with the right to import goods without paying duty. 
Carrier-Sekani Tribal Council v. Canada (Minister of the Environment) 
Supreme Court of Canada 
ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL FOR BRITISH COLUMBIA 
Application for leave to appeal dismissed February 4, 1993. 
An Alcan project affecting two rivers was exempted by the Minister of the 
Environment from compliance with the Environmental Assessment and Review 
Process Guidelines Order. The tribal council questioned the validity of the 
exemption order because it breached the Crown's fiduciary obligation to assess the 
environmental impacts of the project on the Applicant's Aboriginal rights and 
interests. A motion to strike was granted by the Court of Appeal. 
Blueberry River Indian Band v. Canada (DIAND) 
Federal Court of Appeal 
February 9, 1993 
Several allegations of breach of fiduciary duty by the federal government in selling 
rather than leasing surrendered reserve lands were rejected, although the existence 
of the fiduciary relationship prior to the surrender of land was accepted. The 
majority did agree that a breach took place when the Crown failed to get an 
appropriate price for the surrendered land that was sold, but then held that that claim 
was barred by the British Columbia 30-year ultimate limitation period. The dissent, 
however, accepted that a breach had occurred when the surrendered land was sold 
to Veterans'Affairs with mineral rights included and found that the circumstances 
were such that they amounted to an equitable fraud so that the limitation period did 
not preclude the claim. The case went on to the Supreme Court of Canada. 
R. v. Lewis 
British Columbia Court of Appeal 
June 25, 1993 
The Crown appealed the acquittal of the two accused of a breach of the federal 
Fishery Regulations. On appeal it was found that the Indian Band Bylaw which 
permitted fishing in the river to the centre line of the river was a complete defence. 
The two that were fishing on the reserve side were therefore acquitted. The further 
appeal was allowed. The jurisdiction of the Band council to make bylaws pursuant 
to section 81 (1)(0) of the Indian Act was limited to the territory encompassed by 
the boundaries of the reserve. "On reserve" under that provision was not to be 
liberally interpreted to include adjacent waters. The Aboriginal right to fish included 
only the right to harvest such fish as the Band required for sustenance and 
ceremonial purposes. Any fiduciary obligations the Crown may have had were met 
by unimpeded access of Band to the fishery in the river and their priority in 
harvesting it. 
R. v. Alphonse 
British Columbia Court of Appeal 
June 25,1993 
The accused appealed his conviction under the provincial Wildlife Act for hunting 
out of season. It was held on appeal that he had established a prima facie 
infringement of Aboriginal rights not justified by the Crown. The accused was 
exercising an unextinguished Aboriginal right. The Wildlife Act was a law of general 
application and was referentially incorporated by section 88 of the Indian Act. 
R. v. Van der Peet 
British Columbia Court of Appeal 
June 25,1993 
The appellant was charged with selling 10 salmon caught under the authority of an 
Indian food fish licence, contrary to federal Fishery Regulations, which prohibited 
the sale or barter of fish caught under such a licence. The restrictions imposed by 
the Regulations were alleged to infringe the appellant's aboriginal right to sell fish 
and accordingly were invalid because they violated s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 
1982. The Court of Appeal rejected the existence of a commercial right to fish. 
There is no discussion of the extent of the fiduciary relationship or the obligations 
that arise from it. 
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia 
British Columbia Court of Appeal 
June 25, 1993 
The Court of Appeal accepted the facts as found by the trial court, which declared 
that the plaintiffs had unextinguished and non-exclusive Aboriginal rights, other than 
ownership or property rights, in an area described by the court. However, their 
claim to ownership and jurisdiction was dismissed on the basis that any form of 
Indian self-government existing at the time British Columbia entered into 
Confederation, was superseded by the Constitution Act, as adopted by the Province. 
The court favoured a co-existence approach which would allow Indian culture to be 
preserved but ruled that native traditions, rules and regulations could not operate to 
the extent that they conflicted with the laws of the Province or of Canada. Thus, the 
claim that the Province's right to issue grants, licences, leases or permits was subject 
to the claim of Indian ownership and jurisdiction was dismissed. The only reference 
to the fiduciary relationship and the obligations of the Crown arising out of it was 
somewhat peripheral. The Court did observe that since the relationship in relation 
to the sale of their land provides a "guiding principle" for the application of s. 35 of 
the Constitution Act, 1982, then it must bear on the proper test to be applied to 
legislation purporting to extinguish Aboriginal title, because the honour of the 
Crown is engaged. The honour of the Crown, arising from its role as the historic 
protector of Aboriginal lands, requires a clear and plain intention to extinguish 
Aboriginal title that is express or manifested by unavoidable implication. 
Enoch Band of Stony Plain Indians v. Canada 
Federal Court of Appeal 
November 18,1993 
On June 30, 1975, the Appellants, the Band commenced action against Canada 
alleging that a surrender of land obtained by the Crown in 1908 was improperly 
obtained and thereby void, or that the Band had suffered damages thereby. The 
Court allowed the Band's appeal from the court-ordered deletion from their claim 
of paragraphs alleging against the Crown a breach of fiduciary duty for failure to 
ensure that the Band received independent legal advice before the surrender and a 
breach of trust in relation to the handling of monies from the surrender against the 
Crown. 
Skerryvore Ratepayers' Assn. v. Shawanaga Indian Band 
Court of Appeal for Ontario 
December 9, 1993 
The plaintiffs sought a declaration that a road which ran through unsurrendered 
Indian land was a public road. The public had used the road from 1850 until 1978, 
when the Band took the position that the road was a private road. The trial judge 
declared the road to be a public highway by virtue of the common law doctrine of 
dedication and in addition, or in the alternative, by virtue of s. 257 of the Municipal 
Act, which provides that "all roads passing through Indian lands . . . are common and 
public highways". The Band's appeal was allowed on the basis that the doctrine of 
dedication is inapplicable to unsurrendered Indian land because it is impossible to 
infer an intention to dedicate. Section 257 of the Municipal Act cannot mean that 
roads on or passing through Indian lands become public highways by the simple 
operation of that section; that would be legislation in relation to a matter coming 
within the exclusive legislative authority of Parliament and, as such, would be ultra 
vires. 
Ryan v. British Columbia (Ministry of Forests, District Manager) 
British Columbia Court of Appeal (In Chambers) 
February 1, 1994 
An application to stay the operation of a cutting permit pending appeal was 
dismissed. The Gitksan contended that the cutting permit was issued without notice 
to them, and that it was invalid because it was issued without the consultation with 
them that is required by the rules of natural justice, the doctrine of administrative 
fairness and the doctrine of legitimate expectation. The chambers judge rejected all 
of these allegations, but said he "accepted" that the Gitksan are entitled to be 
consulted in respect of such activities because the Forest Act itself and the 
fiduciary obligations toward Native Indians discussed in Delgamuukw, 
establish that right beyond question. However, consultation did not work here 
because the Gitksan did not want it to work. The process was impeded by their 
persistent refusal to take part in the process unless their fundamental demands for 
control were met. 
Quebec (Attorney General) v. Canada (National Energy Board) 
Supreme Court of Canada 
February 24, 1994 
The Board was required to determine whether or not certain licences to export 
electrical power would be issued. The Court held that while there is a fiduciary 
relationship between the federal Crown and the Aboriginal peoples of Canada, the 
function of the Board is quasi-judicial and inherently inconsistent with the imposition 
of a relationship of utmost good faith between the Board and a party appearing 
before it. The fiduciary relationship between the Crown and the appellants does not 
impose a duty on the Board to make its decisions in the appellants' best interests, or 
to change its hearing process so as to impose superadded requirements of disclosure. 
R. v. Wolfe 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal 
September 12, 1995 
The accused was charged with trafficking in wildlife, contrary to provincial wildlife 
laws enacted further to the authority provided to the province in the NRTA. The 
charges resulted from a sting operation in which undercover officers brought liquor 
onto the reserve, which was a "dryflreserve. The court held that this use of alcohol 
in breach of the treaty cannot be justified by reference to principles of wildlife 
conservation. Sparrow and Bear Island require that this law enforcement be 
undertaken in a manner which fulfils the Crown's fiduciary obligations. 
Blueberry River Indian Band v. Canada (DIAND) 
Supreme Court of Canada 
December 14, 1995 
Action was talcen against the federal Crown in relation to the inadvertent surrender 
of mines and minerals from reserve lands. The Court held that the Crown's fiduciary 
obligations in relation to surrenders extended only to the point of preventing 
exploitative bargains. However, the Crown's failure to reserve mines and minerals 
to the benefit of the Indian when the surrendered land was sold, contrary to the usual 
policy, was an error that the Crown had power to and should have rectified. Federal 
Crown found to have breached its fiduciary obligations to the Band in failing to 
rectify this error as soon as the error was discovered. 
R. v. Jack 
British Columbia Court of Appeal 
December 20, 1995 
The defendants appealed their convictions under federal fishery regulations for 
un la f i l ly  fishing in an area and at a time not authorized by law. He possessed an 
Aboriginal right to fish, including the right to fish for food and social and ceremonial 
purposes in certain areas. He fished for salmon for his son's wedding in these areas 
at a time not authorized by law without a licence or permit. The trial judge found 
that a closure order, made for the preservation of fish, breached the defendant's 
constitutional right to fish and found him not guilty. This judgment was reversed on 
appeal. The Appeal Court Judge foundprima facie infringement of the defendant's 
Aboriginal right to fish but concluded that there was a valid legislative objective for 
the infringement which was justified. 
R. v. Little 
British Columbia Court of Appeal 
December 20, 1995 
The defendant appealed from his conviction for fishing without a permit and 
unlawfbl possession of fish. At issue was whether conservation measures instituted 
by the Department of Fisheries and Oceans were constitutionally impermissible 
interferences with the defendant's treaty right to fish as a descendant of the 
signatories to the Douglas Treaty. The treaty included the areas on which the 
defendant fished. The trial judge held that there was aprima facie infringement of 
the defendant's treaty rights but that there was a valid legislative objective to the 
prohibitions with regard to retention and use of gill nets. The Court of Appeal 
allowed the appeal and acquitted the defendant. The allocation of priorities under the 
Regulations and policies did not comply with section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 
1982, in relation to the treaty right to fish. There was evidence from which it could 
be inferred that the policy adopted had the effect of accommodating the interest of 
the commercial fishery and the economic benefits brought to the Province by sports 
fishery at the expense of conservation and Aboriginal food fishing rights. 
Canada (Attorney General) v. Fontaine 
Manitoba Court of Appeal 
February 15,1996 
This was an appeal by Fontaine, an agent for the Sagkeeng First Nation, from a 
decision allowing an application by the Attorney General to discharge a caveat. The 
caveat was filed with regard to a parcel of land. The First Nation claimed that the 
sale of the land which included the parcel, was in breach of the Indian Act and the 
fiduciary duty of the Crown. The motions judge concluded that the agent could not 
establish a prima facie case that the First Nation held an interest in the land. The 
appeal was dismissed. The claim to the land was speculative as revealed by the 
statement on the agent's affidavit that further research was required to determine 
whether the sale was invalid. 
R. v. Badger 
Supreme Court of Canada 
April 3, 1996 
The accused were charged with hunting out of season under provincial legislation. 
The Court held that the NRTA did not extinguish the treaty right to hunt for food. 
Absent direct conflict, treaty rights continue. The right to hunt for food referred to 
in the NRTA may therefore be different from one treaty to another. The 
geographical limitation on the existing hunting right should be based on a concept 
of visible, incompatible land use, consistent with the oral promises made to the 
Indians at the time the Treaty was signed. Even though the provincial law is enacted 
under the authority of the NRTA, the Sparrow justification text must be met so that 
it is necessary for the Crown to prove more than that the legislation is for 
conservation purposes. 
R. v. Lewis 
Supreme Court of Canada 
April 25, 1996 
The Court held that even if the process of reserve allotment in British Columbia was 
to protect the prior rights of Indian nations by the establishment of reserves, the 
Crown did not breach its fiduciary duty, even if one existed at the time of allotment. 
Any fiduciary obligation on the part of the Crown to secure access to the fishery for 
the Squamish Indian Band was honoured by providing fishing stations for their use. 
The fact that the Crown did not secure a larger access to the fishery for the 
Squamish Indian Band, in addition to the fishing stations, did not amount to 
exploitation 
R. v. Gladstone 
Supreme Court of Canada 
August 2 1,1996 
The accused were charged under federal fishery legislation with attempting to sell 
herring spawn on kelp caught without the proper licence contrary to s. 20(3) of the 
Pacific Herring Fishery Regulations. The appeal against conviction was allowed. 
The fiduciary relationship was referred to only in the connection with its requirement 
that priority be provided to Aboriginal fishing rights as an element of the Sparrow 
justification test. 
R. v. N.T.C. Smokehouse Ltd. 
Supreme Court of Canada 
August 2 1,1996 
Charges were laid under federal fishery regulations. The Court did not discuss the 
fiduciary relationship because it found that there was no commercial right to fish 
established. 
R. v. Van der Peet 
Supreme Court of Canada 
August 2 1,1996 
The case deals with federal fishery regulations and discusses extensively how to 
define an existing Aboriginal right and invokes the fiduciary relationship as the 
reason why any ambiguity relating to the scope and application of s. 35 must be 
resolved in favour of Aboriginal peoples. 
R. v. Adams 
Supreme Court of Canada 
October 3, 1996 
Adams was charged with fishing without a licence on Lake St. Francis, Quebec, 
contrary to s. 4(1) of the Quebec Fishery Regulations. A special licence issued under 
ministerial permit authorizing native persons to fish for food may have been available 
under s. 5(9) but he did not apply for such permission. The appellant was convicted 
at trial and this conviction was upheld on appeal. The hndamental issue was 
whether Aboriginal rights are inherently based in claims to land, or whether claims 
to land are simply one manifestation of a broader-based conception of Aboriginal 
rights. The Supreme Court took the latter approach, based on the fiduciary 
relationship, holding that Parliament cannot adopt an unstructured discretionary 
administrative regime which risks infringing Aboriginal rights. The statute or its 
regulations must outline specific criteria for the granting or refusal of the discretion 
which seek to accommodate the existence of aboriginal rights. The absence of such 
criteria will result in the statute being found to represent an infringement of 
Aboriginal rights under the Sparrow test. 
R. v. C8tC 
Supreme Court of Canada 
October 3, 1996 
The accused was charged and originally convicted of offences under federal fishery 
regulations and provincial wildlife legislation. The issue that arose was whether a 
provincial regulation infringing a treaty right to fish was of no force or effect given 
the overlapping statutory and constitutional protection extended to treaty rights from 
provincial legislation under both s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, and s. 88 
of the Indian Act. The provincial law that required the payment of a fee to enter 
certain controlled zones by vehicle was held not to infringe any Aboriginal or treaty 
right to fish because the accused could have gained access to the area by other 
means. 
Batchewana Indian Band (Non-resident members) v. Batchewana Indian Band 
Federal Court of Appeal 
November 20,1996 
The issues in this case was whether or not the provision of the Indian Act requiring 
persons who vote for Chief and Council to be ordinarily resident on the reserve was 
valid. An allegation that this provision on the Act was in breach of the Crown's 
fiduciary obligations was not addressed, although it was described as novel. 
Chippewas of Kettle & Stony Point v. Canada (Attorney General) 
Court of Appeal for Ontario 
December 2, 1996 
The eventual purchasers of surrendered land were present at the meeting at which 
the land was surrendered to the federal Crown. The purchasers were permitted by 
the Indian agent to pay $5 cash to each voting member in attendance and an 
additional $10 subsequently. At the meeting, he had apparently offered to pay $100 
per acre, but, after discussions, he and the Band came to an arrangement in which 
he would pay $85 per acre plus a $15 bonus directly to Band members. This scheme 
was beneficial to the Band members because under the statutory scheme, the 
maximum sum that could be distributed would be 50 per cent of the sale proceeds 
after closing and after reductions for the Band's debts. 
The Band sued the federal Crown, property-owners who owned the surrendered 
land, and others for a declaration that the surrender and the Crown patent were void. 
(The Band also sued for damages including a claim against the Crown for breach of 
fiduciary duty.) On a motion for summary judgment, Killeen J. dismissed the Band's 
claim for declaratory relief. The Band appealed and the appeal was dismissed. 
The court held that the Band understood that it was surrendering to the Crown the 
reserve land and intended to do so. There was no evidence to suggest that the cash 
payments vitiated the true intent or the free and informed consent of the Band. 
However the band's claim of damages for a breach of fiduciary duty could be 
litigated. 
R. v. Marshall 
Nova Scotia Court of Appeal 
March 26, 1997 
The Court held that the accused had not established a treaty right to fish. There was 
no discussion of the fiduciary relationship. 
Opetchesaht Indian Band v. Canada 
Supreme Court of Canada 
May 22, 1997 
In 1959, the Crown, with the consent of the Opetchesaht band council, granted 
Hydro a right-of-way for an electric power transmission line across the band's 
reserve "for such period of time as the . . . right-of-way is required for the purpose 
of" a transmission line. The band applied to the Supreme Court of British Columbia 
for a declaration that the Indian Act did not authorize the grant of a right-of-way for 
an indefinite period of time. The Court held that the permit was valid, despite the 
lack of a specific date for its expiration. There is no discussion of the fiduciary 
relationship. 
Perry v. Ontario 
Court of Appeal for Ontario 
June 5, 1997 
Perry was a non-status Algonquin Indian, charged with hunting and fishing offences. 
He challenged the constitutionality of those charges under s. 15(1) of the Charter, 
on the ground that Ontario's "Interim Enforcement Policy," which was designed as 
a step toward legislative recognition of constitutionally protected Aboriginal and 
treaty rights under R. v. Sparrow, discriminated against non-status Indians. 
Smiahmoo Indian Band v. Canada 
Federal Court of Appeal 
June 24, 1997 
Federal Crown obtaining absolute surrender of reserve land as needed to expand 
customs facilities. Most of surrendered land remaining unused for customs facilities, 
other public purpose for 40 years, but the Crown refused to return the land to the 
Band. 
Samson Indian Nation and Band v. Canada 
Federal Court of Appeal 
October 27, 1997 
The band sought disclosure of documents in an action relating to a surrender of 
reserve lands. The court held that the fiduciary relationship required disclosure of 
documents relating to the Crown's administration of its trust-like responsibilities. 
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia 
Supreme Court of Canada 
December 1 1, 1997 
In an action originally claiming ownership and control of a large area ofthe province, 
and converted to a claim for self-government, the court held that the provincial 
Crown has no jurisdiction to extinguish Aboriginal title as the power to extinguish 
between 1867 and 1982 falls within federal jurisdiction under s.9 l(24). The court 
discusses the scope of the fiduciary duty of the Crown in the context ofjustification. 
Kitkatla Band v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests) 
British Columbia Court of Appeal 
June 25, 1998 
This was an application by the Kitkatla Band for an interlocutory injunction. The 
Band brought a claim for Aboriginal title to Crown land. The respondent Minister 
of Forests licensed the respondent, Interfor, to harvest timber from the land. The 
Court refused a Band application for an interlocutory injunction barring Interfor 
from logging the land pending resolution of its title claim. The Band argued that the 
trees to be cut under the licence were evidence for its Aboriginal title claim. It 
applied to the Court of Appeal for an interlocutory injunction preventing logging 
activity pending resolution of its appeal from the refusal of the Court to grant the 
initial interlocutory injunction. 
Canadian National Railway Co. v. Matsqui Indian Band 
Federal Court of Appeal 
July 2, 1998 
These were appeals by the railway companies from applications to set aside property 
tax assessment notices. Property tax assessment notices were issued on behalf of 
various Indian bands in respect of lands held by a number of railway companies. 
Applications for judicial review were allowed, and the notices taxing the railway 
companies were set aside as being outside the taxing jurisdiction of the Indian bands. 
On appeal, the issue was whether the lands in question were lands in the reserve 
within the meaning of the Indian Act so to be subject to taxation pursuant to section 
83(l)(a) of the Indian Act. The Court acknowledged that the fiduciary relationship 
affected the interpretation to be provided to the Act. Both Indian bands involved in 
the appeal understood and accepted that the lands in question had been surrendered 
absolutely for the construction of the railway. The surrendered lands were no 
longer part of the reserve, and the Indian bands could no longer effectively exercise 
their local government powers over the lands. 
Imperial Oil Resources Ltd. v. Canada (Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern 
Development) 
Federal Court of Appeal 
November 16, 1998 
The Samson Cree Nation brought a motion to be added as a party, appellant, or in 
the alternative, an intervenor, in an appeal from the following order made by a 
Motions Judge to quash a decision of the Minister under the Indian Oil and Gas 
Regulations. The relationship of the Samson Cree Nation and the appellant is that 
of beneficiary and trustee and the subject matter of the dispute between the parties 
to the appeal could affect the band's entitlement under certain oil and gas leases 
between the parties to the appeal. In other words, the financial interest of the 
Samson Cree Nation could be affected by the outcome of this appeal. The court 
held that refusal of the motion to participate in this appeal would not result in any 
prejudice to the Samson Cree Nation, since the federal Crown has an obligation as 
trustee to protect its interest and, if it fails to discharge that obligation, the Samson 
Cree Nation has its remedy either in the ongoing litigation for breach of trust or 
otherwise at law or in equity. 
Musqueam Indian Band v. Glass 
Federal Court of Appeal 
December 2 1, 1998 
The case involved a dispute over the value of Indian land surrendered for lease. The 
fiduciary obligations of the federal Crown in dealing with surrendered lands for the 
benefit of the Indians is referred to. 
Watt v. Liebelt 
Federal Court of Appeal 
December 30, 1998 
An adjudicator under the Immigration Act determined that Watt could not stay in 
Canada because of certain criminal convictions, rejecting his claim that the Act 
infringed an Aboriginal or treaty right. The Court held that the mere fact of the 
enactment of the Act could not be taken to have extinguished a right. There were 
many other related issues concerning which the adjudicator did not have sufficient 
evidence to determine. 
Osoyoos Indian Band v. Oliver (Town) 
British Columbia Court of Appeal 
May 4,1999 
The case considers the fiduciary obligations arising on surrender of reserve lands 
through an expropriation by Canada for provincial needs. 
Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. Matsqui Indian Band 
Federal Court of Appeal 
June 25,1999 
Notices of assessment were issued pursuant to taxation by-laws made under Indian 
Act against Canadian Pacific with respect to rights-of-way traversing reserves in 
British Columbia. The fiduciary obligations arising out of he federal Crown' 
fiduciary relationship were referred to briefly. 
Halfway River First Nation v. British Columbia (Ministry of Forests) 
British Columbia Court of Appeal 
August 12,1999 
The band challenged the issuance of cutting permits by provincial officials in respect 
of lands comprising their traditional hunting areas on the basis that the issuing ofthe 
permits infringed their treaty right to hunt. The Court held that a treaty right to hunt 
did exist and was infringed, but the majority were of the view that the provincial 
officials were required to engage in consultation in order to justify infringing actions. 
Roberts v. Canada 
Federal Court of Appeal 
October 12, 1999 
Two bands brought actions against the federal Crown in respect of the allocation of 
certain reserve lands to each. The court held that there was no breach of any 
fiduciary obligation established. 
R. v. Marshall 
Supreme Court of Canada 
November 17,1999 
The accused, a Mi'kmaq Indian, was fishing with prohibited net a during close period 
and selling fish caught without a licence in violation of federal fishery regulations. 
The Court's obligation is to "choose from among the various possible interpretations 
of the common intention [at the time the treaty was made] the one which best 
reconciles" the Mi'krnaq interests and hose ofthe British Crown. The Court held that 
Marshall had established a treaty right to maintain a small scale eel fishery and the 
Crown had made no effort to justify its infringing legislation. 
R. v. Marshall 
Supreme Court of Canada 
November 17,1999 
MOTION FOR REHEARING AND STAY 
The motion for a rehearing was made by one of the interveners, the West Nova 
Fisherman's coalition, who were seeking a further trial on the issue ofwhether or not 
the infringing legislation could be justified on grounds other than conservation. The 
Court held there were no grounds on which to grant the application. However, the 
Court went on to point out that although in this case the Crown chose not to attempt 
to justify its legislation, that should not be interpreted as a blanket statement that no 
limitations on Aboriginal fishing rights were possible. 
Bear Island Foundation v. Ontario 
Ontario Court of Appeal 
November 1 5,1999 
The Supreme Court of Canada had previously decided that any interest the Indian 
plaintiffs had in lands in northern Ontario had been extinguished by the Robinson 
Huron Treaty. The Court of Appeal now held that the proper interpretation of the 
Supreme Court's decision was that breach of the Treaty could preserve only a claim 
to compensation or related relief, but not an interest in the land. Bear Island and the 
others had asserted one theory in the Bear Island case, that of Aboriginal title. They 
could not now assert new theories, as res judicata applied to the new theories. Even 
if res judicata did not apply, the parties had agreed that the Bear Island Case would 
decide the outcome of the caution appeals. 
Tsartlip Indian Band v. Canada (Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern 
Development) 
Federal Court of Appeal 
November 17,1999 
The appellants sought to set aside the Minister's decision to lease land on an Indian 
reserve. The Court held that the Crown was under no fiduciary obligation to Indian 
band when acting under s. 58(3) of the Indian Act and had to assess competing 
interests among band members. 
Ross River Dena Council Band v. Canada 
Yukon Territory Court of Appeal 
December 15, 1999 
The Band Council claimed that no tobacco tax was payable on reserve. The issue 
whether certain lands were "reserve lands" within the meaning of the Indian Act, so 
that the provisions of section 87 of that Act respecting taxation applied to result in 
a tobacco tax under territorial legislation being not applicable on the "reserve". The 
Court referred to the fiduciary relationship as guiding its interpretation of the Act. 
Transcanada Pipelines Ltd. v. Beardmore (Township) 
Ontario Court of Appeal 
April 5 ,  2000 
The case involved an appeal fiom a judicial review application concerning an order 
to amalgamate certain municipalities under provincial law. The Court of Appeal 
rejected the trial judge's holding that the commission that made the amalgamating 
order had an obligation to consult with First Nations within the municipalities, 
pointing out that such an obligation only arose when it was established that an 
Aboriginal or treaty right was infringed. 
Kitkatla Band v. British Columbia (Small Business, Tourism and Culture) 
British Columbia Court of Appeal 
January 19,2000 
An action was brought against a provincial official charged with the responsibility 
of issuing permits to cut down "cultwally modified trees". Issues included the 
question of whether provincial heritage legislation authorizing such permits was valid 
provincial legislation. The majority of the court held that the legislation was valid 
because it was not "in relation to Indians". Prowse, J.A. dissented, concluding that 
the legislation was in pith and substance in relation to the core of Indianness and 
therefore invalid. A second issue was whether or not the issuance of such a permit 
derogated from Aboriginal rights, contrary to section 8 ofthe provincial Act (similar 
to section 25 of the Charter). The majority held that the section did not require the 
Minister to determine what Aboriginal rights existed, but only that Aboriginal rights 
once established were protected. 
The only reference to "fiduciary" occurs in paragraph 90 where Braidwood JA refers 
to the argument made by the Band that the Minister should first determine the scope 
of the asserted Aboriginal rights and then act to protect them, as required by section 
8. Braidwood quotes from R v. Adams, although Adams dealt with a breach of 
federal fishery regulations, not a provincial law. Braidwood made no reference to 
this different context. 
Chippewas of Sarnia Band v. Canada (Attorney General) 
Ontario Court of Appeal 
January 27,2000 
An application by the Chippewas of Sarnia Band to quash an appeal brought by 
Ontario and a cross-appeal by Canada was dismissed. The Chippewas maintain that 
their Aboriginal title and treaty rights in the disputed lands were never surrendered. 
They were seeking a declaration that their title to the disputed land was never 
extinguished and that they have the exclusive right to occupy, enjoy and possess the 
lands. They also sought damages from Ontario and Canada for breach of fiduciary 
duty, breach of treaty obligations and conversion. 
Animal Alliance of Canada v. Canada (Attorney General) 
Federal Court of Appeal 
September 7,2000 
An appeal was taken from a decision dismissing most aspects of the appellants' 
challenge,to the validity of the March 25,1999 Regulations Amending the Migratory 
Birds Regulations, which extended the hunting season for certain geese. The stated 
reason for the regulation was to check what the government experts believed was 
an overabundance of snow geese. Representatives of the Dene nation asserted that 
"the Canadian Wildlife Service is in violation of treaty rights by advocating measures 
that directly impact on our communities without adequate and proper consultation 
with aboriginal people as required under judicial law." 
Skeetchestn Indian Band v. British Columbia (Registrar of Land Titles) 
British Columbia Court of Appeal 
September 26,2000 
The band attempted to register lispendens against land that was subject to its claim 
of Aboriginal title. The Court held that such interests could not be protected in the 
land titles system. There was no discussion of the fiduciary relationship. 
APPENDIX C 
Saskatchewan Aboriginal Fiduciary Cases 
Lac La Ronge Indian Band v. Canada 
[I9991 S.J. No. 773 
999 SKQB 21 8 
Q.B. No. 2655 of 1987 J.C.S. 
Sasltatchewan Court of Queen's Bench 
Judicial Centre of Sasltatoon 
Gerein J. 
November 3 0,1999 
The Court concluded that it was not necessary to decide the issues in question in this 
case on the fiduciary relationship, which he characterized as being "between Canada 
and Indian peoples". He held that the land in question either passed to 
Saskatchewan, which would not result in a fiduciary relationship arising because "all 
the characteristics are not present" in that "Canada does not possess an exclusive 
power or discretion". The other possibility was that the land remained with Canada, 
but in that case Canada's failure to create the reserve was a breach of the Treaty, not 
a breach of a fiduciary obligation. 
R. v. Bear Claw Casino Ltd. 
[I9941 S.J. No. 485 
Sasltatchewan Provincial Court 
Carlyle, Saskatchewan 
Goliath Prov. Ct. J. 
October 4, 1994 
The accused were charged with Criminal Code offences relating to illegal gambling. 
The Court did not rule on defences based on s. 35 but acquitted the accused on the 
basis of reasonable doubt. 
R. v. Catarat 
[I9981 S.J. No. 601 
Sasltatchewan Provincial Court 
Buffalo Narrows, Saskatchewan 
Nightingale Prov. Ct. J. 
August 26,1998. 
Five members of the Buffalo River Dene Nation flew to Watapi Lake, in the Cold 
Lake Air Weapons Range, in order to hunt. They were charged with unlawfully 
entering a controlled access area, namely the Cold Lake Air Weapons Range, 
contrary to Section 4 of the Defence Controlled Area Regulations and Section 288 
of the National Defence Act and also with a contravention of the provincial Wildlife 
Act. Saskatchewan conceded that the only reason that the accused were or could be 
guilty of a breach of the provincial legislation was because they were forbidden by 
Canada to hunt on the Range. The judge held that their right to hunt under Treaty 
10 was infringed. He also held that the infringement was not justified because there 
was no valid legislative objective and the honour of the Crown was not maintained 
by charging these accused while permitting others access to the Range to hunt. 
R. v. Catarat 
[I9991 S.J. No. 612 
1999 SKQB 28 
Q.B.A. No. 19 of 1998 J.C.B. 
Saskatchewan Court of Queen's Bench 
Judicial Centre of Battleford 
Krueger J. 
August 25,1999 
The Court held that it is settled law that a treaty will be modified to the extent that 
the NRTA evinces a clear intention to effect such a modification. The issue was 
whether the Range was unoccupied Crown land within the meaning of the NRTA. 
The Court held that it was not, but went on to find that the accused may have had 
implied permission to hunt there and referred the matter back to the trial judge to 
hear further evidence on this point. 
R. v. Couillonneur 
[I9961 S.J. No. 305 
DRS 96- 143 1 1 
Saskatchewan Provincial Court 
Judicial District of Beauval 
Nightingale Prov. Ct. J. 
May 28,1996 
The accused was charged with fishing with a gill net smaller than allowed under the 
Regulations under the federal Fisheries Act. He argued that the Regulations were 
an unjustified infringement of his right to fish as guaranteed under section 35 of the 
Constitution Act. The Court held that because the Government had organized 
management of the fishery in a manner giving priority to Aboriginal fishing rights - 
by clearly reserving to them status as "first users" of the fishery - it had honoured its 
fiduciary duties. 
R. v. Ironeagle 
[I9991 S.J. No. 737 
Saskatchewan Provincial Court 
Fort Qu'Appelle, Saskatchewan 
Moxley Prov. Ct. J. 
November 8, 1999. 
The accused was charged with several violations of The Fisheries Regulations made 
under The Fisheries Act, (Saskatchewan) 1994. The charges were dismissed based 
on an entrapment defence. 
R. v. Janvier 
[I9951 S.J. No. 796 
DRS 96-16058 
Saskatchewan Provincial Court 
Meadow Lalte, Saskatchewan 
White Prov. Ct. J. 
July 27, 1995. 
The accused was hunting for food on Crown land. owned by the Crown in an area 
that formed part of a traditional native hunting ground. Janvier was a member of a 
band which was permitted by treaty to hunt on unoccupied Crown land. The Crown 
alleged that Janvier had hunted on occupied Crown land. The land was leased to 
ranchers for grazing purposes. Janvier argued that the land was unoccupied. Guided 
in its interpretation by the fiduciary relationship and the obligations arising out of it 
and following Badger, the Court held that the lands were not occupied because they 
were not actually or visibly in use. 
R. v. Keepness 
[I9991 S.J. No. 869 
Saskatchewan Provincial Court 
Saskatoon, Sasltatchewan 
Smith Prov. Ct. J. 
December 17, 1999 
The accused was charged with trafficking in wildlife, contrary to provincial 
legislation. The Court held that since the sale of deer meet took place on resesve, 
the Indian Act applied, not provincial law. 
R. v. McIntyre 
[I9901 S.J. No. 694 
Sasltatchewan Provincial Court 
LaRonge, Sasltatchewan 
Fafard Prov. Ct. J. 
November 20, 1990. 
A Treaty Indian was charged with offences related to hunting in violation of the 
Saskatchewan Wildlife Act and its regulations. The treaty right to hunt is limited by 
the NRTA to the right to hunt for food only. The question at issue was whether or 
not the Crown, in creating the Road Corridor Game Preserve, occupied the land in 
a constitutionally valid manner, that is, respecting the fiduciary duty of the Crown 
towards the Indians. The Court found that there had been no consultation with the 
Indians of the band in planning the game preserve and no priority given to their 
hunting rights. Therefore the Court found that the infringing legislation was not 
justified. 
R. v. Morin 
[I9961 S.J. No. 262 
DRS 96-1 1555 
Saskatchewan Provincial Court 
Judicial District of Buffalo Narrows 
Meagher Prov. Ct. J. 
April 24, 1996 
The accused were charged with several violations of the Saskatchewan Fisheries 
Regulations made pursuant to the Fisheries Act R.S.C., c. F-14. The Court found 
that as MCtis they had an Aboriginal right to fish and that the legislation was an 
infringement of their right to equality under the law as guaranteed by Section 15(1) 
of the Charter, with the result that it has no force or effect as against the Defendants. 
R. v. Morin 
[I9961 S.J. No. 888 
DRS 97-1 3479 
Q.B.A. No. 11 of 1996 J.C.B. 
Saskatchewan Court of Queen's Bench 
Judicial District of Battleford 
Krueger J. 
December 13, 1996. 
Leave was granted to the MCtis Nation of Saskatchewan and the Metis Nation of Canada to 
intervene on the Crown's appeal of an acquittal of a hunting charge based on an Aboriginal 
right to hunt. The issues involving the scope of the Crown's fiduciary duty justified allowing 
the applicants to intervene. 
R. v. Morin 
[I9971 S.J. No. 529 
DRS 97-14386 
Q.B. No. 11 of 1996 J.C.B. 
Saskatchewan Court of Queen's Bench 
Judicial Centre of Battleford 
Laing J. 
September 8, 1997 
Morin and Daigneault were Metis charged with six fisheries offences. They were acquitted 
at trial of certain of the charges on the basis that they had an Aboriginal right to fish. They 
claimed that the Saslcatchewan Fishery Regulations infringed this constitutional right. The 
Crown appealed the acquittals. The court held that the accused had a right to fish for food, 
which was infringed and not justified. 
R. v. Wolfe 
[I9951 S.J. No. 501 
DRS 95-20409 
Appeal File No. 6003 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal 
Vancise, Gerwing and Jackson JJ.A. 
September 12, 1995. 
The accused was charged with trafficking in wildlife, contrary to provincial wildlife laws 
enacted further to the authority provided to the province in the NRTA. The charges resulted 
from a sting operation in which undercover officers brought liquor onto the reserve, which 
was a "dry"reserve. The court held that this use of alcohol in breach of the treaty cannot be 
justified by reference to principles of wildlife conservation. Sparrow and Bear Island require 
that this law enforcement be undertaken in a manner which fulfils the Crown's fiduciary 
obligations. 
Yellow Quill First Nation v. Saskatchewan (Minister of Environment and Resource 
Management) 
[I9991 S.J. No. 712 
1999 SKQB 82 
Q.B. No. 1910 of 1999 J.C.S. 
Saskatchewan Court of Queen's Bench 
Judicial Centre of Saskatoon 
Krueger J. 
September 20, 1999 
Yellow Quill First Nation applied ex parte for an order staying the operation of the forest 
management agreement between the respondents, the Minister of Environment and Resource 
Management and SaskFor MacMillan Limited and for an interim injunction restraining 
SaskFor from logging a disputed, identified 46,080 acre parcel of land. The interim 
application dealt with the narrow issue of the staylinjunction. 
Yellow Quill claimed the disputed area as traditional, sacred territory. It advanced 
contractual, Aboriginal and treaty rights to the disputed area and alleged that the Crown had 
breached its fiduciary duty in not dealing with Yellow Quill in a fair and honourable manner. 
The court accepted that there was a serious case to be tried in these allegations, but there was 
not a sufficient foundation for an interim injunction. 
